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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report by the Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation responds 
to a request from the Council of Ministers for a study of the effects of plant closings 
on the principle of freedom of association and the right to organize in the three coun-
tries that negotiated the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). 
In February 1996, the Council of Ministers called for this report following minis-
terial consultations initiated by Mexico on a plant closing that occurred in the United 
States during a union organizing campaign. This is the first special report by the 
Secretariat under Article 14 of the NAALC, which provides for special reports on 
"any matter as the Council may request." 
Under terms of reference for this report adopted by the Council, the Secretariat 
was asked to look at the implications of plant closings as related to (1) the right to 
organize, (2) how workplace closings are addressed in the legal systems and how laws 
related to closings are enforced, (3) the experience of labor tribunals and courts with 
this issue, (4) implications for labor market adjustment, and (5) other issues for future 
consideration. The Secretariat was instructed to complete its report in 6 months. 
INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND TERMS OF REFERENCE 
The introduction to the report provides general information on the background 
and terms of reference. Mexico requested ministerial consultations after a report is-
sued by its National Administrative Office (NAO) expressed .concern about the ef-
fectiveness of U.S. law in dealing with a plant closing related to union organizing. 
The Mexican NAO report followed a submission by the Mexican telephone workers 
union on the 1994 closing of La Conexion Familiar', a California-based division of the 
Sprint Corporation, 1 week before a union representation election was to be held.1 
1
 This report does not revisit the specific case that gave rise to the consultation, which is under 
consideration by domestic labor law authorities of the United States. In August 1995, an Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the employer committed numerous unfair labor practices, 
including threats of plant closing. However, the ALJ ruled that the plant closing itself was moti-
vated by economic considerations, not by anti-union animus. 
In December 1996, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) overruled the ALJ deci-
sion, finding that the closing was unlawful discrimination for anti-union rqasons. The NLRB 
upheld the ALJ decision with respect to other unfair labor practices. The Board ordered Sprint to 
rehire affected workers into positions at other company facilities. The Board's decision has been 
appealed to a federal appeals court. See LCF, Inc., d/b/a La Conexion FaftdOi&pand Sprint Corpo-
ration, 322 NLRB 137 (1996). 
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NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
The notes on methodology describe the research plan for the report. The terms of 
reference called for a study of the effects on freedom of association and the right to 
organize. In an effort to develop a new factual basis to improve understanding of these 
issues, a research plan was developed to be as empirical as possible within the given 
time frame. The research plan was formulated in consultation with the labor depart-
ments of the three N AALC countries and was adapted to differences in the legal 
systems and the union organizing systems of the three countries. The plan also took 
into account differences in the availability of resources and research infrastructure 
needed to complete the study in the specified 6-month time frame. The research plan 
called for legal research into the different labor law systems, commentary and analysis by 
knowledgeable labor specialists, examination of the actions of labor boards and courts, 
review of literature, and a special survey of union representatives in the United States. 
PART ONE: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
Part One of the report describes the relevant legal framework for resolving plant 
closing cases in the three NAALC countries. In the United States and Canada, plant 
closings or threats of closing motivated by anti-union sentiment are defined as unfair 
labor practices. As such, they are prohibited under law and are subject to remedial 
action when an employer is found to have committed an unfair labor practice. The 
Mexican labor law system does not use the unfair labor practice concept. Instead, 
Mexican labor law specifies the permissible reasons for closing a plant. 
In all three NAALC countries, an employer may not close a plant or threaten to 
close a plant in reprisal for union activity, but may close a plant for valid economic 
considerations. In the United States, the law allows an employers express "any views, 
argument, or opinion" about plant closings or other possible consequences of union-
ization, as long as such expression contains no "threat of reprisal or force or promise of 
benefit." However, an employer may close a plant, even for anti-union reasons, when 
the plant closing is at the same time a cessation of the entire business. U.S. labor law 
is enforced throughout the United States by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or Board). 
Determining liability in an unfair labor practice (ULP) case is a multi-layered 
procedure under U.S. labor law. After a ULP charge is filed in a regional office of the 
NLRB, the regional director decides whether or not the charge has merit. If so, the 
regional director issues a complaint. A hearing on evidence is held before an Admin-
istrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the NLRB. The ALJ decision may then be appealed to 
the NLRB in Washington, D.C., for a review of the record ai}d an affirmation or 
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reversal, in whole or in part, of the ALJ determinations. The NLRB's decision may 
then be appealed to a federal court of appeals, and that court's decision can be ap-
pealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Canada, statutes generally permit employers to express views on unionization as 
long as the employer does not use "coercion, intimidation, threats, promises, or undue 
influence" (an example drawn from the Ontario statute—other provinces have similar 
rules). Canadian labor boards and courts generally prohibit an employer from acting, 
even in part, on the basis of anti-union motives, regardless of the existence of a valid 
business justification for the employer's actions. 
Canadian labor law is mainly within provincial jurisdiction and is enforced by the 
provincial governments. Provincial jurisdiction covers approximately 90 percent of 
the national workforce. Federal authorities enforce the law with respect to the other 10 
percent of the workforce that come under federal jurisdiction. 
Unfair labor practice cases in Canada are processed in more of a single-layered 
procedure. The relevant labor board or, in Quebec, the labor commissioner receives 
complaints, conducts investigations, holds hearings, and issues decisions in a single 
overall proceeding. Their decisions are generally not susceptible to appeal to the courts 
except on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds. 
In general, U.S. law permits wider latitude for employers to close a plant or to 
make statements about plant closings in connection with a unionization drive by work-
ers. Where both an anti-union motivation and an economic motivation exist, U.S. law 
looks for the predominant motive. Under Canadian law, any degree of anti-union 
motivation is generally sufficient to find an unfair labor practice. 
Mexico does not use the unfair labor practice system, and anti-union motivation 
does not arise explicitly as an issue for administrative or judicial determination. How-
ever, a plant closing can be found to be unlawful in Mexico by labor authorities if the 
closing is not undertaken for specified, legally valid reasons as defined in the Federal 
Labor Law (FLL). Provisions for "collective conflict of an economic nature" in 
Mexico's FLL create a detailed procedural mechanism for determining whether a 
plant closing conforms to the legal requirements. 
A plant closing threat is not unlawful in Mexico because the labor law addresses 
acts, not statements. Therefore, there are no administrative or judicial cases under 
Mexican labor law alleging anti-union threats of plant closing that can be included for 
study in this report. Such cases do arise in the United States and Canada. In both 
countries, the labor authorities determine liability on a case-by-case basis after analyz-
ing alleged plant closing threats in the overall context of employer conduct. Thus, the 
same employer statement alleged as an unlawful threat may be found to be lawful in 
one case and unlawful in another, depending on the overall context. 
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PART TWO: UNION ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 
Part Two discusses the typical process of organizing a union in each country. In the 
United States, workers may petition the NLRB to conduct a representation election if 
at least 30 percent of the employees request it. Unions normally wait until a majority 
of the employees have joined the union before petitioning for an election. 
NLRB representation elections are normally held within 30-60 days after the fil-
ing of a petition for the election. Of all elections, 20 percent are held more than 60 
days after the filing of a petition. The period between filing a petition and holding an 
election is often marked by vigorous pro- and anti-union campaigning in the work-
place by employees and by management. Such campaigns appear to be the typical 
settings that give rise to plant closings or threats of plant closing in response to union 
organizing efforts. 
The NLRB may certify a union as the collective bargaining representative where 
an employer's unlawful conduct has destroyed the union's majority support and made 
a fair election impossible. If a union is certified, the employer must bargain in good 
faith with the union. 
In Canada, the federal jurisdiction and a majority of provinces provide for union 
certification on the basis of authorization cards signed by a majority of workers and 
without the need to hold an election. This is known as the "card-check" method of 
union certification. When an election is held, it is usually within 5 days of the union's 
application for certification. Both the card-check system and the rapid election proce-
dure minimize the extent of sustained, aggressive campaigning in the workplace, al-
though campaigning does take place. 
Labor authorities may certify the union without an election when the employer's 
unlawful conduct destroys the conditions for free choice by employees. The employer 
must bargain in good faith with a certified union. Some provinces set forth conditions 
in which failure to achieve a first collective bargaining agreement in a newly certified 
bargaining unit can lead to binding arbitration for a first agreement. 
In Mexico, any group of 20 or more workers may form a union without an election 
taking place. They need not be a majority of the workforce. There is not normally a 
campaign for or against union organization in the workplace. With some regional and 
sectoral exceptions, unions are generally accepted as a normal feature of Mexico's 
labor relations system. 
After duly registering with the authorities, the union may demand that the em-
ployer sign a contract submitted by the union. If the employer signs, that union is 
considered to hold "title" to the collective bargaining agreement. If the employer re-
fuses to sign, the union may strike to obtain a contract. The employer may then de-
mand a strike vote to determine if a majority of workers support the strike. If not, the 
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strike must end and workers must return to work. The union continues to exist, but 
without title to a collective agreement. If a majority of workers supports the strike, the 
employer must cease operations, and the relevant Conciliation and Arbitration Board 
(CAB) of the federal or state jurisdiction generally mediates a settlement leading to 
titularidad (the holding of tide to the collective agreement) for the registered union. 
If another registered union claims support from workers already represented by a 
union that holds tide to the collective agreement, the labor authorities conduct an 
election to determine which union enjoys majority support. Thus, union representa-
tion elections in Mexico are held only when two unions compete for bargaining rights 
in an already organized workplace. 
PART THREE: REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL DATA 
Part Three reviews official records of labor tribunals in plant closing cases, yielding an 
appreciation of the frequency of cases in each country and how the labor law system deals 
with them. For the United States, additional survey research was undertaken.2 
United States 
U.S. labor law authorities actively prosecute unfair labor practice cases involving 
plant closings and threats of plant closing. They demonstrate a high level of success in 
litigation before the NLRB and the courts. However, despite this effective enforce-
ment, the incidence of anti-union plant closings and threats of plant closing continues 
with some frequency. There appears to be significant variation in the types of state-
ments employers are permitted to make about plant closings in connection with a 
union organizing effort. 
The Secretariat examined all 89 federal appeals court decisions in cases involving 
plant closings and threats of plant closing published between 1986 and 1993. Of the 
cases, 70 arose in the context of a new union organizing campaign. Closings or partial 
closings prompted 32 cases, and 57 cases involved threats of closing. Courts of ap-
peals upheld NLRB determinations that employers unlawfully closed or threatened 
to close plants in 84 of the 89 cases. 
2
 Experts in Canada and Mexico advised the Secretariat that a comparable survey could not 
be carried out in the 6-month time frame allotted for the study. Such a survey was not possible 
within the time both for technical reasons (immediate availability of databases, model question-
naires, mail-and-response systems, trained staff for telephone follow-up and for cfeding/tabulating/ 
entering data, etc.) and because of differences in legal systems. (In Mexico, and in many Canadian 
provinces, there is not an election and related campaign to achieve union rejgiysgnjation, making a 
comparable survey on campaign conduct not feasible.) 
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The Secretariat studied 319 decisions of the NLRB between 1990 and 1995 in-
volving plant closings and threats of closing. Of the total, 109 cases involved closings 
or partial closings, and 210 involved threats of closing. New union organizing cam-
paigns in non-union workplaces were involved in 275 of these cases, while 44 in-
volved existing unions. The NLRB found a violation by the employer in 283 of the 
319 cases. 
The Secretariat also looked at case files in two regional offices of the NLRB to 
determine the volume and disposition of cases that do not reach the level of a pub-
lished determination by an adjudicator. Findings suggest that for every case that reaches 
a published decision, 10 cases are initiated at the regional office level. More than half 
of these are withdrawn or dismissed. 
In more than 40 percent of cases where the regional office found merit in the charge, 
the NLRB General Counsel took the case to trial before an ALJ. This is 10 times the 
rate of enforcement in other cases of meritorious unfair labor practice charges against 
employers. These findings indicate that the NLRB takes plant closing cases very se-
riously and actively pursues them to a litigated conclusion. The General Counsel pre-
vails in nearly 90 percent of such cases. 
In the United States, resources were readily available to conduct survey research 
for information that could not be gleaned from administrative and judicial records. 
Union representatives surveyed reported what they believed to be plant closing threats 
occurring in half of the sampled union organizing campaigns during the 3-year pe-
riod studied, with a higher incidence in industries more susceptible to closing such as 
manufacturing, trucking, and warehousing. Perceived plant closing threats were the 
largest single factor identified by respondents who decided to withdraw an election 
petition they had earlier filed, thus discontinuing the organizing campaign. When 
unions proceeded to an election, the overall union win rate where plant closing threats 
were reported to have occurred was 33 percent, compared with 47 percent in elections 
where no threats were reported to have taken place. 
Canada 
Canadian federal and provincial labor laws on union organizing have generally 
established rapid procedures for union certification, either by card check or by an 
election within 5 days. This minimizes the "campaign" aspects of union organizing 
where plant closings or threats of closing tend to arise. 
Most Canadian jurisdictions hear and decide unfair labor practice cases in a single-
stage proceeding before the relevant labor board or commissioner. Those decisions 
normally are not appealable to the civil courts. This single-stage approach makes for 
relatively prompt final determinations. Canadian law appears to be quite strict in lim-
iting statements about plant closings made by employers during a union organizing 
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effort. In general, enforcement appears to have a significant effect on anti-union plant 
closings and threats of closing in Canada. 
The Secretariat examined 36 cases involving issues of anti-union closings and threats 
from 1986 to 1995. These were apparently all the cases on this subject decided by Canada's 
labor boards, labor commissioners, and civil courts combined during this 10-year period. 
British Columbia and Ontario were the sites of 25 of the Canadian cases. In con-
trast to the U.S. experience, where most cases involved threats of plant closing, the majority 
of Canadian cases involved plant closings rather than threats. Among the Canadian cases, 
21 involved new union organizing or first-contract bargaining, and 15 involved incumbent 
unions. Employers were found liable for unlawful conduct in 23 of the 36 cases. 
Mexico 
In Mexico, the labor law system and the union organizing system are fundamen-
tally different from the systems of the United States and Canada in the treatment of 
plant closings and threats of closing. There are not union organizing "campaigns" in 
Mexico where employers might seek to deter unionization by closing or threatening 
to close the plant. The certification process of union formation that occurs in the 
United States and Canada through an election or other determination of majority 
status does not exist in Mexico. Threats of plant closing that are not followed by an 
actual closing are not unlawful. Thus, there is no opportunity for "threat" cases to 
emerge in Mexican administrative and judicial data as they do in the United States 
and Canada. Moreover, once a union is formed, the law makes it difficult to carry out a 
threat to close without the union's consent. The employer must turn to the relevant CAB to 
obtain approval for closing in a proceeding where the union can challenge the closing. 
Mexican workers may normally form a union without eleptions, except where unions 
compete for representation rights in an already organized workplace. With exceptions 
in some maquiladora regions, most medium and large employers in the formal sector 
of the economy accept unions as an inevitable part of the industrial relations landscape 
in Mexico. Controversies sometimes arise in connection with disputes ovtv titularidad 
between two unions or leadership disputes within a union/but they generally do not 
give rise to legal cases or decisions where plant closings or threats of closing are at 
issue. 
The Federal Labor Law creates a complex procedure called "collective conflict of 
an economic nature" where employers must secure the permission of a federal or state 
labor board before closing a plant. A closing is justifiable only for a specific cause 
defined in the law, and unions have the opportunity to appear before the board to 
contest the closing on the grounds that it does not meet one of the statutory causes for 
closing. The procedure involves extensive hearings and testimony by financial experts 
and other expert witnesses. **** L^ 
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Secretariat researchers confirmed that this procedure is almost never used. In the 
Federal CAB and two state CABs visited by Secretariat researchers who examined 
thousands of case files, only five cases in 5 years involved the "collective conflict" 
plant closing procedure, which is contemplated in the law as the mechanism for un-
dertaking a plant closing. In contrast, more than 1,000 cases followed an alternative 
"voluntary termination" procedure under other provisions of the FLL. 
The most common alternative procedure in plant closings takes place under a pro-
vision for voluntary termination of the employment relationship through a "mutual 
consent" clause of the law. Workers and unions appear to prefer this more rapid, flex-
ible procedure, which results in a faster provision of severance pay to affected workers 
in place of a long, complex, and costly procedure that delays receipt of severance pay. 
It must be noted that statutorily required severance pay in Mexico, which can equal 
3 months' pay plus 12-20 days5 pay for each year of service, is significantly greater 
than customary or contractual severance pay in the United States or Canada. 
PART FOUR: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Part Four presents relevant contextual information on plant closings and worker 
displacement in labor markets in the three countries, and describes labor adjustment 
and social security systems to address such dislocations. This section discusses the 
constant "churning" in the labor markets of the three countries, reflected in frequent 
plant closings and high numbers of affected workers in all three countries. 
The U.S. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act requires 
advance notice of plant closings in large workplaces. Canadian federal and provincial 
statutes also provide for advance notice of closings^ Many statutes in Canada compel 
the creation of joint committees through which employers are to cooperate with em-
ployee representatives to search for alternative solutions to mass termination or to 
minimize the impact of termination on employees. Mexican law contains a procedure 
requiring permission from the appropriate CAB before a plant can be closed, although 
an alternative procedure for "mutual consent" usually replaces it. 
PART FIVE: SUMMARY AND ISSUES FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION 
Part Five summarizes the report and offers, pursuant to the terms of reference, 
"important issues for future consideration regarding this matter." Issues for future 
consideration include possible improvements to the quality and accessibility of ad-
ministrative data, particularly from dispersed regional, state, and local labor law au-
thorities, which would help to advance prospects for comparative international stud-
ies. Possibilities for further research are also indicated. ~** *^* 
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Also to be considered are links to labor relations initiatives in each country and in 
international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the International Labor Organization (ILO). These 
models are variously known as "codes of conduct," "model business principles," "prin-
ciples of ethics in labor relations," and "guidelines for multi-national corporations." 
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BACKGROUND AND TERMS OF REFERENCE 
THE COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION AND THE NAALC 
The Commission for Labor Cooperation is a new international organization cre-
ated by Canada, Mexico, and the United States under the North American Agree-
ment on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). Along with an agreement on environmental 
cooperation, the NAALC is one of two supplementary or "side" agreements to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAFTA and the two side 
agreements came into force on January 1, 1994. 
The NAALC sets forth Objectives that include promoting 11 basic labor principles 
promoting international cooperation, improving working conditions and living stan-
dards, and ensuring the effective enforcement of labor laws. Following these objec-
tives, the NAALC countries agree to a set of six Obligations that relate specifically to 
the effective enforcement of labor law. 
The NAALC's 11 Labor Principles define the scope of the agreement. Covering 
nearly all aspects of labor rights and labor standards, the principles are ones that the 
countries are committed to promote but those principles do not establish common 
laws or standards. However, the countries agree to open themselves up to reviews and 
consultations among themselves on all labor matters within the scope of the Agree-
ment. 
The NAALC is the first international labor agreement linked to a trade treaty. It 
creates an international discipline on the enforcement of domestic labor law, a major 
innovation in international labor affairs. In addition to review and consultation, the 
countries' obligations on effective labor law enforcement are subject to an Evaluation 
by an independent committee of experts and, in certain circumstances, to Dispute Reso-
lution by an independent arbitral panel. 
The Agreement also establishes an organizational structure. It involves a Commis-
sion for Labor Cooperation headed by a Council of Ministers responsible for labor in 
each nation, and an international Secretariat, located in Dallas, to support the Coun-
cil. Each government has also established a National Administrative Office (NAO) 
within each department or ministry of labor to receive communications from the pub-
lic in that country, provide information, and generally facilitate participation under 
the Agreement. 
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ROLE OF THE SECRETARIAT 
As the permanent staff organization of the Commission, the Secretariat has two 
main responsibilities. First, it assists the Ministerial Council in carrying out any of the 
Council's functions under the agreement, such as supporting an independent Evalu-
ation Committee of Experts or Arbitral Panel, which the Council may establish. Sec-
ond, the Secretariat prepares both periodic reports and special studies. Periodic re-
ports cover four broad areas: (1) labor law and administrative procedures, (2) the 
implementation and enforcement of labor law, (3) labor market conditions, and (4) 
human resource development issues. Special studies can be called for at any time on 
any matter that the Council considers necessary. This report on the effects of plant 
closings on workers' right to organize is the first such special study carried out under 
theNAALC. 
MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS 
Under Article 22 of the NAALC any country can formally request consultations at 
the level of the Council of Ministers to consider any matter within the scope of the 
Agreement. Ministerial Consultations may address issues pertaining to the enforce-
ment of labor laws, but are not restricted to such issues. Ministerial Consultations are 
a flexible mechanism by which the countries can engage one another formally, in a 
cooperative manner, at the highest political level (involving the Secretary or Minister 
of Labor) on issues of importance relevant to their Agreement. 
For most matters arising under the NAALC, Ministerial Consultations are a nec-
essary step before proceeding to independent evaluation and dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. However, matters regarding the enforcement of labor laws related to the first 
three labor principles (freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, 
the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike) can be the subject of only 
Ministerial Consultations. Such matters cannot be taken further in the evaluation and 
dispute resolution procedures of the NAALC. As a result, the conduct of Ministerial 
Consultations is very important for these matters. 
To date there have been two Ministerial Consultations completed under the 
NAALC, one at the request of the United States and the other at the request of Mexico. 
This study is an outcome of the second consultation. Both consultations have raised 
issues related to the enforcement of labor law regarding freedom of association and 
the right to organize a union. Both have originated as public communications that 
were submitted to and reviewed initially by the respective NAOs of the United States 
and Mexico. In both cases, the Ministers have concluded their consultations with 
announcements of follow-up programs involving conferences, workshops, studies, and 
other measures. In the consultation giving rise to this report, thg results included a 
forum open to the public conducted by officials of the governments. 
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CURRENT MINISTERIAL CONSULTATION AND SECRETARIAT SPECIAL STUDY 
Under Article 14 of the NAALC, the Secretariat is authorized to undertake spe-
cial studies as directed by the Council. This report was directed by the Council as part 
of its action plan following the Ministerial Consultation initiated by Mexico after 
review by the Mexican NAO of Submission No. 9501/NAOMEX. The Mexican 
NAO review was released May 31, 1995. The Ministers announced the results of 
their consultation on February 13, 1996 (see Appendix A). They called for a tri-
national study by the Secretariat on "the effects of the sudden closing of a plant on the 
principle of freedom of association and right of workers to organize in the three coun-
tries" to be completed within 6 months. 
Submission No. 9501/NAOMEX was filed by the Sindicato de Telefonistas de la 
Republica Mexicana (STRM) on February 9, 1995. The submission addressed the 
closing by Sprint Corporation of its La Conexion Familiar (LCF) facility in San Fran-
cisco on July 14, 1994. Sprint closed the LCF operation shortly before workers there 
were to vote in an NLRB-supervised election for union representation by the Communi-
cation Workers of America (CWA). The election had been scheduled for July 22,1994. 
The LCF closing affected 235 workers engaged in "telemarketing" long-distance 
telephone service to the Spanish-speaking population in the area. The union and em-
ployees filed a charge with the NLRB alleging that the closing of the workplace was the 
culmination of a series of illegal practices by the employer during the organizing campaign 
and was itself motivated by anti-union animus. The employer argued that the closing was 
motivated by the fact that the business was losing money and its place in the market. 
The regional office of the NLRB, acting as an arm of the General Counsel of the 
NLRB (which operates independendy from the Board itself), issued a complaint in 
the case after determining that there was enough evidence to take the case to trial 
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), part of another independent branch in 
the NLRB structure. In August 1995, the ALJ ruled that the employer committed 
over 50 unfair labor practices prior to the closing, including threats of plant closing, 
but that the closing itself was economically motivated. The union and the General 
Counsel appealed the ALJ decision to the Board. 
In December 1996, the NLRB issued a determination on the appeal of the ALJ 
decision. The Board overruled the ALJ on the plant closing issue, finding that the 
closing was motivated by unlawful anti-union considerations. The NLRB upheld the 
ALJ findings on other unfair labor practices committed by the employer. The Board 
ordered the employer to offer affected workers reinstatement at other operations of the 
employer and to pay back wages lost because of the unlawful closing.3 *, 
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In addition to calling on the Secretariat to undertake this study the Ministers an-
nounced that a public forum on the events surrounding this Ministerial Consultation 
would be held in San Francisco. The forum took place on February 27, 1996. A 
transcript of the forum is included at the end of this report. 
The NAALC does not provide the basis for any rehearing at an international level 
of the merits of any particular case that has been treated by domestic authorities. This 
report does not re-examine the originating case, but is devoted to a general examina-
tion of practices in all three countries over a period of years on general or systemic 
issues posed by that specific case, especially as they relate to the administration of 
labor law. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N : B A C K G R O U N D A N D T E R M S OF R E F E R E N C E 
Terms of Reference 
The Council adopted the following terms of reference for the Secretariat's study: 
Effects of Sudden Plant Closings on Principle of Freedom of Association 
The Secretariat is instructed by the Council of the Commission for Labor Coopera-
tion to conduct a study on the effects of the sudden closing of a plant on the 
principle of freedom of association and the right of workers to organize in the three 
countries: Canada, the United States, and Mexico. 
Terms of Reference 
1. What are the primary implications of sudden plant closings for the right to orga-
nize a union, and the ability of workers and unions to adjust? 
2. How are the principle of freedom of association (including the right to union 
organization) and the question of workplace closings addressed in the legal sys-
tem in each country, and how are those laws enforced? 
3. What has been the experience in the labor tribunals and the courts with this 
issue in each country? In particular, how has the question of "intent" been ad-
dressed? 
4. How is this issue currently being affected by labor market developments in North 
America and what are the implications for labor market adjustment? 
5. What are important issues for future consideration regarding this matter? 
Conduct of the Study 
1. The study is to be completed 180 days from February 13, *1996, which is the 
date it was formally authorized by the Council. 
2. The study is to be undertaken and authored by the Secretariat itself, allowing for 
the use of experts on contract on a limited basis only to provide necessary back-
ground information. 
3. The study is to be based on existing publicly available information. The Secre-
tariat may take into consideration any relevant information, including any written 
contributions provided voluntarily by the public. The Secretariat may seek rel-
evant information from appropriate government, business, labor, and academic 
sources. 
4. The Secretariat shall make periodic reports on the progress of the study to the 
Council. 
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f J 
The Secretariat study focuses mainly on the effectiveness of the law, and of admin-
istrative and judicial enforcement, as they have dealt with plant closings and threats of 
plant closing to prevent union organization in a previously unorganized workplace. 
The study also looks at the period following formation of a new union and, where an 
existing union is already present at the workplace, at closings or threats where the 
potential objective is to eliminate the union. 
For the study to have comparative value, a mix of methods suited to each country's 
labor system was required. Labor rights in relation to plant closings and threats of 
1
 plant closing have varying and complex dimensions in the three NAALC countries. 
Plant closings themselves take various forms.4 The first obvious difference is one be-
tween total closings and partial closings of a plant or workplace. There is a further 
difference, under U.S. and Quebec labor law, between a total plant closing that is also 
a total closing of the entire business and a total plant closing that affects only part of a 
business—closing one plant of a multi-plant enterprise, for example.5 
Partial plant closings themselves can take several forms: closing a department, closing 
a shift, closing a product line or service function, relocating work, subcontracting 
work, converting employees to independent contractors, and so on. Cases before labor 
authorities reveal that any of these measures can be employed to deter union organiza-
tion by workers. Of equal importance, employers can affect workers' choice of union 
representation by making statements about plant closing, which may or may not amount 
to unlawful threats under U.S. and Canadian labor law. Such statements themselves 
can take different forms and arise in different contexts. 
In all three NAALC countries the challenge for labor law enforcement is to deter-
mine the motivation for an employer's decision to close a plant, and to decide whether 
it is motivated by legitimate business considerations or by anti-union bias. In the United 
States and Canada, issues of anti-union motivation can be litigated, while in Mexico 
4
 Note that the term "plant closing" is used generically in this report. It includes any work-
place shutdown, not just a closing of a "plant" in the usual sense of a manufacturing plant. The 
Secretariat uses the term "plant closing" to conform to the terms of the ministerial agreement. The 
"plant" in the case that prompted the Ministerial Consultation was a telemarketingfacility, not a 
"plant" in the more common, industrial sense of the word. 
5
 See text accompanying notes 15 and 29. —* 
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the only issue is the legitimacy of the claimed business consideration for an actual 
closing. Evidence about other motivations is not relevant in Mexican labor law. 
In legal proceedings on this issue, labor tribunals must take into account complex 
issues involving the burden of proof, the use of expert witnesses, the financial docu-
ments, and the other means of proving financial difficulty or economic necessity for a 
plant closing. In the United States and Canada, there is the added complexity of 
evidence about other motives that may demonstrate unlawful anti-union discrimina-
tion. In all three countries, experts in labor law and union organizing matters contrib-
uted to the research effort. 
All outside researchers' reports and supporting documentation are on file and avail-
able upon request for a fee from the Secretariat. 
UNITED STATES 
U.S. research first examined all decisions by U.S. federal appeals courts in the 
period 1986-1993 in which the courts upheld, modified, or reversed the findings and 
orders of the NLRB in cases involving plant closings or threats of closing. This infor-
mation was drawn from a pre-existing database and methodology for typifying court 
decisions in unfair labor practice cases.6 
The U.S. research also covered administrative data in plant closing cases, review-
ing all NLRB decisions in cases involving plant closings and threats of plant closing 
from 1990-1995. The cases were found through an electronic search of all NLRB 
decisions using appropriate key words.7 Researchers also reviewed case files in two 
regional offices of the NLRB to sample how cases that do not reach the level of a 
published Board decision are handled by the regional offices. This review required a 
6
 Federal appeals court research was performed by Professor James J. Brudney of the Ohio 
State University College of Law using a database he had earlier created of 1,224 cases decided 
between October 1986 and November 1993. While the time frame does not precisely match that of 
the NLRB decisions, the immediate availability of the database and methodology made it possible 
to include this information in the Secretariat's study within the allotted time for this report. 
At the Secretariat's request, Professor Brudney's research deals with cases involving unfair 
labor practices under Sections 8(a)(1) [coercion] and 8(a)(3) [discrimination], not under Section 
8(a)(5) [refusal to bargain]. Thus, for example, it does not treat a case like the recent decision of a 
U.S. appeals court reversing a Board order that a Canadian-owned company reopen a plant it had 
closed during negotiations with the union. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. [Division of George Weston 
Ltd.] v. NLRB, CA 2, Nos. 95-4159(L), 95-4207(XAP), September 9, 1996. 
7
 NLRB case research was performed by Professor David Weinstein of the Temple Univer-
sity School of Law. 
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physical examination of thousands of case files in two regional offices recommended 
by the NLRB General Counsel's office as generally reflective of national data. 
The sample research in NLRB regional offices indicated that for every case 
involving a plant closing or a threat of plant closing that reaches the level of a pub-
lished NLRB decision, 10 other cases are initiated in Board regional offices and dis-
posed of through withdrawal, dismissal, or settlement, or by an administrative 
'judge's decision. 
Survey research was undertaken to obtain information that cannot be gleaned from 
records of unfair labor practice charges filed with the NLRB. Unions that had 
recently attempted organizing campaigns were surveyed for data on the factors, 
including perceived plant closings and threats of plant closing, that influenced their 
decisions to withdraw election petitions or to proceed to elections, as well as factors 
affecting the results of elections and first-contract negotiations.8 
The Secretariat also sent letters to four major U.S. employer associations describ-
ing the study, attaching the ministerial agreement, provisions of the NAALC on Sec-
retariat studies, and the terms of reference, and inviting any views and information 
relevant to the project.9 
CANADA 
In Canada, researchers reviewed unfair labor practice cases involving plant clos-
ings and threats of plant closing before the administrative labor boards and commis-
sioners of the 10 provinces and the federal government. Court decisions dealing with 
these issues were also examined, although the court decisions are few since labor board 
decisions are normally not accepted for appeal by the courts.10 
8
 The survey research was designed and directed by Dr. Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Director of 
Labor Education Research at the New Ifcrk State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at 
Cornell University. The Cornell group used an existing database of information on union petitions, 
withdrawals, elections, and first contracts drawn from records of the NLRB. Survey question-
naires were mailed to a random sample of 1,000 U.S. union representatives who had filed petitions 
with the NLRB to hold a representation election in workplaces with bargaining units of more than 
50 workers. Responses and follow-up phone calls from researchers obtained information about the 
incidence and effects of plant closings and threats of plant closing in union organizing campaigns, 
certification elections, and first-contract bargaining in the United States. 
9
 The four associations were the U.S. Council for International Business, the Business 
Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
10
 Research on Canadian administrative and judicial data was performed by Professor Brian 
Etherington of the Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, and editor of the C%nad%an Labour and 
Employment Law Journal, with John C Murray, chairman and partner, Genest Murray DesBrisay 
Lamek, and Jeffrey Sack, Q.C., Sack Goldblatt Mitchell, co-editors of the Journal. 
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An electronic search using appropriate key words, with follow-up review of texts, 
exposed the entire field of plant closing and threat cases in all Canadian jurisdictions 
since 1986. Each case could be examined in detail for its key characteristics, with 
extensive comparative information on a provincial basis. Important cases that arose in 
earlier years were also examined, especially for their importance as legal precedent. 
MEXICO 
Mexican labor law requires employers to exhaust a complex legal proceeding be-
fore a state or federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board (CAB) to justify a plant 
closing and ensure that the reason for closing is among those permitted in the Federal 
Labor Law. The proceeding is called a "collective conflict of economic nature" in 
which the employer, the union (if there is one), and workers must appear. If a union 
were to resist a plant closing, the challenge would be raised in this proceeding. 
No published records of the results of such proceedings are generally available in 
libraries or electronically Case files and decisions are housed in the offices of the 
CABs. Secretariat researchers visited the offices of the federal CAB and two state 
CABs and examined thousands of case files in "collective conflict" cases brought be-
fore the CABs of selected jurisdictions.11 The collective conflict proceedings covered 
several other common types of labor grievances, which meant that extracting those on 
plant closings was a daunting task. 
The review of CAB records revealed that the collective conflict mechanism de-
scribed above is rarely invoked in plant closing cases. This led researchers to examine 
records of another means of resolving plant closing disputes: a "voluntary termina-
tion" clause of the law in which the critical issue is the provision of severance pay to 
workers as quickly as possible and under the most favorable terms. 
For Part Four of this report on the labor market context, the Secretariat relied on 
reports from the three governments' labor departments and statistical agencies, as 
well as a review of reports on plant closing issues produced by non-governmental 
groups. The Secretariat also used information from its own North American Labor 
Markets: A Comparative Profile, prepared for publication in May 1997. 
1
' Empirical research in Mexico was performed by Dr. Juan Jose Rios Estavillo of the Institute 
of Juridical Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico; Lie. Humberto Flores 
Salas, former president of the Central CAB of the state of Chihuahua; and Dr. Mario Humberto 
Gamboa, former president of the Central CAB of the state of Nuevo Leon. Legal analysis and 
advice were provided by expert labor attorneys Nestor de Buen Lozano, Carlos de Buen Unna, 
and Arturo Alcalde Justiniani. 
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Systematic Differences Among Mexico, Canada, 
and the United States 
y Mexico does not normally have union organizing "campaigns" in which employers might 
I seek to deter unionization in an unorganized workplace by closing or threatening to close 
lathe plant. In Canada there are several days, and in the United States several weeks, 
I leading up to a union representation election. In a majority of Canadian provinces, however, 
pno election is necessary. Workers obtain union certification by sighing authorization cards. 
| f This campaign period—prolonged in the United States and short in Canada—is the 
|setting for most threats or decisions to close a plant to block unionization. In Mexico; the 
pprocess of union formation through an election or other determination of majority status 
?tloes not exist Thus, Mexican administrative data offer little opportunity for examining 
kplant closings or threats of plant closing as U.S. or Canadian case law does. This limited 
\ the applicability of the method of examining published labor board and court decisions in 
^plant closing cases with respect to anti-union motivation, although important new data 
|were obtained on how plant closing cases are resolved within the legal system. 
jV While actual plant closings are unlawful in the Mexican system if they do not conform to 
^specified legal requirements, threats to close a plant if workers form a union are not 
t unlawful under Mexican law. Mexico does not employ an unfair labor practice concept, 
; such as that used in Canada and the United States, which defines such threats as illegal. 
I J The protection against threats in the U.S, and Canadian systems is directly linked to the 
| union election campaign process, which is not contemplated in Mexican labor law. 
4 
) \ Mexican labor law targets employer actions, not employer, statements. The relevant 
Hssue under Mexican law is whether the employer met one of the specified, permissible 
I ^reasons for closing a plant Since it is not unlawful, the phenomenon of the anti-union 
threat to close a plant, as it occurs in the United States or Canada, cannot be discerned in 
Mexican labor law records. 
f: 
% 
i 
4 
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Systematic Differences Among Mexico, Canada, 
and the United States (continued) 
Some academic researchers have discussed a phenomenon of localized business cul-
tures where there exists a widespread sentiment among workers that their employer would 
close a plant rather than accept a union. Some of these accounts point to maquiladora 
areas that are along the U.S.-Mexico border and that are said to be anti-union, while other 
areas are seen to have developed a culture of company unionism.12 Similar academic and 
journalistic accounts discuss an anti-union culture in areas of the southern United States, 
and in "Silicon Valley" and other high-technology manufacturing centers.13 But examining 
a culture of anti-unionism in which workers have internalized a fear of plant closing would 
have to be undertaken in another study that would range far beyond the terms of reference 
of this report. Thus, no anecdotal accounts of anti-union behavior could be confirmed and 
incorporated into this study on the same basis as administrative and judicial records, or as 
a methodologically sound social science survey. 
12
 See, for example, Guillermo Marrero, "Labor Issues for Maquiladoras," 4 Latin America 
Law and Business Report (May 31, 1996), citing "an anti-union attitude held by many maquiladora 
operators in most locations; the perception by some maquiladora workers and managers that trade 
unions will have little to offer them; and the inability or unwillingness of unions to zealously repre-
sent workers against foreign manufacturers." See also Alfredo Hualde, "Industrial Relations in the 
Maquiladora Industry: Management's Search for Participation and Quality," in Maria Cook and 
Harry Katz, eds., Regional Integration and Industrial Relations in North America (1994); Jorge Carillo 
and Alfredo Hualde, "Maquiladoras: La restructuracion industrial y el impacto sindical," in 
Bensusan and Leon, eds., Negociaciony conflicto laboralen Mexico (1990); Maria Eugenia De la O. 
and Cirila Quintero, "Sindicalismo y contratacion colectiva en las maquiladoras fronterizas," Frontera 
Norte 8 (July-December 1992); Monica Claire Gambrill, "Sindicalismo en las maquiladoras de 
Tijuana: regresion en las prestaciones sociales," in Jorge Carrillo, ed., Reestructuracion industrial: 
Maquiladoras en la frontera MexicoEstados Unidos (1986); Edward J. Williams, "Attitudes and Strat-
egies Inhibiting the Unionization of the Maquiladora Industry: Government, Industry, Unions 
and Workers," VI Journal of Borderlands Studies 51 (1991); Susan Tiano, Patriarchy on the Line: 
Labor, Gender, and Ideology in the Mexican Maquila Industry (1994); Kathryn Kopinak, Desert Capi-
talism: Maquiladoras in North America's Western Industrial Corridor (1996). 
13
 See, for example, AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon 
Valley and Route 128 (1994), noting that "No high technology firm has been organized by a labor 
union in Silicon Valley during the past 20 years, and there have beer} fe^er than a dozen serious 
attempts," at 55] Kathy Sawyer, "Unions Striking Out in High-Tech Firms," the Washington Post, 
March 18, 1984, at Cl . 
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LEGAL FRAMEWORKS14 
UNITED STATES 
The U.S. legal framework regarding the effects of plant closings on freedom of 
association and the right of workers to organize encompasses two central issues in 
labor law jurisprudence: (1) motivation for closing a plant, and (2) the difference 
between a lawful expression of any views, argument, or opinion, and an unlawful 
threat of reprisal. 
The key issue in a plant closing, except where an employer goes completely out of 
business (see 1 below), is whether the closing is motivated by anti-union consider-
ations, often called "anti-union animus" in legal proceedings, or by unbiased eco-
nomic considerations. An anti-union plant closing is unlawful and may be remedied 
by an order to reopen the facility and rehire the workers. An economic closing is 
lawful, although there may be related legal obligations such as advance notice require-
ments, accrued benefits, health insurance continuation, or contractually required sev-
erance pay. 
In threat cases in which an employer makes statements about the possibility of the 
plant closing if workers unionize, the issue is whether such statements amount to a 
threat of reprisal against workers5 organizing efforts, or are simply an expression of 
views, argument, or opinion that do not contain a threat of reprisal. A threat of reprisal 
is an unfair labor practice, whereas expressions of any views, argument, or opinion are 
allowed under the law. ; 
Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) and fed-
eral courts have established the following basic principles in cases involving plant 
closings or threats of plant closing in connection with workers' organizing efforts: 
1. An employer may not close a plant to avoid dealing with a union, to retaliate 
against workers for forming a union, or to discourage union organizing at another 
facility of the employer. Such an unfair labor practice may be remedied by an order to 
reopen the plant and rehire the employees. However, an employer may lawfully decide 
14
 The legal frameworks presented here cover general private sector labor Jaw. Each country 
has special constitutional or statutory regimes for public sector employment in federal, state or 
provincial, and subordinate jurisdictions. The countries also have special legislation for certain 
private sector industries or occupations. These specialized legal systems areifrdf treated here. 
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to go completely out of business and cease operating altogether, even for an anti-union 
motivation.15 
2. An employer may close a plant for legitimate economic considerations if the 
closing is not motivated by anti-union considerations. 
3. An employer may not threaten to close a plant in reprisal for union activity. 
4. An employer may express any views, argument, or opinion about plant closings 
or other possible consequences of unionization, as long as such expression contains no 
threat of reprisal or force, or promise of benefit. 
The cases that arise in U.S. labor law posing issues of plant closings or threats of 
plant closing in connection with the workers' right to organize are among the most 
difficult and complex in labor jurisprudence. There is no "rule" for such cases, be-
cause proving motivation (anti-union versus economic), or proving whether certain 
statements amount to an unlawful threat or a lawful expression of views, argument, or 
opinion, is always a matter of interpretation of the evidence. 
Each case depends on a unique set of facts and circumstances that are brought out 
in a trial before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the NLRB. The judge's 
decision may then be appealed to the NLRB in Washington, D.C., and the Board's 
decision may be appealed to 1 of 12 federal circuit courts of appeals, whose own deci-
sions may be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Elements of the U.S. Legal Framework 
Common Law Rights of Ownership 
As a general principle, the common law places no restrictions on an owner's power 
to dispose of means of production through sale, lease, transfer, relocation, shutdown, 
or other form of alienability because of such a transaction's effects on workers. Until 
passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA or "Wagner Act," after 
the name of its author in the U.S. Senate) and its upholding by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1937, U.S. employers enjoyed unfettered power to close a plant in response 
to unionization drives by their employees, or to threaten plant closings if their employ-
ees chose union representation. 
Notwithstanding this, much of U.S. heavy industry was unionized in the 1930s 
and 1940s through mass organizing drives and "sit down" strikes. An actual closing 
was not so easy at large-scale industrial plants representing huge investments, which 
15
 See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
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characterized the period of the early 20th century. Many of these plants in the steel, 
auto, electrical, rubber, aircraft, and other mass production industries were relatively 
new, vertically integrated, and highly productive, so employers could not easily "walk 
away" from them, or credibly threaten to close them, if workers unionized.16 
TheNLRA 
The NLRA changed the law regarding plant closings and threats of plant closing 
related to workers' organizing efforts. The Wagner Act affirmed workers' freedom of 
association, defined certain anti-union conduct as an "unfair labor practice," and pro-
hibited such conduct. 
Section 7 of the NLRA extended to most private sector employees "the right to 
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 
The Wagner Act also created a means to protect these rights by defining unfair 
labor practices in Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. An unfair labor practice 
violates the law and is subject to the remedies provided by the Act. 
An anti-union plant closing, or a threat to close a plant in reprisal for workers' 
organizing activity, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which makes it an unfair 
labor practice to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed in Section 7." The Act empowers the NLRB to issue "cease-and-
desist" orders and other remedial steps to prevent 8(a)(1) violations. 
Closing a plant in retaliation for union activity also violates Section 8(a)(3) of 
the Act, which defines the unfair labor practice of "discrimination in regard to 
hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any la-
bor organization." 
The Act provides for reinstatement and back pay (or other "make-whole" rem-
edies) for workers who are discharged or otherwise discriminated against for such 
activity. For workers affected by a plant closing, the remedy may include an order to 
reopen the plant and re-employ the workers. The Act also,empowers the Labor Board 
to set aside an election and order a new election if plant closing threats destroyed 
"laboratory conditions" for employee free choice of representation, whether or not an 
unfair labor practice charge is filed. 
16
 Recall that in the case that gave rise to submission no. 9501 OAN/Mex and the Ministerial 
Consultations that prompted this report, the workplace was a telemarketing facility consisting es-
sentially of offices, cubicles, and telephone lines and phones. The work was shifted to another U.S. 
city after the closing of the facility. For another example of capital mobility in the new global economy, 
see Mike Mills, "With CUck of a Mouse, White-Collar Jobs Go Overseas," the Washington Post, 
September 17, 1996, at Al. ^ '*** 
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The Employer Free Speech Clause of the Taft-Hartley Act 
While the Wagner Act of 1935 has been described as "Labor's Magna Carta," the 
1947 Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or "Taft-Hartley Act," after its 
legislative sponsors) reflected management interests. Opposed by U.S. unions as an 
anti-labor law while supported by management as a restoration of balance in the law, 
the L M R A added a new clause, Section 8(c), known as the "employer free speech" 
provision. It states that 
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemi-
nation thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic or visual form, 
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under 
any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat 
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 
Section 8(c) codified a trend in court rulings that established the employer's right 
to communicate its views on unionization to employees. In the decades since then, the 
NLRB and the courts have introduced complicated and often shifting rules about 
how strongly, directly, or aggressively employers may speak out against unionization, 
including through such devices as "captive audience meetings" where workers are 
required to hear management speeches against union organization. Under these rules, 
employers are allowed to discuss with employees the possible consequences of union-
ization, including plant closings, as long as the employer's statements do not contain a 
"threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 
Critics have long argued that management's ability to discuss plant closings, how-
ever apparently neutral the discussion may be, inherendy amounts to a threat of re-
prisal given the employer's acknowledged power to close a facility. Defenders of 8(c) 
argue that management cannot be denied its free speech rights to convey its opposi-
tion to unionization and to objectively discuss issues, including plant closings, as long 
as the discussion does not amount to a threat. Since this is a matter of interpretation of 
management statements, the NLRB and the courts closely scrutinize such statements 
in the overall context of company actions in an organizing campaign. The result is that 
the Board or the courts might find the same words permissible in one case and an 
unlawful threat in another case. Each case rises and falls on its own unique facts and 
circumstances as to whether employer statements stop short of a threat, or cross the 
line and become a threat. 
Significantly, the Taft-Hardey Act did not diminish Section 7 rights or change the 
Wagner Act's definitions of unfair labor practices by employers. Sections 8(a)(1) and 
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(3) of the Act remained intact. The statute preserved the unlawfulness of threats to 
close a plant to discourage union activity, and of the actual closing of a plant in reprisal 
for union activity. 
Plant Closings: The Wright Line Test 
In plant closing cases, the issue of motivation is paramount. Did the employer close 
for legitimate economic reasons or for unlawful anti-union reasons? This issue is even 
more difficult in "mixed motive" cases where both considerations are present. 
The NLRB and the courts apply the same test to plant closing cases that they apply 
to unfair labor practice cases involving the alleged discriminatory discharge of an 
individual employee for attempting to form a union. The employer usually responds 
that the employee was terminated for legitimate reasons such as absenteeism, miscon-
duct, poor performance, and so on. Such cases can be either a "pretext" case, alleging 
that the employer's excuse is completely false and fabricated, or a "mixed motive" 
case, where there is some evidence of employee wrongdoing as well as evidence of 
anti-union motivation of the employer. 
The test for such cases was elaborated in the NLRB's Wright Line decision.17 Un-
der this ruling, the NLRB General Counsel first has the burden of proving that the 
employee's union activity was a motivating factor in the employer's action. If the Gen-
eral Counsel establishes a case of apparent anti-union motivation, the burden of proof 
shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the discharge was for legitimate, job-related 
causes. If the employer fails to prove any legitimate cause, it is a pretext case, and the 
employee is reinstated regardless of the degree of unlawful anti-union motivation. If 
the employer succeeds in proving some level of legitimate, business-related motiva-
tion, it is a mixed motive case. The employer must prove that the employee would 
have been terminated even in the absence of an anti-union motivation. 
Plant closing cases usually pose the issue even more starkly. An employer can nearly 
always present some legitimate business reason for closing a plant, which is a much 
weightier action than discharging an individual employee. Thus, these cases usually 
present the mixed motive posture. The General Counsel first has the burden of show-
ing that anti-union motivation is an element in the decision to close. Evidence could 
include such matters as the timing of the closing in relation to the union organizing 
effort, or statements by managers and supervisors suggesting that the closing is re-
lated to the unionization. The burden then shifts to the employer to show that the 
decision to close would have been made anyway, and to provide evidence of business, 
accounting, marketing, or other economic considerations motivating the decision. 
17
 Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083(1980), enf'd, 662 F.2d 899 
(1st Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). 
27 
P L A N T C L O S I N G S A N D L A B O R R I G H T S 
Threats of Plant Closing: The Gissel Balancing Test 
In the landmark Gissel case,18 the U.S. Supreme Court established the standards 
for balancing an employer's right to express any views, argument, or opinion on plant 
closings with the employees' right to organize. The court stated that balancing those 
rights "must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their 
employers" and the "necessary tendency" of employees to perceive implied threats in 
statements "that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear." 
An employer may make a prediction as to the precise effect he believes unionization 
will have, but such a prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact 
involving demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control. If there is any 
implication that the employer may take action for reasons unrelated to economic ne-
cessity, the statement is an unlawful threat. 
Remedies 
The NLRB normally views an order to reopen the plant and rehire the workers as 
the proper remedy for an anti-union plant closing, unless the employer can demon-
strate that reopening would endanger its continued viability. In this case, remedies are 
usually limited to back pay. The Board may order the employer to offer employment 
to affected workers at other facilities of the employer and to pay workers the costs of 
moving to a new location. It should be recalled, however, that such remedies apply 
only when the employer relocates work or maintains operations elsewhere. Under the 
Darlington doctrine, there is no remedy when an employer goes entirely out of busi-
ness for antiunion motivations. 
NLRB decisions are routinely appealed to the federal courts. While generally the 
courts maintain a doctrine of "deference" to the Board's specialized expertise in labor 
relations matters, federal courts may reverse or modify Board decisions. In plant clos-
ing cases, some federal courts make the test one of "undue burden" on the employer 
rather than the viability of the enterprise. Under this standard, NLRB orders to reopen 
a plant are sometimes overturned by the federal court reviewing the Board's decision. 
The remedy for plant closing threats is different from the remedy for a closing. 
The normal remedy for plant closing threats is a "cease-and-desist" order. The NLRB 
orders the employer (1) to cease and desist from threatening to close the plant, and 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 39'5 U.S. 575 (1969). 
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(2) to repudiate the earlier threats by posting a notice at the workplace promising not 
to repeat the threat. In some cases the Board orders the employer to repudiate the 
threat in the same manner that the threat was made—in a letter to employees' homes, 
for example, or in a meeting with employees. 
Critics argue that the mere posting of a notice or other promise not to repeat the 
threat is an empty remedy. They maintain that the effect of the threat remains, despite 
the employer's new statements to the contrary as ordered by the NLRB, because of 
the employer's inherent power to carry out the threat. This argument is not accepted 
in U.S. labor law jurisprudence. However, U.S. law does provide that in extraordi-
nary cases where plant closing threats are part of a pattern of massive unfair labor 
practices that would destroy a union's majority support and make a fair election im-
possible, the NLRB is empowered to issue an order to the employer to recognize and 
bargain with the union, either without an election or even if the union lost the election. 
This is also based on the Gissel ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Plant Closings and Threats at an Already Unionized Plant 
The discussion up to now has focused on the effects of plant closings or threats of 
plant closing on workers attempting to form a new union. Another line of labor juris-
prudence involves cases affecting workers who have already formed a union and es-
tablished a bargaining relationship with the employer through one or more collective 
bargaining agreements.19 
The same basic issues of anti-union motivation versus economic justification, and 
prediction versus threat of reprisal, arise in cases where already unionized plants are 
closed or where threats of plant closing are made in the course of collective bargain-
ing. Normally in such cases, however, closings or threats are seen as reflecting an 
employer's desire to achieve cost reductions. A viable unfair labor practice case exists 
only if the employer demonstrates, by some action susceptible to proof, an anti-union 
motivation or a desire to discourage union organizing at other facilities. 
Employers normally have available managers, planners, consultants, and accoun-
tants who can provide documentary evidence of the claimed business justification. 
Workers and unions can only claim to "know" that the closing or the threat is moti-
vated by anti-unionism, while having great difficulty proving it. 
19
 Because of the limits of this study and its focus on the effects of plant closings on workers' 
right to organize, as distinct from the right to collective bargaining, the issue of the employer's duty 
to bargain with the union over a decision to close the plant (as opposed to the effectsoi the decision to 
close), and the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining (a distinction 
that does not exist in Canadian or Mexican labor law), are not discussed here^ See First National 
Maintenance Corf. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
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This poses the central, unresolved problem of plant closings and their effects on 
workers' right to organize under U.S. labor law: how can the right be sufficiently 
protected when the law subordinates it to a plausible economic motive for closing? 
Since union organization and collective bargaining are normally seen by managers as 
imposing additional costs, there is almost always in management's view an element of 
Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings Under U.S. Law 
1. Investigation of the Charge 
ActJng under the authority of the General Counsel, the NLRB Regional Director first conducts an 
investigation of the unfair labor practice charge. The investigation includes taking sworn statements. 
It also allows opportunity for union or employer counsel to submit position papers and to argue on 
behalf of their client for the issuance of a complaint or dismissal of the charge. 
2. Complaint or Dismissal 
The Regional Director issues a complaint upon a finding that the charge is "meritorious"—that is, if 
the findings of a preliminary investigation support the facts alleged in the charge, and the facts 
alleged, if true, would constitute an unfair labor practice, if not, the charge is dismissed. No appeal 
is allowed to the NLRB or to the courts of a decision by the General Counsel to dismiss an unfair labor 
practice charge. 
3. AU Hearing 
If the parties do not settle a complaint, the case goes forward to a trial of the facts before an AU. The 
AU hears the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and rules on the admissibility of 
evidence and testimony. The General Counsel (that is, an NLRB staff attorney representing the Gen-
eral Counsel) prosecutes a case before the AU, with assistance of counsel for the charging party. The 
AUs evaluate witnesses' credibility, examine documents and other exhibits for their probative weight, 
and make findings of fact and findings of law. They issue a written decision in the case determining 
whether the charged party has committed an unfair labor practice, and explaining the reasons for 
such a determination. (See Table 1 for statistics on NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings through 
these stages, 1990-1995). 
4. Appeal to the NLRB 
AU decisions may be appealed to the NLRB for a review of the record in the case, which includes the . 
transcript of the trial before the AU and all documentary evidence. The Board can affirm or reverse, 
in whole or in part, the AU decision. In complex or novel cases, the NLRB might hear oral arguments 
by parties to the case. The Board issues a written decision in the case either adopting the AU 
decision without further comment, or offering its own reasoning for deciding how to treat the case, in 
contrast to Canadian and Mexican law, U.S. NLRB decisions are ,not self-enforcing. A party may. 
refuse to abide by the Board's ruling, forcing the NLRB to initiate new legal proceedings to have its 
order enforced by the courts. 
5. Appeal to the Federal Courts 
The NLRB's decision may then be appealed to a federal court of appeals in 1 of 12 judicial circuits, 
divided geographically among several states. The courts of appeals maintain a general policy of 
deference to the administrative expertise of the NLRB, but at the same time the courts will consider 
the substance of a case and may overrule the Board on the merits. Some circuit courts are more. 
deferential to the NLRB. Others are more forceful in reviewing the substance of Board decisions and ^ 
overturning them when the court disagrees. 
Decisions by the federal circuit courts of appeals may be appealed to the JJ.S. Supreme Court. Only 
a small percentage of cases are accepted for review by the Supreme Court. As a result, despite the. 
general rule of uniform federal law governing labor relations in the United States, conflicting doctrines ' 
on certain aspects of the law may prevail in different judicial circuits^ ; ^ 
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20 economic rationality or business justification in avoiding or eliminating a union. 
This rationale applies equally to a closing where a new union organizing campaign is 
under way, where a union has won bargaining rights and is seeking a first contract, or 
to the closing of an already unionized plant. 
Table 1 
U.S. NLRB Handling of Unfair Labor Practice Charges 
Against Employers, 1990-19953 
Charges Informal/ Post-
Filed Under Charges Complaints Formal Hearing Hearing 
PY §8(a) Withdrawn Dismissed Issued Sett lement Held Sett lement 
1990 24,075 
(26,265) 
1991 23,005 
(25,661) 
1992 23,119 
(25,652) 
1993 24,500 
(26,270) 
1994 26,058 
(26,592) 
1995 26,244 
(27,123) 
Average 24,500 
(26,262) 
7,294 
(28%) 
7,433 
(29%) 
7,541 
(29%) 
7,467 
(28%) 
7,705 
(29%) 
8,175 
(30%) 
7,603 
(29%) 
7,251 
(28%) 
6,470 
(25%) 
6,778 
(26%) 
6,887 
(26%) 
6,877 
(26%) 
6,213 
(23%) 
6,746 
(26%) 
3,182 
(12%) 
3,225 
(13%) 
3,013 
(12%) 
3,069 
(12%) 
3,162 
(12%) 
3,271 
(12%) 
3,154 
(12%) 
7,891 
(30%) 
7,881 
(31%) 
7,689 
(30%) 
8,354 
(32%) 
8,304 
(31%) 
8,870 
(33%) 
8,165 
(31%) 
523 
(2%) 
559 
(2%) 
536 
(2%) 
362 
(1.4%) 
422 
(1.6%) 
465 
(1.7%) 
' 478 
(1.8%) 
124 
(.5%) 
93 
(.4%) 
95 
(.4%) 
131 
(.5%) 
122 
(.5%) 
129 
(.5%) 
116 
(.4%) 
a
 Numbers in parentheses under Charges Filed are the number of dispositions of unfair labor practice charges 
against employers during the year. The percentages supplied here in parentheses refer to these dispositions. 
The number of dispositions is higher than the number of charges filed in a given year because some are 
dispositions of charges filed in prior years. This trend reflects the progress of the NLRB in taking care of the 
backlog of cases from earlier years. 
20
 See, for example, Roger W. Schmenner, Making Business Location Decisions (1982), a study 
that equated "favorable labor climate" with non-union status, and concluded that" [a] new workforce 
that is nearly impossible to organize is perhaps the most prized side benefit of a ^ ew plant site, and 
it is the controlling consideration for many companies." (at 37, 156-157); Thomas A. Kochan et 
al., The Transformation of American Industrial Relations (1986), discussing union avoidance as a fac-
tor in U.S. corporate investment and plant closing decisions (at 66-76). ~ 
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CANADA 
Plant closings and threats of plant closing in the context of Canadian labor orga-
nizing give rise to unfair labor practice complaints.21 A complaint normally alleges 
that an employer has interfered in the formation or selection of a trade union or the 
representation of employees by a union, or that the employer has disciplined or dis-
criminated against employees for exercising their rights to organize or bargain collec-
tively under the legislation, or both.22 
As in U.S. labor law, some Canadian statutes contain an employer "free speech 
clause." The Ontario Act states that "nothing in this section shall be deemed to de-
prive an employer of the employer's freedom to express views so long as the employer 
does not use coercion, intimidation, threats, promises, or undue influence." Whether 
statements about plant closing are coercive or not depends on the overall context of 
employer conduct, but Canadian jurisdictions generally limit the scope of what em-
ployers may lawfully say in light of potential coercion inherent in the employer's posi-
tion of authority over employees.23 
21
 Note that in U.S. terminology, affected workers or unions file a "charge." In Canada, this 
initial filing is called a "complaint." In the United States, a "complaint" is issued by the Regional 
Director acting as an arm of the General Counsel upon finding merit to the charge. The finding of 
merit is preliminary; it is not a determination of guilt. 
22
 See for example, Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1. (hereinafter "OLRA"), 
s. 70: "No employer or employers' organization and no persons acting on behalf of an employer or 
an employers' organization shall participate in or interfere with the formation, selection or admin-
istration of a trade union or the representation of employees by a trade union or contribute financial 
or other support to a trade union"; and OLRA, s. 72: "No employer, employers' organization or 
person acting on behalf of an employer or employers' organization (a) shall refuse to employ or 
continue to employ a person, or discriminate against a person in regard to employment or any term 
or condition of employment because the person was or is a member of a trade union or was or is 
exercising any other rights under this Act; (b) shall impose any condition in a contract of employ-
ment or propose the imposition of any condition in a contract of employment that seeks to restrain 
an employee or a person seeking employment from becoming a member of a trade union or exer-
cising any rights under this Act; or (c ) shall seek by threat of dismissal, or by any other kind of 
threat, or by the imposition of a pecuniary or other penalty, or by any means to compel an employee 
to become or refrain from becoming or continue to be or to cease to be a member or officer or 
representative of a trade union or cease to exercise any other rights under this Act." 
23
 See, for example, the American Airlines and Wal-Mart cases described in Part Three. The 
statements "I hope you will think very seriously before taking any actios that will make your job a 
union job" and "It would be inappropriate for your company to comment on what it will or will not 
do if the store is unionized" were found to be unlawful closing threats in the context in which they 
were delivered. **** 
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Closings or threats of closing may result in complaints that an employer has breached 
its duty to bargain in good faith with the union, or has engaged in an unlawful lock-
out. In Newfoundland and Saskatchewan, a union may bring a complaint that an 
employer has closed, relocated, or threatened to close a plant or business during a 
labor-management dispute, conduct which is expressly prohibited by statute.24 
Several principles are applied consistently and uniformly across jurisdictional lines. 
In unfair labor practice cases, the presence of anti-union animus is the prime determi-
nant. Canadian tribunals and courts generally prohibit an employer from acting even 
in part on the basis of anti-union motives, regardless of the existence of a valid busi-
ness justification for its actions. The predominant motive approach was specifically 
rejected by the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) in its oft-cited decision in 
Westinghouse.25 There, the OLRB held that, despite the existence of several valid busi-
ness reasons for moving operations, the employer acted in part based on anti-union 
motives and thus committed an unfair labor practice. 
In plant closing cases, evidence of economic considerations and business justifica-
tions are critical in applying the mixed motive test. A majority of Canadian jurisdic-
tions place the burden of proof on employers to show that the closing was not moti-
vated by anti-union animus.26 In practice, the presence or absence of anti-union mo-
tive will often have to be determined without direct evidence and will depend upon 
inferences drawn from the timing of decisions and other contextual factors. 
The most difficult unfair labor practice cases tend to arise when employers claim 
they are acting solely on the grounds of economic considerations, part of which are the 
economic costs of collective bargaining. The employers' argument is twofold: (1) they 
are not attempting to forestall the exercise of union rights; rather they are reacting to 
the economic consequences of collective bargaining; aijd (2) labor legislation must 
not prevent them from responding to the marketplace. Unions,maintain, conversely, 
that statutory rights to bargain will be meaningless if, on the basis of increased costs, 
employers can simply move elsewhere when a union is certified. 
24
 See Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. L-l (hereinafter "Nfld. LRA"), s. 
26; and Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17 (hereinafter "STUA"), s. 11(1)(I). 
25
 UEW, Local 504 v. Westinghouse Canada Inc. (1980), 80 C.L.L.C. 16,053 (O.L.R.B.); up-
held on judicial review Westinghouse Canada Inc. v. UEW Local 504 (1980), 80 C.L.L.C. 14,062 
(Ont.Div.Ct). ' * 
26
 See British Columbia, s.8(6); Manitoba, s.7; Ontario, s.89(5); Quebec, s.17; Prince Ed-
ward Island, s.l 1(5); Canada, s.98(4). ~ 
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Canadian labor law contains the same tension noted previously, in connection with 
U.S. law, of protecting workers' right to organize in a context in which economic 
motivations justify plant closings. For example, the OLRB distinguished the 
Westinghouse case, where the employer explicitly made non-union operation as the goal 
to be achieved, from another case where "there was no evidence that the fact that the 
employees ... were represented by a trade union played any part in the employer's 
decision ... a decision to save money and thereby increase profits is not equivalent to 
anti-union animus simply because the money saved would otherwise have been paid 
as wages to employees in the bargaining unit."27 
A later Ontario board decision involving the same employer cautioned that its ear-
lier decision did not stand for the proposition that "so long as an employer can point to 
cost savings in justifying the business decision he has made, it cannot be found he has 
breached the Act."28 Instead, labor boards have attempted to resolve these difficult 
cases through the use of the mixed motive approach, the drawing of inferences and J 
presumptions, and the use of a flexible approach to remedies in cases where there is 
evidence of legitimate business justifications. Cases tend to be decided against an em-
ployer when it has taken precipitous action in the context of an organizing drive, failed to 
resort to collective bargaining to resolve economic difficulties with employees, or reacted to 
the process of collective bargaining as opposed to its actual economic impact. 
In general, Canadian labor boards make no distinction between full and partial 
closures in finding that an unfair labor practice has been committed. Except in Que-
bec, and then in just one reported case, Canadian adjudicators have generally rejected 
the view that an employer has a fundamental right to completely close down opera-
tions, even if motivated by anti-union animus.29 An unfair labor practice may also be 
found when an employer, during negotiations for a new collective agreement, fails to 
disclose an impending decision, or the high probability of a decision, to close, relocate, 
or contract out operations even for purely economic motives.30 
27
 See Kennedy Lodge Nursing Home (1980), 81 C.L.L.C. para. 16,078 (O.L.R.B.), at 473. Ana-
lyzing this passage, one commentator argued that "this simply collapses the distinction between dis-
criminatory (anti-union) and economic motives, at least in a good number of cases. The rational em-
ployer, intent on avoiding the collective bargaining process is protected through this test." See Brian 
Langille, "Equal Partnership in Canadian Labour Law" (1983), 21 Osgood Hall Law Journal 496. 
28
 See Kennedy Lodge Inc. (1984), O.L.R.B. Rep.931. 
29
 In City Buick Pontiac (Montreal) Inc. (1981), 81 C.L.L.C. 14,108, the Quebec Labour Court | 
held that as long as the closure was permanent and complete the employer could go out of business 
with impunity, despite the presence of anti-union motive. 
30
 See Int'l Woodworkers of America, Local 2—69 v. Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd., (1983), 83 
C.L.L.C. 16,066 (O.L.R.B.); upheld on application for judicial review on another point; Consolidated m 
Bathurst Packaging Ltd. v. Int'l Woodworkers of America, Local 2-69 (1990)768 DJL.R. (4th) 524 (S.C.C.) 
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Labor boards are generally given fairly broad remedial powers, not only to make 
cease-and-desist orders but also to require one of the parties to rectify violations. Stat-
utes often contain explicit powers to order reinstatement or award damages. However, 
no Canadian labor board has actually ordered an employer to resume operations at a 
closed facility. Many have expressed concern about the practicality of such an order, 
although at the same time several decisions have suggested that they have the jurisdic-
tion to order reopening. 
However, labor boards have ordered an entire bargaining unit to be reinstated where 
employers unlawfully contracted out the work of that unit. In another case, where a 
legitimate closing was moved up by 8 months as a result of anti-union animus, the 
board ordered the employer to either maintain operations for 8 months and reinstate 
the employees, or pay employees their wages and benefits as if they were employed 
throughout that period.31 
Generally, labor boards have sought to formulate alternatives such as providing 
affected employees with transfer rights at other locations or compensating employees 
and unions as fully as possible in the circumstances.32 While courts do not usually 
disturb labor board rulings, the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that labor 
boards5 innovative remedies must be reasonably related to an employer's breach of the 
statute and must meet constitutional criteria. For example, it overturned a CLRB 
order that an employer pay its savings from closing a unionized facility into a trust 
fund to promote the objectives of the statute on the grounds that such an order is not 
within a labor board's jurisdiction. The Court also suggested that the federal board's 
31
 See Insurance Courier Services and UFCW, hoc. 175 (1993), 18 Can. L.R.B.R. (2d) 286 
(Can); West)air Foods andRWDSU, Local 454, (1993) S.L.RB.D, No. 2. 
32
 InHumpty Dumpty Foods Ltd. (1978), 78 C.L.L.C. 16,136 (O.L.R.B.), a case involving the 
transfer of operations to a location beyond the coverage of the collective agreement, the board 
ordered the employer either to reopen operations at its original location, or to agree to extend the 
scope of the recognition clause in the collective agreement to cover its new locations. Subsequently, 
in Westinghouse, supra note 3, the employer relocated its operations to avoid a collective agreement, 
at the same time creating considerable employment. Because of the intermingling of old and new 
employees, the board refused to extend the collective agreement to cover the new locations. In-
stead, existing employees were given the right to claim job openings in other divisions of the old 
location or at the new locations (without loss of benefits and full relocation expenses) and, the 
employer was ordered to compensate the union for organizing expenses at the new locations and to 
provide the union with information relevant to organizing employees. ** 
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practice of requiring an employer to sign and send to its employees a board-dictated 
pledge of future compliance'may violate the employer's freedom of expression under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.33 
Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings Under Canadian Law 
As a result of the structure of Canadian federalism, Canada has 11 labor relations 
regimes: one federal and 1 in each of the 10 provinces. The Canada Labour Code, 
administered by the Canada Labour Relations Board (CLRB) and the Federal Me-
diation and Conciliation Service, governs labor relations in the federal jurisdiction, 
which covers approximately 10 percent of the nation's workforce. The acts and au-
thorities for the provinces are 
Alberta Labour Relations Code /Alberta Labour Relations Board 
British Columbia Labour Relations Code / British Columbia Labour Relations Board 
Manitoba Labour Relations Act / Manitoba Labour Board 
New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act /New Brunswick Labour and 
Employment Board 
Newfoundland Labour Relations Act / Newfoundland Labour Relations Board 
Nova Scotia Trade Union Act / Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board 
Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995 / Ontario Labour Relations Board 
Prince Edward Island Labour Act /Prince Edward Island Labour Relations Board 
Saskatchewan Trade Union Act / Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board 
Quebec Labour Code / Office of the General Commissioner of Labour 
(Labour Ministry) 
Unfair labor practice law enforcement is complaint driven. Details of procedures 
differ from province to province, but most jurisdictions empower their labor boards 
(or commissioners in Quebec) to investigate a complaint, receive evidence and hear 
arguments of the parties, and issue a decision. Note that there is no equivalent in 
Canada to the independent General Counsel of the NLRB, who decides (through the 
Regional Director) if a charge has merit, then issues a complaint and takes over the 
prosecution of the case on behalf of the charging party. In Canada the complaining 
worker or union, and the complained-against employer, represent themselves through 
counsel before the board or commissioner. 
33
 National Bank of Canada v. Retail Clerk's Int'l Union (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 10 (S.C.C.). 
There, the employer closed one of its bank branches and transferred work to a non-union branch 
following certification of a union. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the remedy of automatic 
certification at the new branch and other aspects of the Board's remedial order. With respect to the trust 
fund and the written pledge, one justice called these "clearly punitive in nature ... the Canada Labour 
Relations Board has no power to impose punitive measures. This type of penalty is totalitarian...." 
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Provincial Example: Ontario 
The Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) is an independent enforcement 
agency composed of a chairperson, an alternate chairperson, 27 vice chairs, and 34 
board members—17 each of employer and employee representatives. Many of the 
vice chairs and board members serve part-time, maintaining separate employment. 
The OLRB employs 20 labor relations officers as its full-time staff. The Board 
normally operates in thrtt-mtmbcr ad hoc panels to hear cases based on investigations 
carried out by the staff The chair appoints one representative from each of the employer 
and employee members of the OLRB, as well as a vice chair to preside over the panel 
Upon receiving a complaint, the OLRB will normally appoint a permanent staff 
officer to investigate it and report to the Board. In practice, officers are trained to 
encourage the parties to settle the matter without need for further legal proceedings. 
Of unfair labor practice complaints in Ontario, 80 percent are resolved without a 
hearing, compared with 98 percent for the U.S. NLRB. 
Although a greater percentage of Canadian cases go forward to a hearing, they are 
handled in a streamlined fashion. Instead of having multiple stages of investigation, 
hearings, and appeals, the case is handled in a single proceeding. The OLRB hears 
the case and issues a final decision. Unfair labor practice procedures before the OLRB 
are usually concluded relatively rapidly34 
Although the OLRB can reconsider its own decisions, its rulings are final and 
binding, and are immediately enforceable by the civil courts, backed by contempt-of-
court power. There is no right of appeal, but there is a limited right to judicial review 
in the Ontario Court (General Division) on grounds of natural justice, jurisdictional 
error, and constitutional matters. Courts have exercised caution in reviewing decisions 
of the OLRB on the grounds that the Board is a specialized tribunal charged with 
balancing competing interests. For example, in 1994-1995, the Ontario Court dealt 
with just five applications for judicial review among hundreds of OLRB decisions. 
All five appeals were dismissed. 
Ontario Board Statistics 
During fiscal year 1993—1994, the OLRB received 4,525 cases and carried over 
894 from the previous year for a total caseload of 5,419. Compare this figure to 711 
cases received by the federal CLRB for an indication of the relative importance of 
34
 See Peter G. Bruce, "State Structures and Processing of Unfair Labor Practice Cases in the 
United States and Canada," in Jane Jenson and Rianne Mahon, eds., The Challenge^ of Restructuring: 
North American Labor Movements Respond (1993), at 180. 
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provincial jurisdiction in labor matters. The OLRB processed 1,297 unfair labor 
practice cases alleging contravention of the Act. Of those, 856 were disposed of, pro- f 
ceedings were adjourned indefinitely in 160 cases, and 281 unfair labor practice cases j 
were pending at the end of the fiscal year. I 
From the date of initial filing, 80 percent of all dispositions were accomplished in | 
3 months or less. A median of 26 days was taken to proceed from filing to disposition f 
for the 3,287 cases completed in the year. Certification applications were processed in f 
a median of 24 days, while unfair labor practice cases took 33 days. In all categories of f 
cases, the processing time was shorter than the year before. 
The experience of the CLRB contrasts sharply with the OLRB case-handling ex-
perience. The average time taken to process a CLRB case without a hearing in 1994-
1995 was 168 days, or 5-1/2 months. The average for a CLRB unfair labor practice 
case with a hearing was 447 days, with averages of about 4 months to prepare a report, 
3 months waiting for a scheduled hearing, and 6 months to write the decision.35 
While the Quebec statute is like other Canadian laws in its definition and prohibi-
35
 See Seeking a Balance: Canada Labour Code Part 1 Review, Ministry of Labour Task Force 
(1996), at 187. Using this report, the federal government in November 1996 proposed amend-
ments to the Canada Labour Code that would streamline and accelerate urifair%bor practice pro-
ceedings. A new Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) would replace the CLRB. This new, 
tripartite Board would be made up of a neutral chair and vice chairs, andjsgujdjriumbers of mem-
bers representing labor and management. 
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The Quebec Commissioners and the Labour Court 
tion of unfair labor practices, labor law enforcement is structured differently in Que- I 
bee. Quebec does not have a separate board empowered to adjudicate cases and issue | 
remedies largely free of judicial review. Quebec's enforcement is carried out by a j 
specialized branch of the Ministry of Labour: the Office of the General Commis- i 
sioner of Labour. The commissioners' decisions are subject to review by the Labour f 
Court, part of the judicial branch. ":s 
The General Commissioner of Labour 
An individual Labour Commissioner investigates an unfair labor practice charge \ 
after a complaint is filed. The Commissioner receives evidence and makes determina- \ 
tions on lawful or unlawful conduct. The Commissioner is empowered to order an 
employer to cease and desist from unlawful conduct and to reinstate with full back pay 
or otherwise make whole an employee who suffered discrimination for union activity. 
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The Labour Court 
The Court hears appeals from final decisions of a Labour Commissioner, and is 
empowered to affirm, reverse, or modify the commissioner's decision. The Court's 
decision is final, and there is no appeal. The Labour Court has original jurisdiction in 
penal cases involving criminal liability for labor law violations, a powerful but rarely 
used remedy. 
The Labour Court is a judicial entity, not an administrative one. The Court is 
composed of judges chosen among those of the Quebec Court after consultation with 
the General Counsel of the Quebec Bar and the Consultative Labour and Employ-
ment Council, a labor-management advisory body created by law. Their number is 
not fixed, but must be "sufficient to rapidly dispose of matters submitted to the Court." 
As in all Canadian jurisdictions, decisions of the Labour Commissioners or the 
Labour Court are self-enforcing upon deposit of the decision in Superior Court, with 
the same obligatory effect as a decision of the Superior Court itself. The decision may 
then be carried out as with any decision by a common law court under the Quebec 
Code of Civil Procedure, enforceable in a contempt of court proceeding upon non-
compliance with the order, backed by incarceration and fines. 
MEXICO 
Mexico's legal framework regarding plant closings and freedom of association is 
substantially different from that of the United States and Canada.36 Mexico does not 
use the unfair labor practice (ULP) concept. Instead, rather than defining prohibited 
acts, Mexican labor law sets forth affirmative requirements for employment-related 
decisions. 
The Federal Labor Law (FLL) requires companies to secure permission from the 
relevant Conciliation and Arbitration Board (CAB) before closing a plant. There are 
over 100 such boards in federal and state jurisdictions for various regions and indus-
trial sectors. Whether in federal or state jurisdiction and regardless of geographic or 
sectoral reach, all CABs enforce the same provisions of the F L L . 
36
 The Secretariat's preparation of this section of the report draws on two legal memoranda 
supplied to the Secretariat for this purpose: "Effects of Sudden Plant Closings on the Principle of 
Freedom of Association and the Right of Workers to Organize in Mexico," by Nestor de Buen 
Lozano and Carlos de Buen Unna, and "Trade Union Effects of Plant Closings," by Arturo 
Alcalde Justiniani. 
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A temporary plant closing creates a "collective suspension" of the employment re- j 
lationship under F L L Article 427, and a permanent closing creates a "collective ter- ] 
mination" of the employment relationship under Article 433. In short, an employer j 
must obtain the labor board's approval before closing a plant, rather than having a j 
union file a complaint with the labor board after a closing. j 
In another key difference, the F L L does not consider threats in general or plant \ 
closing threats in particular as unlawful acts. The law only addresses cases where an j 
employee threatens the employer, which can result in a justified discharge under FLL • 
Article 47 (II). However, Mexican law does address the effects of a plant closing j 
threat if the threat is carried out. The issue in such proceedings is whether the em- j 
ployer closed for one of the permissible causes specified in the FLL. The employer j 
would seek to prove that the closing was motivated by legitimate economic cause sped- j 
fied in the law, through testimony of financial analysts, expert witnesses, examination ;. 
of books and records, and so forth. Anti-union motivation is not a permissible cause, j 
However, the burden always rests with the employer to show legitimate cause. Evi- : 
dence of anti-union motivation is not relevant in a plant closing case, so threats are not ; 
an issue. 
Failing proof of a permissible cause, employees are considered to have been unjus- ! 
tifiably discharged. The employer must then, under the Constitution, reinstate or pay 
severance pay to affected workers. In any event, as will be seen, the specified proce-
dure for plant closing is rarely invoked. 
Job Stability and Discharge 
A key concept in Mexican labor law, without which a plant closing situation cannot 
be understood, is that of job stability and discharge. Job stability is understood in 
Mexico as a right of the worker to keep his or her job either for a time specified in a 
contract or, without such specification, indefinitely. The employer may not discharge a 
worker arbitrarily, but must prove a specific cause defined in the law. 
This job stability is recognized as a constitutional right in Article 123, Part A, 
Paragraph XXII, which states, "The employer who discharges a worker without just 
cause, or for having joined an association or a union, or for having participated in a 
lawful strike, shall be obligated, at the worker's choice, to fulfill the employment con-
tract or to indemnify the worker with an amount of three months' salary..." Parallel 
to the remedy of reinstatement or indemnification, F L L Article 48 gives the unjustly 
discharged worker the right to lost salary for the period between the discharge and the 
reinstatement or indemnification. 
The principle of job security gives rise to two basic protections: first, that the em-
ployment contract can only be terminated for cause; second, that additional rights and 
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benefits accrue with time on the job and increasing seniority. Job security can be abso-
lute, preventing any discharge before a labor tribunal has found cause for discharge 
and granted a dissolution of the employment relationship or contract. In practice, 
however, job security is treated as relative, providing security but not necessarily per-
manence. Section XXII of the Constitution states that "The Law shall determine 
those cases in which the employer shall be relieved of the obligation to fulfill the em-
ployment contract through payment of an indemnizacion " 
Thus, Article 49 of the F L L allows the employer to refuse reinstatement and pay 
indemnification to discharged workers with less than 1 year of service, or who come 
into direct contact with the employer, or to confidential, domestic, or casual workers. 
Article 50 sets forth a formula for indemnification payment, generally 3 months' pay 
with additional seniority-based payments (usually 12-20 days' pay per year of service) 
as well as payment of lost salary for the period between the unjust discharge and the 
payment of the indemnification. Individual discharge cases are heard by the relevant 
federal or state CABs, where the burden of proof in discharge cases always rests with 
the employer to show just cause for the discharge. 
Workers frequendy accept severance pay in liquidation of their claim for reinstate-
ment. According to data from the Office of the Federal Labor Ombudsman (the free 
legal service for workers claiming unjustified discharge), only 1 worker among 154 
who won a claim for unjustified discharge in 1995 opted for reinstatement.37 In a case 
study of two state CABs, researchers examined 75 cases of individual claims of unjus-
tified dismissal. None of the workers who prevailed in those cases opted for reinstate-
ment.38 
Plant Closing Labor Law 
The F L L has been fashioned to deal with two types of plant closings: temporary 
and permanent. 
Temporary Plant Closings 
Articles 427-432 of the F L L cover temporary plant closings under the tide "col-
lective suspension of the employment relationship." In seeking "balance between the 
factors of production," Article 123 of the Constitution, in its Section XIX, counter-
poises the workers' right to strike with the employer's right to cease production "when 
37
 Information supplied to Secretariat by the Procuraduria Federal de la Defensa del Trabajo of 
the Mexican Department of Labor and Social Welfare. 
38
 See Kevin J. Middlebrook and Cirila Quintero Ramirez, "Conflict Resolution in the Mexi-
can Labor Courts: An Examination of Local CABs in Chihuahua and Tamaulipas" (1995), avail-
able from the U.S. National Administrative Office. 
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excess production makes it necessary to suspend operations to maintain prices within 
limits that meet costs, with prior approval of the CAB." Article 427 of the FLL ex-
tends this principle by setting forth extensive procedures for intervention by the CAB, 
rather than permitting a unilateral decision by the employer on a temporary or perma-
nent closing. 
The following are permissible reasons for a temporary plant closing under Article 427; 
I. Force majeure or an unforeseen circumstance not imputable to the employer, 
or by his physical or mental incapacity or death, which produces as a necessary, 
immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work; 
II. Lack of raw materials not imputable to the employer; 
III. The excess of production in relation to economic conditions and the circum-
stance of the market; 
IV The inability to meet the costs of production, of a temporary, clear, and obvious 
nature; 
V. The lack of funds and the impossibility of obtaining them for the normal pro-
secution of work, if proven by the employer; and I 
VI. The lack of delivery by the State of payments it had obligated itself to deliver ] 
to the enterprise with which it had contracted for goods or services, if such " 
are indispensable. 
Under Article 428 of the FLL, a temporary closing of an enterprise or establish-
ment may be total or partial. Under Article 431, if the CAB permits the temporary 
closing, the union may request every 6 months a reverification of the causes that pre-
cipitated the closing. If cause is not found, the Board will order reopening of the 
workplace within 30 days. Under Article 432, workers have 30 days after the reopen-
ing to report back to work, and they must be given their previously held positions. 
Permanent Plant Closings 
Articles 433-439 of the F L L cover permanent plant closings under the tide "col-
lective termination of the employment relationship." Article 434 of Mexico's FLL 
sets forth specific causes that must be proven, and decided by the CAB, before an 
employer may permanently close an enterprise or establishment. The permissible rea-
sons for a permanent plant closing are the following: 
I. Force majeure or an unforeseen circumstance not imputable to the employer, or 
by his physical or mental incapacity or death, which produces as a necessary, 
immediate, and direct consequence the suspension of work; 
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II. The clear and obvious inability to meet the costs of production; 
III. The exhaustion of basic material of an extractive industry; 
IV. Cases involving employment derived from the exploitation of mines that 
lack minerals that recover their cost, or in the restoration of abandoned or inop-
erative mines; and 
V. A legally declared personal or corporate bankruptcy, where the creditors have 
agreed to a permanent plant closing or permanent reduction of work. 
In conformity with Mexican law, an enterprise cannot close without following other 
legal requirements besides the FLL, such as advance notice to the tax authorities. If 
an employer closes a plant and converts its assets to personal use, the employer will be 
declared in fraudulent bankruptcy, which carries a 5- to 10-year prison sentence, and 
will be fined up to 10 percent of the value of the assets. This penal sanction protects 
the interests of all parties, including workers, tax authorities, social security, creditors, 
and so on. 
In sum, Mexican law protects workers facing a plant closing while recognizing 
that in certain circumstances closings will be allowed, always with the following 
two conditions: 
1. Workers must receive reasonable severance pay depending on the circumstances 
and within the parameters of the law (in plant closings, normally 3 months' pay plus 
12 days' pay for each year of service), but such severance pay can be higher if so 
stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement. 
2. A plant closing must be approved by a CAB. 
Procedures for Temporary and Permanent Plant Closings 
The F L L contains different procedures for different types of cases. In temporary 
plant closing cases, issues of force majeure or unforeseen circumstances, and lack of 
raw materials or payments by the State, are handled through a "special proceeding" 
before the CAB contained in Articles 892-899 of the F L L , Issues of excess produc-
tion or failure to meet the costs of production are treated in another procedure for an 
"economic conflict of a collective nature," which has its own, highly detailed and spe-
cific procedural requirements, including reports from expert witnesses on the company's 
financial status (FLL Articles 900-919). 
In permanent closing cases, there are likewise two different proceedings for obtain-
ing the necessary authorization to close a plant, depending on the cause of the closing. 
For questions of force majeure or unforeseen circumstances, such as an earthquake that 
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destroys the workplace, the employer must advise the CAB to invoke a special pro-
ceeding under Articles 892-899 of the F L L to approve or disapprove of the closing. 
When the cause involves failure to meet the cost of production, the employer must 
initiate a collective conflict of an economic nature before the CAB under Articles 
900-919 of the FLL . 
Rather than engaging in this complex procedural process, many companies and 
unions act under Article 53 of the FLL, which permits termination of the employ-
ment relationship "by mutual consent of the parties," or under Article 401, which 
permits termination of a collective contract "by mutual consent." This procedure pro-
vides for more rapid, flexible resolution of issues in the plant closing, mainly involving • 
the amount of severance pay and other benefits to affected workers. Under this proce- ! 
dure, which also is overseen by the relevant CAB in a conciliation capacity, the parties j 
reach a voluntary collective agreement on the plant closing. | 
In addition to this proceeding, at any time workers may exercise their right to strike, -j 
which has the effect of halting all proceedings under the collective conflict provisions I 
of the FLL. The matter then shifts to the bargaining table where the parties may i 
reach a settlement, with the intervention of the CAB in a conciliation and mediation | 
role rather than an adjudicatory role. In practice, these alternatives to the "special 
proceeding" or "economic conflict" procedures are more widely used. I 
Jurisprudence j 
Like all systems with origins in Roman and continental European law, Mexican i 
law is a code-based system rather than a common law system. Court decisions are j 
subordinated to the Constitution, laws, and regulations established under the law. I 
Article 17 of the F L L specifies that the Constitution* the F L L and its regulations, I 
international treaties ratified by the Senate, and general principles of law precede ju- -
risprudence, custom, and equity in applying the labor law. In Mexico the legislative 
authority creates the law. Judges and tribunals resolve only cases that come before 
them, and their decisions affect only the parties to the cases they decide. They do not | 
establish precedent for other cases with similar facts, unlike in U.S. or Canadian law. I 
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The Mexican Supreme Court has elaborated the following points of jurisprudence 
regarding plant closings:39 
I Definition of Plant Closing 
In light of the nature of juridical relations contemplated in labor legislation, it is 
understood that a plant closing exists when activities for which the service of employ-
ees was required has ceased, independently of whether other activities of a different 
character continue to fulfill the obligations determined by mercantile law. 
2. Requirements for Plant Closings 
The total closing of an enterprise, which carries with it the termination of contracts 
of employment, is an economic fact. The F L L does not authorize owners to close an 
enterprise of their own free will, but considers that the opening of a workplace carries 
with it the obligation of the owner to remain in business indefinitely, and that the 
owner may terminate or close it only by fulfilling requirements set forth in the law, and 
that any failure to fulfill such requirements would make the cessation of operations 
and the closing of the workplace illegal 
39
 See Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, epoca 7A, Tomo XXXIII, p. 15, Precedentes: 
Amparo Directo 6486/68, Union de Abridores de Ostion, Trabajadores en las Industrias de 
Empacadores de Pescado, Mariscos y Productos Similares del Golfo de Mexico, 8 de septiembre 
de 1971, 5 votos. Ponente: Maria Cristina Salmoran de Tamano. Cierre Total de Una Empresa, 
Demanda a la Reanudacion de Labores en Caso De; 
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, epoca 6A, Tomo LVIII, p. 9, Precedentes: Amparo 
Directo 3273/56 Moises Cosio Gomez, 12 de abril de 1962, 5 votos. Ponente: Agapito Pozo. 
Contrato Colectivo de Trabajo, Terminacion, Causas De; 
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, epoca 5A, Cuarta Sala, Tomo CXIX, p. 2528, 
Precedentes: Tomo CXIX, p. 2528 Alvarez del Castillo Efren, 3 de julio de 1953,4 votos. Contrato 
db Trabajo, Terminacion del Por Cierre Total de la Empresa; 
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, Cuarta Sala, epoca 5A, Tomo CVII, p. 1965, Precedentes: 
Tomo CVII, p. 1965, 14 de marzo de 1951, 5 votos, Tomo CXXV, p.1982, Tomo XCIV, p. 54, 
Tomo LXXXVIII, p. 2046. Cierre de Empresas, Con Autorizacion de la Junta. Despido 
Injustificado; 
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, epoca 5A, Tomo LXXVI, p. 6207, Precedentes: Tomo 
LXXVI, p. 6207 Ojeda Manuel, 28 dejunio de 1943. Cierre de Negociaciones por Incosteabilidad; 
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, epoca 5A, Tomo LX, p. 4276, Precedentes: Tomo 
LXIX, p. 4267, Munos Mufioz, Nieves, 17 de septiembre de 1941; Semanario Judicial de la 
Federacion, epoca 5A, Tomo LVII, p. 1267. 
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, epoca 5 A, Tomo XLVII, p. 1991, Conflictos de Orden 
Economico. 
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, epoca 5A, Tomo LVII, p.l768trJ|i^ta^, Conflictos 
Economicos Ante Las. 
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3. Procedure to Follow for Plant Closings 
The procedure to follow in the labor field for the temporary or permanent closing 
of an enterprise is that established in the F L L as an economic conflict to be litigated 
before the CAB, and which has the nature of public order by which the labor tribunals 
must issue a justified decision in which both parties, workers and employers, have the 
opportunity to avail themselves of due process of justice. 
4. Termination of Employment Contracts and Plant Closings 
The fact that the law allows for such termination of employment contracts for vari-
ous individual or collective causes does not mean that employers decide the matter on 
their own, since they cannot halt operations or close a facility, whatever the motivation, 
except by filing a petition regarding the closing before the CAB, which must then 
hear the views of the workers so that related dispositions of the F L L are observed. 
5. Unjustified Discharges and Plant Closings 
The illegal closing of an enterprise undertaken without the intervention of the la-
bor tribunals must be considered as an unjustified discharge because employers are 
not permitted to simply close without notice on their own volition. Such an action is 
harmful to workers and undermines the national economy and the general interest of 
society in preserving sources of employment and increasing the benefits of collective 
social activity. 
The total closing of an enterprise can only take place when there exists a cause that 
is justified and precisely foreseen in the FLL, and the procedure also preordained in 
the law for matters of an economic nature is followed (requiring approval by the CAB 
before closing). When these two requirements have not been complied with, the clos-
ing of the enterprise and the separation of the workers amount to unjustified dis-
charge, and the discharged workers are then entitled to their constitutionally guaran-
teed severance pay under Section XXII of Article 123. 
Plant Closing Procedures Under Mexican Law 
For temporary closing cases mvolvmgforce majeure, lack of raw materials, and the 
like, employers must follow "special proceedings" under Articles 892-899 of the FLL. 
For cases involving failure to meet costs or lack of funds, procedures under Articles 
900-919 for a "collective conflict of an economic nature" are used. For permanent 
closing cases, there are also two procedural routes under the FLL: "special proceed-
ings" for closings caused by unforeseen circumstances, j&ra majeure, bankruptcy, or 
exhaustion of raw materials, and "collective conflict of an economic nature" proceed-
ings for a clear and obvious inability to meet costs. 
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Special Proceeding (Articles 892-899) 
The special proceeding begins with a demand from the employer to the CAB for 
permission to close the plant, citing the reasons for the closing. The CAB must ar-
range a hearing with at least 10 days' notice, and within 15 working days, for the 
employer and the union to appear before it with evidence, witnesses from the work-
place, and testimony from expert witnesses. Every attempt is made to fully air the 
evidence in the hearing so that it is a final rather than a preliminary hearing. Further 
hearings may be scheduled as needed. After receiving and weighing evidence, the 
CAB issues an order, or laudo, approving or disapproving of the closing. 
Collective Conflict of an Economic Nature (Articles 900-919) 
Throughout the procedure for a collective conflict of an economic nature, the CAB 
is obligated to pursue conciliation by agreement of the parties, even as litigation en-
sues. This procedure is initiated by a written petition from the employer seeking per-
mission to close the plant, with documents demonstrating the economic condition of 
the company and the necessity of the relief sought. The petition must also contain a 
list of employees, a statement from an independent expert attesting to the economic 
situation of the company, and other evidence crediting the claims of the company. 
The CAB convenes a hearing for the company and the union within 5 days, and 
appoints a team of expert witnesses independent of the expert witnesses of the parties. 
The CAB's expert witnesses undertake the research and studies considered necessary, 
and may demand of the parties reports and information as needed. The independent 
experts may also seek information from the public authorities and from independent 
researchers, union organizations, management associations, and industry groups. They 
may also visit the workplace and examine books and records, and interview workers 
and managers. The CAB may undertake its own investigatory action as it deems con-
venient. At any time this long, complicated process may be immediately halted if the 
union exercises its right to strike, except in the case of a solidarity strike (Articles 448, 
450 fracc. VI, and 902 of the FLL). 
The Amparo Proceeding as a Guarantee of Due Process in Collective 
Conflicts 
The FLL provides that CAB decisions are final and binding in labor proceedings, 
including those for special proceedings and collective conflict of an economic nature. 
Decisions may not be appealed, and the CAB may not revise its own decision. How-
ever, either of the parties involved in a case before the CAB has recourse to the amparo 
(shelter) appeal under Article 103 of the Constitution and the federal Law of Amparo. 
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The right of amparo is a cornerstone of civil law in Mexico and in all Latin Ameri-
can countries as a check on administrative authority. Under constitutional and statu-
tory rights of amparo, a private party injured by the decision or actions of a CAB may I 
seek review in the civil courts alleging that the CAB has engaged in a violation of : 
fundamental rights or due process of law. An amparo appeal must be filed within 15 
days of the decision under the Law of Amparo, Article 21. An action for amparo can 
be brought to district court judges, and their decisions may then be appealed to fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals and to the Supreme Court. The amparo courts may re-
view the decision and the proceedings of an administrative authority, and they are 
empowered to overturn the CAB where they find a violation of fundamental rights or 
due process. The findings of the amparo court are applicable only to the parties in the 
case before the court; they do not become precedents for other cases. '; 
In practice, such amparo appeals are the most often used recourse in Mexican labor '\ 
law. The court may issue an injunction in case of irreparable harm or burdensome [ 
remedy, or to restore the status quo ante while the case is considered. The amparo I 
ruling has the objective of restoring the aggrieved party to the enjoyment of the rights \ 
that were violated, and obligates the responsible administrative authority to carry out • 
the ruling, subject to sanctions if it fails to do so. j 
Collective Termination of the Employment Relationship I 
i 
In Mexico, it is not lawful for an employer unilaterally to close a plant. The em- \ 
ployer must follow the procedures spelled out in the FLL or, alternatively, obtain a j 
collective agreement to terminate the employment relationship. Articles 433-434 of j 
the F L L permit a collective termination of the employment relationship as a conse- ! 
quence of a plant closing by mutual consent of the parties, with payment under Article j 
436 of severance pay of 3 months' salary plus a seniority-based bonus. ! 
Rather than the complex procedure for collective conflict of an economic nature, j 
using the procedure for collective termination of the employment relationship has \ 
emerged as a more frequent practice.40 The union and the company come before the ! 
CAB to declare that they have reached a settlement of their economic conflict between : 
themselves by means of a collective agreement for termination of the collective and [ 
individual employment relationships. They present the agreement for CAB approval ; 
under Article 901 of the FLL, which empowers the boards to mediate such matters. ; 
Article 906 establishes that if the parties reach such an agreement, the collective con- i 
flict is considered resolved on that basis, and the agreement ratified by the CAB has j 
the force of a board order or laudo. \ 
40
 See Juan B. Climent, Elementos de Derecho Procesal del Trabajo (EHit. "Esfinge, 1989), at 252. i 
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Whether the parties initiate a collective conflict followed by a voluntary agree-
ment, or come to the CAB directly with a voluntary agreement, they may avoid 
the long and complicated procedure involving hearings, evidence, three sets of 
expert witnesses, and the other features of the collective conflict proceeding called 
for in the FLL. By means of the voluntary agreement for termination of the em-
ployment relationship, they find an alternative route that is more rapid, more col-
laborative, and perhaps, most important, provides higher levels of severance pay 
for the workers. 
The plant closing agreement is treated as a modification of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, which must be approved by the CAB. The accompanying dissolution 
of the union requires a separate proceeding and declaration by the labor authorities in 
which no action by the employer in closing the plant can have the effect of harming 
workers' trade union rights. 
The following box compares the legal frameworks for protection of labor rights in 
the three countries of the NAALC. 
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Legal Frameworks at a Glance3 
Canada United States Mexico 
Constitutional 
Foundations 
1
 Constitution is silent on 
labor rights and 
standards, except §2 of 
the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, which 
guarantees freedom of 
association and 
assembly. (Supreme 
Court ruled Charter 
protects labor 
organization and some 
related activity, but not 
collective bargaining or 
the right to strike.) 
1
 Constitution is silent on 
labor rights and 
standards. 
• First Amendment 
protects freedom of 
assembly, free speech, 
and the right to petition 
the government for 
redress of grievances; 
courts have applied this 
to some labor activity. 
• Constitution protects 
freedom of association, 
the right to organize, and 
the right to strike. 
* Constitution details basic 
labor standards (i.e.,, 
minimum wages, hours of 
work, seniority, overtime, 
child labor, leaves, profit 
sharing, worker housing, 
etc) . 
Labor Law 
Jurisdiction 
» Distinct labor law 
systems: 1 federal, 10 
provincial. 
• Only 10% of workers are 
within federal sector. 
'Administrative labor 
boards are in federal 
sector, 9 provinces, and 
territories; office of 
commissioner (Labour 
Ministry) and labor 
tribunals (Judicial 
branch) in Quebec. 
• National system of 
labor laws: Wagner 
Act, Taft-Hartley Act, 
and Landrum-Griffin 
Act apply throughout 
the national territory. 
• Single national 
administrative labor 
board (NLRB) is for 
enforcement; 33 
regional offices are 
throughout the 
country. 
> Federal labor legislation 
is applied through the 
national territory; federal 
labor law is enforced by 
the federal government 
for key industries and 
sectors; states enforce 
federaliaw for state-level 
industries and sectors. 
»Federal and state 
tripartite CABs are for 
enforcement. 
a
 "Complete" and "partial" closure here refer to the U.S. Darlington doctrine wherein the Supreme Court ruled 
that a complete closing of an entire business, without continuing in business under any other form or guise, 
or in any other location, is permissible, but a partial closure of a business for anti-union motives is unlawful, 
even if the closing is a total closing of a workplace, if the employer remains in business in other locations or 
reopens operations under another name. 
Abbreviation Key: 
CA: collective agreement 
CAB: Conciliation and Arbitration Board (Mexico) 
FLL: Federal Labor Law (Mexico) 
NLRB: National Labor Relations Board (United States) 
ULP: unfair labor practice •«*#^£ £*»£** 
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Legal Frameworks at a Glance (continued) 
Canada United States Mexico 
Union 
Registration 
& 
Certification 
• Majority of jurisdictions 
certify on basis of signed 
cards evidencing 
majority support. 
• Four provinces require 
elections in most cases; 
elections are usually 
held within days of filing. 
• Voluntary recognition « 
may be obtained on basis 
of cards if employer 
agrees. 
« 
• Certification normally 
requires a majority vote 
in a secret ballot 
election; elections are • 
held within several 
weeks of filing petition. 
• Pro- and anti-union 
campaigning occurs 
between petition and 
vote. 
• Unions may be registered 
by any group of 20 or 
more employees. 
• No election is required 
for single union 
formation. 
• A vote is required when a 
second union claims 
majority support for title 
to collective agreement 
(CA). 
Bargaining • Exclusive bargaining rights 
Rights provided to one union per 
bargaining unit upon 
certification {i.e., legal 
recognition of majority 
desire for representation); 
normally shown by card 
check or election; 
voluntary recognition is 
also possible. 
• Exclusive bargaining 
rights are provided 
to one union per 
bargaining unit upon 
certification of majority 
status, normally 
shown by election; 
voluntary recognition 
is also possible. 
• Exclusive bargaining 
rights are given to one 
union per bargaining unit; 
bargaining rights are 
obtained by union upon 
registration (administrative 
process). 
Protection of 
Right to 
Organize 
• Key protection is ULP 
complaint brought by 
employees or union. 
* It is prohibited to 
discharge or discriminate 
for union activity (see 
below "anti-union 
animus"). 
* Key protection is ULP 
charge made by 
employees or union; if 
charge has merit, NLRB 
issues complaint. 
» It is prohibited to 
discharge or discriminate 
for union activity (see 
below "anti-union 
animus"). 
% Constitution prohibits 
discharge for union 
activities. 
• Employees discharged 
within 30 days prior to 
union formation are still 
counted as eligible for "20 
employees" needed to 
constitute union. 
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Legal Frameworks at a Glance (continued) 
Canada United States Mexico 
Protection • Labor boards balance 
for employees' organizing 
Organizing rights with employers' free 
Activity speech rights; evidence of 
"anti-union animus" alone 
is sufficient to constitute 
illegal "unfair labor 
practice," even in 
presence of other motives. 
> NLRB and courts 
balance employees' 
right to organize with 
employers' right of 
free speech up to limit 
of "threat of reprisal"; 
anti-union animus is 
balanced against other 
motives to determine 
predominant motive. 
• Anti-union campaigning 
is exceptional given 
constitutional right to 
organize and place of 
unions in economic/ 
political structure; there is 
no need for election or 
other showing of majority 
status. 
Closing 
Workplace 
for Anti-Union 
Purpose 
• Illegal; anti-union 
motivation for closure 
constitutes unfair labor 
practice; no distinction is 
made between complete 
and partial3 closures 
(except in Quebec). 
* May be legal or illegal; 
closure of entire 
business is not illegal; 
other closures may be 
illegal if predominant 
motive is anti-union 
animus. 
• Illegal if unapproved by 
CAB; all closures require 
approval by CAB for 
specified legal cause 
{force majeure, economic 
failure, bankruptcy, etc.). 
Threats of • Threats are illegal; they 
Closure for are unfair labor practice if 
Anti-Union coercive, intimidating, or 
Purpose undue influence. 
» Threats are illegal; 
unfair labor practice 
if words contain "threat 
of reprisal." 
• Threat is not defined as 
illegal unfair labor 
practice;it does not arise 
as a legal dispute under 
labor law. 
Penalties & 
Remedies for 
Threats of 
Closure 
• Cease-and-desist orders; 
post notices; certification 
of union where conditions 
for objective determination 
of employee sentiment are 
destroyed by employer's 
unlawful conduct. 
• Cease-and-desist order; • Threats as such are not 
post notices; certification defined as illegal. 
of union where conditions 
for fair election*are 
destroyed by employer's; 
unlawful conduct. 
Penalties & 
Remedies 
for Closure 
> Severance pay and 
transfer rights for workers; 
extension of contract to 
new sites; payment of 
organizing costs to union. 
» Order to reopen and 
rehire workers where 
feasible; order to 
bargain over effects of 
closure; back pay as 
appropriate. 
Back pay, severance 
pay for affected workers 
(rarely arises since unions 
usually agree on 
severance terms). 
UNION ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 
UNITED STATES 
In the United States, organizing usually begins when workers concerned about 
working conditions make contact with a trade union representative. In some cases, 
union representatives actively seek contact with workers at a particular workplace for 
strategic purposes, usually when the union already has a collective bargaining rela-
tionship with the same employer or one or more other employers in the same industry. 
However, there is no requirement that a union limit its organizing to a single industry, 
or that workers seek a union that already represents workers in their company or in-
dustry. Many U.S. unions represent groups of workers totally unrelated to their prin-
cipal industry. For example, the United Steel Workers union represents some nurses' 
groups, the United Automobile Workers union represents some insurance company 
clerks, and so on. 
The union representative normally "arranges a series of meetings with workers in 
their homes, in a union office, or at restaurants, rented halls, or other meeting places. 
Workers inform the union representative about conditions in the workplace, and the 
union representative informs workers about how the union operates. Usually the most 
interested workers form an "organizing committee" to openly advocate for the union 
in the workplace. 
Organizing in the United States 
At some point in the process (it could be at the beginning or later, after the organiz-
ing committee has formed), the union representative distributes cards for workers to 
sign indicating their desire to have the union represent them in collective bargaining. 
Some unions prefer to have in-plant organizing leaders distribute the cards to co-
workers inside the workplace, which is permitted as long as such solicitation takes 
place in non-work areas on non-work time (typically, in a break or lunch room). 
If 30 percent of the workers who are part of the "bargaining unit"41 sign cards, the 
union may petition the nearest office of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB 
41
 The "bargaining unit" is defined as employees with a sufficient community of interest to 
bargain collectively for a single agreement. Managers and supervisors are excluded from a bar-
gaining unit, and often workers with apparently divergent interests (professionals and non-
professionals, for example) are divided into separate units. 
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or the Board) to conduct a secret ballot election to determine whether a majority of 
workers desire representation by the union. Normally, however, union organizers wait 
until a substantial majority of workers have signed cards (two-thirds is an informal 
measure often used by experienced organizers). The union then requests recognition 
from the employer, which is nearly always refused. The union proceeds to petition the 
NLRB for a representation election. 
Slightly fewer than 50 days is the median length of time between the filing of the 
petition and the holding of the election. Most elections take place in 30-60 days; 20 
percent of elections are held more than 60 days after the filing of the petition.42 The 
period can be extended when employers challenge the definition of the bargaining 
unit claimed by the union. 
The weeks leading up to the NLRB election are usually marked by vigorous cam-
paigning on all sides. The union organizing campaign often involves wearing buttons 
and T-shirts, distributing leaflets, holding rallies, and using other tactics. The 
employer's anti-union campaign usually consists of managers' speeches to assembled 
employees, letters to workers' homes, and training and instructions to supervisors to 
convey the employer's opposition to unionization in individual and group discussions 
with workers. Many employers engage consulting groups or law firms that specialize 
in directing the "union avoidance" campaign for management. 
Typically, some employees within the group being organized are opposed to union-
ization. They often form a "Vote No" committee and campaign against the union 
supporters. It is unlawful for the employer to instigate or to assist such a committee. 
Intensive workplace discussions and arguments are common. After several weeks of 
such campaigning, the final days before an election usually reach a high level of tension. 
NLRB agents conduct a secret ballot vote, usually in the workplace in a time span 
sufficient to permit all eligible workers to vote during working hours. A voting booth 
with a curtain to maintain ballot secrecy is normally used. After balloting is com-
pleted, the Board agent counts the votes with union and management observers present 
for the vote count. 
Either party may file objections to the election claiming unfair tactics by the other 
side. If no objections are filed, or if the NLRB disposes of the objections without 
overturning the election, the election results are certified. If the union has won, the 
NLRB certifies the union as the exclusive bargaining representative, and the em-
ployer is obligated to bargain in good faith with the union. 
42
 See U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Department of Commerce, Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report (May 1994); at 82. 
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In the 1990-1995 period, unions filed an average of 5,000 petitions for an NLRB 
election per year. After withdrawals and dismissals, elections took place in 3,200 of 
those campaigns, and unions won the election in about 1,500 cases (47 percent). (See 
Table 2 for statistics on union elections conducted by the NLRB, 1990-1995.) 
Table 2 
U.S. NLRB RC Election Results, 1990-1995a 
FY 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Average 
Representation 
Petitions Filed 
6,005 
5,162 
4,946 
5,084 
4,610 
4,571 
5,063 
Petitions 
Dismissed or 
Withdrawn 
2,398 
1,868 
1,852 
1,932 
1,428 
1,498 
1,829 
"RC" 
Elections 
3,607 
(60%) 
3,294 
(64%) 
3,094 
(63%) 
3,152 
(62%) 
3,182 
69%) 
3,073 
(67%) 
3,234 
(64%) 
Union Wins 
("Success Rate" 
in Elections) 
1,773 
(49%) 
1,465 
(44%) 
1,476 
48%) 
1,524 
(48%) 
1,481 
(47%) 
1,456 
(47%) 
1,529 
(47%) 
aMost RC (Representation Case) elections are held in connection with new union organizing at an 
unorganized workplace. These figures do not include decertification or other types of elections. 
Bargaining After Certification 
The "good faith" requirement is often the subject of new unfair labor practice charges 
when a union and a company engage in fruitless negotiations. When the employer is 
found to be bargaining in bad faith, the remedy is an order to return to the bargaining 
table and bargain in good faith. Nothing in the law compels the employer or the union 
to agree to any contract clause or to reach an overall agreement. If they bargain to a 
genuine impasse, the employer may unilaterally implement its last proposal.43 The 
union may undertake a strike, or the employer may undertake a lockout, to back up 
their bargaining position. 
43
 Whether or not a genuine impasse exists when an employer unilaterally implements its last 
proposal is often the subject of unfair labor practice charges of failure to bargainTri good faith. 
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CANADA 
Union organizing in Canada often begins with unorganized workers contacting a 
union representative for help forming a union in their workplace. Workers can seek 
any union to represent them; they are not limited to a union in their company or 
industry (Canada's largest private sector union, the Canadian Auto Workers, bargains 
for workers in many industries unrelated to automobiles). 
A series of meetings normally takes place in workers' homes or in meeting places. 
The basic mechanism for union formation is the signing of individual cards authoriz-
ing the union as the workers' bargaining agent. In a majority of provinces, signing the 
card is effectively the vote for union representation. The federal jurisdiction and 6 of 
the 10 provinces provide for certification of the union as the workers' bargaining agent 
if the union obtains signed cards from a majority of workers in the bargaining unit (in 
some provinces, the requirement is 55 or 60 percent to avoid disputes over small 
numbers of cards). The relevant labor board or labor commissioner in Quebec checks 
the authenticity of the cards before proceeding to certify the union. This is known as 
the "card-check" method of union certification. 
In those provinces that usually require an election,44 it is normally held within a few 
days of the application. In Ontario, for example, which recently switched from the 
card-check system to a mandatory election system, the election must be held within 5 
days of the application. The result of both the card-check system and the rapid-elec-
tion features of Canadian labor organizing is the relative absence of prolonged, ag-
gressive workplace campaigning for or against union representation.45 
44
' In the United States and Canadian provinces that normally hold representation elections, 
statutes or judicial doctrines permit the labor authorities to certify a union without an election or in 
spite of election results when the employer's unfair labor practices make a fair election impossible. 
In the United States, the union must have attained majority support before its majority was de-
stroyed by employer conduct. In Canada, it is generally not necessary to have obtained a majority. 
45
 Many analysts attribute the diverging proportion of union representation in Canada (more 
than 30 percent) and the United States (less than 15 percent) in part to this key difference in labor 
law. See Gary N. Chaison and Joseph B. Rose, "Continental Divide: The Direction and Fate of 
North American Unions," m Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Sockell, Lewin and Lipsky, 
eds. (1991); Richard Freeman, "On the Divergence in Unionism among Developed Countries," 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 2817 (1989); Paul Weiler, "Promises 
to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA," 96 Harvard Law 
Review 1769(1983). 
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Organizing Results in Canada 
A study of certification results in Canada in the 1990—1995 period shows that the 
two largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, averaged 953 and 983 applications per 
year for new union certification received by their board or commissioners. British 
Columbia averaged 523 applications per year, and 161 per year were received by the 
federal labor board. 
For Ontario and Quebec, applications granted averaged 616 and 712 per year, a 65 
and 72 percent success rate, respectively. British Columbia granted 338 certifications 
per year (65 percent of applications), and the federal board granted 102 per year, a 63 
percent success rate. (See Table 3 for statistics on Canadian union certification results, 
1990-1995.) 
Bargaining After Certification 
Canadian labor law establishes the obligation of an employer to bargain in good 
faith with a certified union. Failure to bargain in good faith is an unfair labor practice. 
In addition, however, a majority of provinces, and the federal jurisdiction, provide for 
a special settlement process that may lead to binding arbitration of a first contract 
when a newly formed union is unable to reach an agreement with the employer. 
MEXICO 
The union organizing system in Mexico is fundamentally different from the sys-
tems of the United States and Canada. In Mexico, unions require a public act of state 
granting the status needed to legally function. Unions must obtain this official regis-
tration with the appropriate government agency For unions covered by federal juris-
diction, the registry resides in the Department of Labor. In state jurisdiction, registra-
tion is obtained from the state CAB. Under the law, the granting of registration is a 
purely administrative act, as long as the union complies with filing requirements.46 
Any group of 20 or more workers, even if they are only a minority of the workplace's 
employees, can form a union by a formal act of registering with the labor authorities. 
No election is necessary Normally the union must affiliate with an existing registered 
46
 An extensive analysis of the union registration system in Mexico is available in a special 
study by a group of independent experts commissioned by the National Administrative Office of 
Mexico in connection with ministerial consultations following U.S. NAO Public Communication 
94003 (the Sony case). See "Estudio del Grupo de Expertos Independientes" in Consultas 
Mtnisteriales: Registro de asociaciones sindicales (March 1996). 
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Applications for Certification and Certifications Granted in 
Selected Canadian Jurisdictions, 1989-1995 
Canada Labour Relations Board 
Certification Applications Received 
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Avg. 
175 175 155 127 173 160 161 
Certification Applications Granted 
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Avg. 
89 133 92 81 103 113 102 
(63% success) 
Ontario Labour Relations Board 
Certification Applications Received 
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Avg. 
910 775 1,092 824 1,166 n/a 953 
Certification Applications Granted 
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Avg. 
573 511 660 509 829 n/a 616 
(65% success) 
Quebec Office of the General Commissioner of Labour 
Certification Applications Received 
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Avg. 
1,267 903 1,320 768 785 854 983 
Certification Applications Granted 
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1991-93 1993-94 1994-95 Avg. 
899 640 978 643 556 555 712 
(72% success) 
British Columbia Labour Relations Board 
Certification Applications Received 
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Avg. 
435 409 347 692 648 607 523 
Certification Applications Granted 
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Avg. 
250 244 197 509 437 393 338 
(65% success) 
Average "Success Rate" for four jurisdictions combined: 66 percent 
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union within the industrial sector for that employer—food workers with a food work-
ers union, textile workers with a textile workers union, machinists with a machinists 
union, and so forth. 
With registration achieved, a union may then demand a contract from the em-
ployer. However, Mexico does not provide for "certification" of a union in the U.S. or 
Canadian sense, which creates a legal duty of the employer to bargain with the union 
selected by a majority of workers. Mexico does not require majority status for union 
registration, and does not use the "duty to bargain" concept. An employer can ignore 
the union's demand for a contract, which challenges the union to launch a strike. The 
union must then estimate whether it has the capacity to undertake an effective strike 
with majority support. 
The employer must cease operations when a strike begins. Within 3 days, however, 
the employer may obtain a vote in which the union must demonstrate majority support 
for the strike. If the majority is not shown, the strike must end and the workers must 
return to work or face dismissal. If the union proves its majority, the employer remains 
closed. The union and the company can continue their test of economic strength until 
they reach a settlement between them, or seek mediation and arbitration from the 
CAB. CAB intervention is the normal route. 
New union organizing in Mexico (that is, in never-unionized workplaces where 
workers seek to form a union, register the union, and obtain a contract where none 
existed before) is relatively low in volume. In private sector industries that are within 
the federal jurisdiction,47 which encompasses more than 2.5 million workers, an aver-
age of 125 new union registrations were sought from the Department of Labor each 
year in the 1989—1994 period and an average of 25 registrations granted per year.48 
In viewing this relatively low volume of new union formation in federal jurisdic-
tion, it should be kept in mind that Mexico has a high density of union organization in 
the formal, non-agricultural sector. Of manufacturing enterprises in ^ Mexico with more 
than 100 employees, 85 percent are unionized. More than 50 percent of private sector 
workers within federal jurisdiction are unionized.49 (See Table 4 for statistics on union 
density in private sector industries under federal enforcement jurisdiction in Mexico.) 
47
 Article 123 of the Constitution grants jurisdiction over FLL enforcement to the states, with 
the exception of 22 industrial sectors that remain under federal jurisdiction, and enterprises operat-
ing in two or more states. The specified private sector industries that remain within federal jurisdic-
tion are contained in Table 4. 
Informes de Labores de la Secretaria del Trabajoy Prevision Social (STPS), 1989-1994. 
Data on federal private sector employment and union membership were obtained bjr the 
Secretariat from the General Coordination of Labor Statistic of STPS. 
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Union Density in Mexican Private Sector Industries Under 
Federal Jurisdiction, 1994 
Industrial Branch 
Federal 
Jurisdiction 
Workers 
Unionized 
Workers in 
Federal Jurisdiction 
Rate of 
Unionization 
Total 
Textiles 
Electricity 
Cinematography 
Rubber 
Sugar 
Mining -
Foundries & Steel Mills 
Energy 
Cement & Limestone 
Automotive 
Chemical 
Pulp & Paper 
Vegetable Oils 
Packaged Food Processors 
Bottling 
Ranroad 
Lumber 
Glass 
Tobacco 
Banks & Credit Unions 
Other Federal Jurisdiction 
2,557,122 
97,337 
87,473 
26,513 
46,232 
184,863 
64,427 
113,614 
94,462 
32,898 
139,772 
123,068 
47,635 
16,400 
210,316 
152,275 
95,706 
30,765 
19,072 
6,095 
259,164 
709,035 
1,314,431 
80,536 
77,503 
18,124 
9,121 
63,631 
26,193 
34,113 
81,648 
11,069 
59,178 
27,339 
20,066 
8,529 
61,439 
81,197 
36,432 
7,037 
12,901 
3,667 
95,163 
499,545 
51.4 
82.7 
88.6 
68.4 
19.7 
34.4 
40.7 
30.0 
86.4 
33.6 
42.3 
22.2 
42.1 
52.0 
29.2 
53.3 
38.1 
22.9 
67.6 
60.2 
36.7 
70.5 
Source: STPS. 
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Since most large and medium-sized firms in Mexico's formal sector are already 
unionized, the potential for new union organizing in the formal sector is greatly re-
duced. Most workers in established firms are already covered by a union contract. 
However, they are a minority of the total workforce. In contrast to the United States 
and Canada, where approximately half the labor force work in enterprises of 500 or 
more employees, only one-third of the Mexican labor force is employed in enterprises 
of 50 or more employees. Of all Mexican workers, 60 percent are employed in firms 
of 15 or fewer employees.50 Many of these are in the large informal sector. Unions are 
mostly absent from small firms, small agricultural enterprises, and the informal sector. 
There are exceptions to this pattern reported in certain maquiladora areas where some 
large firms are not unionized. Maquiladora enterprises are normally within state juris-
diction, not federal. 
Much of union organizing in Mexico involves one already registered union seek-
ing to supplant another as the collective bargaining representative of the workers. In 
some instances, workers initiate a change. In others, the challenging union solicits 
workers' support for a change.51 In federal private sector jurisdiction, there were an 
average of 636 such title disputes per year between unions in the 1990-1994 period, 
compared with the 25 new registrations per year noted above.52 
When one union claims it has majority support and thus is entitled to take over the 
collective agreement from an incumbent union, the relevant CAB conducts a vote, 
called a recuento, to determine which union has majority support.53 The union that 
gains majority support is awarded title to the collective agreement. 
50
 See STPS/INEGI, 1995 National Employment Survey. 
51
 It should be noted that the same phenomenon, called "raiding," occurs in Canada and the 
United States as well, although it is relatively rare now (in decades past it was more common as, for 
example, when the American Federation of Labor [AFL] and the Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations [CIO] were separate, rival federations). The relevant authorities in all three countries 
conduct votes to determine workers' preference. 
Estadisticas Laborales, Segundo Semestrey STPS, Subsecretaria "B" at 123. 
53
 The voting method is not specified in the statute or by regulations. It may or may not be by 
secret ballot. 
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PART THREE 
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND JUDICIAL DATA 
UNITED STATES 
Judicial Findings—Federal Courts of Appeals Case Review 
Secretariat researchers examined all 89 U.S. federal appeals court decisions in cases 
involving plant closings and threats of plant closing published between 1986 and 1993.54 
Among them, 70 cases arose in the context of a new union organizing effort at an 
unorganized workplace, and 19 cases involved unions with an established bargaining 
relationship. Significantly, 14 of these 19 cases involved a successor employer or an 
"alter ego" employer; that is, the same employer claimed to be a successor not bound 
by a collective bargaining agreement. This suggests that changes in corporate owner-
ship may pose a risk of closing-related, anti-union conduct. 
Of the 89 cases, 4 involved a complete plant closing in retaliation for union orga-
nizing or union activity. Among the 89 cases, 28 involved some form of partial closing 
(mass layoffs, subcontracting, shift elimination, failure to rehire union workers after a 
temporary closing, etc.). Also, 43 cases involved threats to totally close a plant, while 
14 involved threats of some other form of systemic (as opposed to individual) job 
elimination—57 "threat" cases overall. 
Appeals Court Findings 
The courts of appeals upheld determinations by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or the Board) that employers unlawfully closed plants in all four cases of 
complete closings.55 In three of those four, the courts upheld a Board order to reopen 
the facility and rehire the workers. 
In the partial closing cases, courts found employers liable for unlawful actions in 26 
of the 28 cases. In 22 of those cases, the courts upheld NLRB orders to restore the 
work and reinstate the affected workers. 
54
 The period studied covered the last 3 months of 1986 and the first 10 months of 1993. Thus, 
the time frame for the study is 7 years and 1 month. 
55
 In one of the four cases, the court found that the employer closed the facility for a discrimi-
natory anti-union motive, but found further that the employer would have closed for legitimate 
business purposes at a later date. The court awarded back pay to affected workers up to the date 
that the facility would have been closed in the normal course of business, but it ruled that the 
employer did not have to reopen and rehire the workers. 
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Employers were found liable for unlawful plant closing threats in 41 of the 43 
reported cases, and in 13 of the 14 cases involving partial closing threats.56 
With regard to plant closing issues, the number of appeals court reversals of NLRB 
decisions is extraordinarily low. In 32 cases in which the Board found an unlawful 
closing (full or partial), the courts overruled the Board only three times (9.1 percent). 
In 57 cases in which the NLRB found an unlawful threat, the decision was reversed 
only once (1.5 percent). This rate compares to an overall reversal rate of 14.2 percent 
for all unfair labor practice cases that went to the federal courts in the period studied.57 
Appeals Court Remedies 
The courts nearly always upheld traditional NLRB remedies in unfair labor prac-
tice cases: (1) to cease and desist from the unlawful conduct, (2) to post a notice in the 
workplace promising not to repeat such conduct, and (3) to reinstate and/or to award 
back pay to affected workers. In one case, the court upheld a Board order for the 
company president to personally read the notice to assembled workers in the work-
place. 
Additionally, many of the cases reviewed by the researchers resulted in extraordi-
nary remedies. In more than half the cases, the NLRB had ordered some form of 
extraordinary relief beyond the normal cease-and-desist order, notice posting, and 
reinstatement remedies. In one full closing case and 17 of the threat cases that arose in 
a union organizing campaign before an election could be held, the courts upheld Board 
orders that the employer must recognize and bargain with the union because the 
employer's extensive unfair labor practices made a fair election impossible. The courts 
reversed such orders by the NLRB in four cases. 
In 29 cases, the NLRB had issued a bargaining order (these include the 18 cases 
mentioned above, and 11 cases that resulted in orders to resume bargaining with an 
existing union). In 12 cases, the Board set aside an election and/or ordered a new 
56
 Many of the closing cases also involved threats. They were counted as closing cases only. 
Many of the threat cases involved both types of threats (full or partial closing). All were counted as 
threats of full closing. Note that in some of these cases the court found in favor of employers on 
non-plant closing issues, such as individual discharge cases, or remanded the case to the NLRB for 
further findings or to adjust the remedy. 
57
 For purposes of compiling reversal rates, the study here (in contrast to the foregoing) counted 
cases that involved both closing and threats of closing as separate cases. 
64 
P A R T T H R E E : R E V I E W OF A D M I N I S T R A T I V E A N D J U D I C I A L D A T A 
election. In seven cases, the NLRB ordered substantial structural relief that went 
beyond rehiring or reinstating employees, requiring the reopening of a facility or the 
relocating of equipment that had been moved back to the original site where the clos-
ing took place. It is noteworthy that the courts of appeals reversed these broad reme-
dial orders more often than they reversed findings that the employer committed an 
unfair labor practice. Bargaining orders were reversed on four occasions, new election 
orders once, and structural relief twice.58 
This review of federal court decisions shows that plant closing cases have arisen 
with increasing frequency in recent years. Of the 89 decisions examined, 28 were 
issued in the 4 years before 1990. As Table 5 shows, more than twice as many (61) 
have been issued since 1990. 
Table 5 
U-S. Courts of Appeals Decisions in Plant Closing Cases 
1986 
1 
1987 
6 
1988 
9 
1989 
12 
1990 
11 
1991 
18 
1992 
4 
1993 
28 
These annual figures reveal an overall increase in plant closing case decisions dur-
ing the period under study. The decline in 1992 is counterbalanced by the large in-
crease in 1993, suggesting that viewing the progression in 2-year increments may be 
more accurate. This view yields successive increments of 7, 21, 29, and 32 decisions 
issued. However, the volume of reported decisions and the limited time examined are 
not enough to conclude that the rate of cases involving the phenomena of plant clos-
ings and threats of plant closing that come before the federal appeals courts is dra-
matically increasing. (See tables in Appendix B for detailed data from federal courts cases.) 
58
 This rate of reversal (14.8 percent, or 7 of 48 instances) is consistent with Professor Brudney's 
findings in his review of all court decisions on NLRB appeals that the courts reversed the Board 
more frequently on remedy issues than on liability issues. See James J. Brudney, "A Famous Vic-
tory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging Process," 74 North Carolina Law 
Review 939 (1996). 
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Administrative Findings 
NLRB Case Review 
The Secretariat examined 319 NLRB decisions between 1990 and 1995 involving 
plant closings and threats of plant closing.59 Of these decisions, 27 dealt with actual 
closings (either straightforward closings, or closings with reopenings); 82 addressed 
partial closings (refusals to hire or rehire union employees, subcontracting of union 
work, closing of a unit or department of the plant, major layoffs and transfers, and so 
on); and 210 decisions related to threats of closing. 
Complaints numbered 275 in the context of a new organizing campaign in a non-
union shop, while situations involving incumbent unions in established bargaining 
relationships arose on 44 occasions. 
The NLRB found a violation by the employer in 283 of the 319 cases (89 percent). 
The Board found no violation in 29 cases and remanded the rest for further findings. 
The standard remedy, consisting of a cease-and-desist order and an order to post a 
notice, was delivered in virtually every case. Four additional remedies were frequendy 
awarded: employers were ordered to bargain with the union on 83 occasions, new 
elections were ordered and/or election results were set aside in 42 cases, employers 
were ordered to make employees whole in 42 cases, and employers were ordered to 
reinstate groups of employees on 40 occasions. 
Extraordinary remedies were also granted on a number of occasions. Employers 
were ordered to reinstate a department and/or reinstate subcontracted work in 14 
cases, to restore the status quo in eight cases, and to reopen a facility in six cases. The 
opening and counting of ballots was ordered in four cases, and automatic certification 
was granted twice. A relocation order was made once, as was an order for the em-
ployer to pay the union the costs of the case. (See tables in Appendix C for detailed 
data from NLRB cases.) 
Case Handling in NLRB Regional Offices 
The foregoing review of NLRB decisions in plant closing cases reflects just a frac-
tion of administrative treatment under U.S. labor law of plant closing effects on the 
right to organize. Unfair labor practice cases are filed in one of the NLRB's 33 re-
gional offices around the country. Before such charges reach the level of a Board 
decision, they may be disposed of by withdrawal, dismissal, settlements, or a decision 
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
59
 Of the 319 cases, 30 were also part of the federal court case survey. This figure is not double 
counting. The Secretariat is looking overall at how such cases are handled at two different levels of 
the legal system, one dealing with court decisions on plant closing cases, and one dealing with 
Board decisions. 
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Only 2 percent of unfair labor practice charges against employers filed with the 
NLRB reach the stage of a hearing before an ALJ. One-fourth of these cases are 
settled after the hearing. The rest go forward to a decision by the NLRB. The earlier 
decision to dismiss the charge or issue a complaint rests with the Regional Director acting 
on behalf of the independent General Counsel, and the decision after trial is made by the 
independent ALJ. The Board hears the case as an appeal from the ALJ decision.60 
There is no systematic record keeping or electronic access to NLRB cases that are 
treated below the level of full, published Board decisions. Faced with the impossibility 
of reviewing tens of thousands of case records in the Board's 33 regional offices, the 
Secretariat examined records covering a 4-year period (1992-1995) in two regional 
offices suggested by the NLRB as fairly reflective of Board experience nationally: 
Region 16 in Fort Worth, Texas, and Region 30 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. These two 
selections also permit a comparison of experience in a "Sunbelt" area with low union 
density and a "Frostbelt" area with long-established unions.61 
Of 24 unfair labor practice cases involving charges of plant closings or threats of 
plant closing that were received in the Fort Worth regional office in the 4-year review 
period, 9 were withdrawn or dismissed before a complaint was issued.62 Of those that 
remained, 6 cases were settled before a complaint was issued.63 Complaints were is-
sued in 9 cases (finding "merit" in the charge, but not concluding whether a violation 
took place). Of these, 6 were settled after the complaint was issued. Trials before an 
ALJ were held in 3 cases. 
60
 In its 1995 fiscal year, the NLRB closed 23,862 unfair labor practice cases involving charges 
against employers. In these cases, 8,175 charges were withdrawn, 6,213 were dismissed, and 8,870 
were settled. A complaint was issued by the regional director in 3,271 cases, and 450 cases were 
decided by an ALJ. A total of 356 unfair labor practice cases against employers were closed by a 
Board decision. It must be noted that these are not necessarily the same cases. Many of the NLRB 
decisions involve cases filed in earlier years. However, tracking individual cases across years was 
not possible in the time frame of this report. In any event, the yearly case handling totals reflect 
Board experience over time. 
61
 This phase of the research involved physical review of thousands of case files in the regional 
offices because files are not separate by subject matter to allow immediate access to plant closing or 
threat cases. The research also required assistance, which was graciously provided, by the staff of 
the Forth Worth and Milwaukee regional offices, both in obtaining case files and in further search-
ing records for the ultimate disposition of the plant closing and threat cases. 
62
 It is impossible to know the full reasons for withdrawal or dismissal of an unfair labor prac-
tice charge. Such action might indicate a case with weak evidence or one with strong evidence. It 
might indicate that the parties reached a substantive settlement without need for further Board 
involvement and agreed to withdraw the charge or to request the Board to dismiss the charge. 
63
 Similarly, it is not possible to ascertain the relative merit of cases settled before dismissal or 
the motivations of the parties in deciding to settle the cases. 
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In the Milwaukee regional office, 43 charges were filed involving plant closings or 
threats of closing. Of these, 27 were withdrawn or dismissed before a complaint was 
issued. Of those that remained, 8 cases were settled before a complaint was issued. A 
complaint was issued in 7 cases, of which 3 were withdrawn or settled after the com-
plaint. The other 4 were set for trial. (See Table 6 for statistics on plant closing cases in 
NLRB regional offices, 1992-1995.) 
Sample of NLRB Cases Filed in Regional Offices, 1992-1995 
(Unfair Labor Practice Charges on Plant Closings/Threats of Plant Closing) 
Cases Withdrawn/ Settled Pre- Complaint Settled Post- To Trial 
Filed Dismissed Complaint Issued Complaint AU 
Fort Worth 24 9 8 9 6 3 
(Region 16) 
Milwaukee 43 27 8 7 3 4 
(Region 30) 
Total 67 36 16 16 9 7 
These findings suggest that for every case involving plant closing or threat of plant 
closing that reached the stage of a trial before an ALJ, some 10 unfair labor practice 
cases were initiated at the regional level. Complaints were issued in almost 25 percent 
of the cases filed. This was twice the rate of complaint issuance for all other unfair 
labor practice charges against employers (see Table 1). 
In the sample studied, 10 percent of all plant closing and plant closing threat cases 
filed, as well as over 40 percent of those in which a complaint was issued, advanced to 
trial before an ALJ. This is 10 times the rate of enforcement in other cases of unfair 
labor practice charges against employers.64 While the sample of 2 regional offices out 
of 33 may not be sufficient to reach firm conclusions, these findings indicate that the 
NLRB is more likely to take such cases very seriously and to aggressively pursue 
cases involving plant closing and threats" of plant closing to a litigated conclusion, 
prevailing in nearly 90 percent of such cases. 
64
 To put this suggested, sample-based finding in perspective, it should be kept in mind that 
for all unfair labor practice charges filed before the NLRB, only 2 percent—not 10 percent-— 
reach the level of an ALJ decision. That is, this is a relatively modest finding, one that confirms the 
importance of the sample research in the regional offices. Otherwise, one might use a factor of50y 
not 10, to estimate the volume of plant closings and threats of closing for each case initiated that 
ultimately reaches the stage of a written decision. 
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Considering Tables 6 and 2 together with the incidence of cases decided by the 
NLRB, the following overall pattern emerges: of an average of 5,000 union election 
titions fyec[ per year, some 500-600 or 1 in 10, result in unfair labor practice charges 
that alleging plant closing or threats and that are filed with regional offices of the 
NLRB- Of these cases, 50-60 result in published Board decisions. 
Survey Findings 
To obtain information not available from published decisions or from N L R B case 
records, the Secretariat arranged for extensive, original survey research into plant clos-
ings and threats of plant closing in union organizing campaigns.65 Researchers sur-
veyed union representatives to examine why they decide to initiate, discontinue, or 
proceed with an organizing campaign, or to file or not file unfair labor practice charges 
in connection with their campaigns. 
The survey covered the reported experience of U.S. union representatives in 525 
organizing campaigns. Survey questionnaires were sent to union representatives who 
undertook to organize employees in workplaces with 50 or more employees in the 
potential bargaining unit over a 3-year period from January 1, 1993, to December 31, 
1995.66 In 149 of the campaigns, unions withdrew their petition for an election before 
an election took place. In 376 campaigns, the unions proceeded to an election. This is 
the largest comprehensive database on union organizing campaigns to date. 
Key findings of the survey include the following: 
• Plant closing threats were reported to have occurred in half of the sampled 
union organizing campaigns during the period studied. 
• Threats were reported to have occurred frequently in industries more suscep-
tible to plant closings such as manufacturing, trucking, and warehousing. In 
those sectors, the reported incidence of plant closing threats in organizing cam-
65
 In union organizing campaigns in which plant closings or threats of closing halt the cam-
paign before it ever gets off the ground, a union may have no interest in filing charges, preferring 
to seek more fruitful organizing opportunities. Also, filing ULP charges requires supporting evi-
dence in the form of sworn statements by workers, who may be reluctant to come forward when the 
campaign has been discontinued. For other practical reasons including litigation costs, litigation 
delays, staff organizers' time, staff attorneys' time, difficulty in obtaining witnesses and so on, many 
unions make a simple strategic decision to forego filing charges, hoping the campaign might be 
revived later. 
66
 Recall that the review of federal court decisions covered a 7-year period, and the review of 
NLRB cases covered a 5-year period. Time and resource constraints required a telescoping of time 
periods examined as the volume of cases and organizing campaigns multiplied. 
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paigns surveyed was 62 percent, compared with 36 percent in relatively immo-
bile industries such as construction, health care, hotels, retail stores, and other 
services. 
• Where plant closing threats were reported, such threats wrere the most signifi-
cant identified factor in a union's decision to withdraw its election petition. 
Threats of closing were cited by 53 percent of respondents as the main reason 
they withdrew petitions, followed by those reporting other threats and dis-
charges (47 percent) and employer promises of improvements (38 percent). 
• In surveyed campaigns where elections took place, the overall union win rate 
when the employer reportedly threatened plant closing was 33 percent, com-
pared with 47 percent in elections where no plant closing threats were reported 
to have been made. The union election win rate in the total sample studied, 
including elections where threats were reported to have been made and elections 
with no threats reported, was 41 percent. 
• The union election success rate in companies that reportedly have Canadian 
locations (34 percent union success) or that reportedly trade with Canada (33 
percent), as well as in companies with sites in Mexico or that trade with Mexico 
(both 31 percent), was lower than the overall election win rate of 41 percent in 
the sample. 
• While no threats to move to Canada were reported by respondents, threats to 
move to Mexico were cited in 15.5 percent of manufacturing sector campaigns 
in which threats were reported to have occurred. 
Note on Survey Results 
In discussing survey results, the use of the term "threats" has to be clarified. Union 
representatives responding to the survey might characterize as threats employer state-
ments that, if they were tested in litigation, might be found to be lawful. The use of the 
term "threat" in the survey and in this section does not imply any legal conclusion as 
to whether what survey respondents characterized as a threat was lawful or unlawful, 
unless it is clearly specified with reference to a final decision of an ALJ, the NLRB, or 
a federal appeals court. Only a fraction of potentially unlawful closings or threats ever 
reach the stage of a final, litigated conclusion. 
Whether or not threats reported by respondents were lawful or unlawful is not 
determinable here. However, respondents' perceptions are relevant to determining 
how plant closings or threats of closing affect the right to organize. The design of the 
questionnaire guarded against self-serving answers by union respondents, as is borne 
out by the richness and variety of the data. Half of the respondents, for example 
reported no closings or threats in their campaigns. 
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Union respondents reported that they filed unfair labor practice charges in only 
one-third of the reported cases of threats and that a complaint was issued (indicating 
preliminary finding of merit to the charge) in half of the cases filed. Unions and 
ernpl°yers both have myriad reasons for not filing unfair labor practice charges or for 
settling cases without a final decision by an adjudicator. Those reasons cannot be con-
nected to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the alleged unfair labor practice. Settle-
ments routinely contain a "non-admission" of liability clause that cannot be taken as 
conclusive whether a violation did or did not occur. 
Similarly the finding in the survey that plant closing threats reportedly occurred in 
half of the organizing campaigns in the sample cannot be seen as conclusive evidence 
that employers make unlawful threats in half of all union organizing campaigns. Union 
representatives reported what they perceived as threats, whether they were lawful or 
unlawful, in half of the campaigns in the sample, and accordingly took action to with-
draw their petition or proceed to an election, with the results indicated. 
Examples of Plant Closing Cases in the United States 
A Lawful Prediction 
At an Illinois restaurant where workers launched an organizing drive, the employer 
guaranteed that if the union came in he would be out of business within a year. In a 
taperecorded speech in a captive audience meeting, the owner stated "If the union 
exists at [the company], [the company] will fail. The cancer will eat us up and we will fall 
by the wayside.... I am not making a threat. I am stating a fact... I only know from my 
mind, from my pocketbook, how I stand on this." 
This statement was found by a U.S. Court of Appeals to be a lawful prediction that did 
not interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees.67 
A Pre-Election Closing 
A Georgia cardboard box manufacturer threatened to close the plant if the union won 
the election. In a tape-recorded speech on file with the NLRB Region 12 office in Jack-
sonville, Florida, the company president stated: "There are people here who don't care 
whether [the company] survives or doesn't sun/ive ... why kill this plant for the rest of the 
people who really care. ... There's plenty of small towns in Georgia for companies like 
ours ... and Alabama and Florida and North and South Carolina and Missouri and Texas 
and New Mexico...." ' 
Worker Question: "So if we vote for the union, are you going to close the plant down?" 
President: "I'm not going to fall into this trap. There are a lot of people who would love 
See NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 E2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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Examples of Plant Closing Cases in the United States {continued) 
me to say something like you just said. I won't do it... Whether this company stays open 
or doesn't stay open, that will depend on economics...." 
The company closed the plant 4 days before the NLRB representation election. The 
NLRB regional office issued a complaint that the company unlawfully threatened to close 
and then closed the plant because employees supported the union. The threats and the 
closing were among 66 separate unfair labor practice counts that also included indi- \ 
vidual discharges, mass layoffs, interrogation, surveillance, promise of benefits, other 
threats of reprisal, and other acts of interference, restraint, and coercion. 
The company and the union settled the case after the trial took place. The company 
agreed to reopen the plant, rehire the workers with back pay, and recognize and bargain 
with the union.68 
I Effective Enforcement 
At a Michigan auto parts manufacturer; the NLRB set aside an election where it found \ 
that the employer "created and reinforced an overall atmosphere of fear among the 
employees that a union victory could result not only in loss of work and customers, but in 
plant closure itself." Among the company's tactics was reference to a nearby plant that 
closed and moved to Mexico. The NLRB ruled that these threats were illegal, and ordered j 
a new election. In a new election ordered by the Board, the union prevailed and was j 
certified as the bargaining representative.69 j 
Threatening to Move to Mexico (1) 
An automotive parts manufacturer in Michigan responded to an organizing drive by 
the United Auto Workers (UAW) with a speech by the division president stating "We are 
fortunate to have a growing operation in Mexico where we are able to produce when we 
become non-competitive here. ...We are now trying to develop our plants to enable us to 
move product from one plant to another. ...We cannot sun/ive here if we continue to lose \ 
product... even to our own plant in Mexico.... [In other locations] we have moved the 
work and closed the plant especially where light assembly or manual work was being 
done.... Don rt let it happen here." 
Before the election the company displayed large "MEXICO TRANSFER JOB" signs on 
equipment placed on flatbed trailers in the employee parking lot. The union lost the 
representation election. In a decision issued July 17,1996, the AU who heard the case 
ruled that the company's conduct was coercive, and ordered a new election.70 
68
 See Roblaw Industries, Inc., and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Complaint in Case No. 
12-CA-17901 (1995), and Settlement Agreement (October 23,1995) on file with NLRB Region 12. 
69
 See Contec Division, SPX Corp. and UAW, 320 NLRB No. 52 (1995). 
70
 See ITT Automotive and United Auto Workers, decision of Judge Marion C. Ladwig, NLRB 
Division of Judges, JD-79-96 (1996). 
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Examples of Plant Closing Cases in the United States (continued) 
Threatening to Move to Mexico (2) 
At an Illinois auto parts plant, a supervisor's comment to workers that '7 hope you 
guys are ready to pack up and move to Mexico" did not violate the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit ruled. The court decision reversed 
the NLRB's determination that the statement was an unlawful threat. The court ruled 
that the statement was a "joke/' not a threat.71 
The Effects of Delay 
A manufacturer of window coverings in New Jersey responded to an organizing cam-
paign by the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (UE) by laying off the entire 
second shift, which was more than 40 percent of the workforce. The AU ruled that the 
layoff had legitimate business motivation. The NLRB reversed the AU decision. The Board 
found that this partial closing was motivated by anti-union animus. The federal court of 
appeals upheld the NLRB ruling, and workers were reinstated with back pay. However, 
during the more than 3 years' duration of the legal proceedings, the union's organizing 
impetus was dissipated. The workers never succeeded in forming a union.72 
Sham Closing 
A Texas foundry where employees were represented by the United Steelworkers Union 
closed its doors and ceased doing business under one corporate name, then reopened 3 
days later under another name and hired new, non-union workers. The union filed an 
unfair labor practice charge and pursued it to a successful conclusion, including a Board 
order to rehire affected union members. The company then declared bankruptcy. En-
forcement of the NLRB's order awaits a decision of the bankruptcy court.73 
Converting Employees to "Independent Contractor" Status 
A unionized Massachusetts wire and cable installation company converted employees 
to independent contractor status and cut off all salaries and fringe benefits under the 
collective bargaining agreement. Employees who protested were fired. The NLRB ordered 
the employer to reinstate the discharged employees and recognize and bargain with the 
union.74 
71
 See NLRB v. Champion Laboratories Inc., CA 7, No. 95-2433 (October 24, 1996). 
72
 See Hunter-Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808 (1986). 
73
 See Texas Electric Steel Casting Co. and United Steelworkers, decision of Judge James S. Jensen, 
NLRB Division of ALJs, JD (SF)-19-94. 
74
 See Cable-Masters, Inc., and Communications Workers of America, 307 NLRB No. 139 (1992). 
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Examples of Plant Closing Cases in the United States (continued) 
Converting Employees to "Temporary Manpower9' Status 
When workers at a Wisconsin plant launched an organizing campaign, management 
responded with a mass layoff of first-shift employees and a transfer of all employees from 
the employer's payroll to the payroll of a temporary manpower agency, telling workers 
that the transfer to temporary status was made "to scare them off the union." The NLRB 
found that the mass layoff was an unlawful act of discrimination and the transfer to 
temporary manpower status was an unlawful act of coercion. The Board ordered the 
company to cease discriminatory layoffs, restore employees to employment status with 
the company, and to recognize and bargain with the union. The union later obtained a 
collective bargaining agreement.75 
A Threat to Withhold Investment 
The plant manager of a large multi-national company (with extensive operations in 
Mexico) told workers in a West Virginia union-organizing campaign 'The company that 
supplies the investment dollars for our growth [is] watching what happens here.... We 
must learn to work together,... I'm afraid if we can't do that—we won't have a business 
here ten years from now.,,. If you choose [the union], we could be heading in the wrong 
direction.../' A company supervisor told a worker that if the union got in "they would 
close the plant... within 2 weeks." 
The NLRB found these statements to be unlawful, coercive threats of plant closing. In 
the same case, the NLRB also found the company guilty of unlawfully threatening loss of 
benefits, loss of wage increases, temporary layoffs, and other reprisals if the workers 
chose union representation. The Board set aside the election results (the union had lost 
the election) and ordered a new election.76 
75
 See Americas Best Quality Coatings Corp. and Staff Right, Inc., Joint Employers, and United 
Electrical Workers, 313 N L R B No. 52 (1993). 
76
 See General Electric Company and United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America 
(UE), 321 NLRB No. 86 (1996). 
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CANADA 
In a 10-year period from 1986 to 1995, 36 cases involving issues of anti-union 
closings and threats were decided by all of Canada's labor boards, labor commission-
ers, and labor tribunals combined.77 
The plant closing and threats of plant closing cases arose in seven jurisdictions: 
Federal 2 cases 
Alberta 3 cases 
British Columbia 17 cases 
New Brunswick 2 cases 
Ontario 8 cases 
Quebec 1 case 
Saskatchewan 3 cases 
Manitoba, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island showed no 
plant closing cases.78 
Notably, cases involving total or partial closing (25) exceed the number of cases 
involving a threat (11).79 Moreover, all the Canadian cases (with the exception of one 
Quebec case)80 were decided by the administrative labor authority of the relevant ju-
risdiction. None was decided by a court acting on an appeal from an administrative 
decision. This confirms that the civil courts rarely review or overturn a labor board or 
commissioner decision in Canada. 
Of the 36 Canadian cases, 21 involved new union organizing or a first collective 
bargaining agreement and 15 arose in the context of an established bargaining rela-
tionship. In 15 of the 21 organizing/new union cases, the labor tribunals upheld un-
77
 These cases were obtained through Quicklaw (a legal database) searches, through review of 
the major Canadian texts touching on unfair labor practices, and through direct contact with the 
labor board and tribunals in each jurisdiction. 
78
 The provincial differences noted here might also lend themselves to further research into, 
for example, why the three largest provinces—Quebec, British Columbia, and Ontario—range 
from the smallest number of reported cases to the greatest number, with one at the midpoint be-
tween the extremes. 
79
 As shown above in U.S. cases, a sizeable majority (57 of 89 court cases, and 210 of 319 
Board cases) involve threats rather than closings. 
80
 Recall that in Quebec, the labor relations law is administered first by a Labor Commissioner 
of the provincial labor ministry. Appeals from commissioners' decisions go to the Labor Tribunal, 
a judicial branch entity. Thus, the single Quebec case is a court decision, as distinct from a labor 
board decision. 
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fair labor practice complaints involving plant closings or threats of plant closing. In 6 
cases, the boards found no violation. In the 15 established union cases, the boards 
found violations 7 times, and no violation 8 times. That is, employers were found to be 
liable for unlawful conduct in 60 percent of the cases decided by an adjudicator.81 
Remedies 
The remedies most frequently awarded by labor relations boards were (1) re-
instatement and/or compensation for employees,82 and (2) cease-and-desist orders and/ 
or declarations of breach of statute. Orders to post board decisions in the workplace or 
to mail them to employees were also made, though somewhat less frequently. 
In addition to these normal remedies, many of the cases resulted in extraordinary 
remedies. Automatic certification was ordered in three cases involving extensive un-
fair labor practices by employers, and an order to resume negotiations was made once. 
Boards compelled employers to reimburse unions for the costs incurred in organizing 
on one occasion, and twice required employers to provide unions with access to em-
ployees for organizing purposes. 
In contrast to the stronger remedy sometimes applied by the U.S. NLRB and the 
courts, no Canadian labor board has ordered an employer to permanently resume 
operations or reopen a plant.83 Rather, the normal board response in a plant closing 
context was to provide monetary compensation to the employees and the union. On 
two occasions, however, boards did make orders involving an explicit return of work 
to the bargaining unit. First, a board ordered temporary resumption of operations for 
a period of 8 months, following an otherwise legitimate closing that had been ad-
vanced 8 months to punish a union.84 Second, when an employer moved work from 
one operation to another, locking out its unionized employees, a board ordered that 
the work be returned to the unionized subsidiary. 
81
 In U.S. cases reviewed for this report, employers were found liable for unlawful conduct in 
94 percent of the federal court decisions and 89 percent of the NLRB decisions. 
82
 On a number of occasions, reinstatement of an entire bargaining unit was ordered following 
the subcontracting or movement of a unit's work. Reinstatement was ordered in cases where layoffs 
of union members or organizers were related to the closing threat. 
While the decisions of several labor boards in Canada have suggested that they have the 
capacity to order an employer to resume operations, no board has actually done so, and many have 
expressed concern about the practicality of such an order. 
The employer was provided the option of not resuming operations but of maintaining the 
employees' wages and benefits as if they were employed throughout that 8-month period. 
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A cautionary note needs to be introduced here regarding comparisons of U.S. and 
Canadian findings. Although both systems apply the concept of unfair labor practices 
to deal with alleged plant closings or threats of plant closing, differences in legal defi-
nitions and administration, in the pace of new union organizing activity and in the 
size of the labor force (Canada's is 10 times smaller) make strict comparisons difficult. 
However, recognizing that comparisons between the two systems are inevitable, 
perhaps the most appropriate comparison using findings in this report may be the 
number of cases decided by labor boards per year relative to the number of union 
election petitions (in the United States) or union certification applications (in Canada) 
filed per year. In the United States, some 50-60 cases involving plant closings or 
threats of closing are decided each year by the NLRB. These cases arise in a context 
where 5,000 union election petitions are filed and 3,200 elections are held. In Canada, 
3-4 cases are decided by the labor boards each year in a context where more than 
2,600 certification applications are filed in the country's four major jurisdictions with 
most of the workforce, in the federal labor board, and in British Columbia, Ontario, 
and Quebec. (See Appendix D for detailed data from Canadian labor board cases.) 
Examples of Plant Closing Cases in Canada 
An Unlawful Threat 
When some of the 134 employees at an airline ticket office in Toronto began organiz-
ing a union, a vice president of the U.S.-based company began holding mandatory "rap 
sessions" with small groups of workers. The official sent a letter to air employees that 
concluded by saying "However ...I hope you will think very seriously before you take any 
action that will make your job a union job," 
The Canada Labour Relations Board (CLRB) noted that "Any statement, action, com-
portment that indicates to employees the employer's desire not to have them join a 
union impresses on them that their action clearly goes against his wish, he who is ulti-
mately responsible for their job security. Under such circumstances, what must an em-
ployee feel? How at ease were the 10 or 12 employees who were obliged to attend rap 
sessions?" 
The Board found that the overall letter to employees was unlawful interference with 
workers' organizing rights and that the concluding statement about "thinking very seri-
ouslyff was unlawful intimidation.85 The CLRB ordered the employer to mail to each em-
ployee another letter acknowledging that the CLRB had found the employer's earlier 
letter to be a violation of the Canada Labour Code, and to enclose a copy of the Board's 
decision. 
See American Airlines, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks (198J)} 3 
CL.R.B.R. 90 (C.L.R.B., Foisy, Vice Chair). 
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Examples of Plant Closing Cases in Canada (continued) 
Finding a Remedy for a "Runaway Shop" 
A large Ontario manufacturing company relocated its operations from an urban center 
to several rural, non-unionized locations. The Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) 
found that the action was motivated in part by a desire to escape the union and thus 
constituted an unfair labor practice. Significant employment was created at its new sites, 
complicating the problem of finding an appropriate remedy for the unlawful action. The 
OLRB directed the employer (1) to provide the employees of the closed plant with the 
right of first refusal for jobs at the new plants with no loss of seniority or fringe benefits, 
(2) to provide relocation allowances to employees who chose to move, (3) to provide the 
union with a list of employees at the new plants, (4) to provide the union with access to 
company bulletin boards at the new plants, and (5) to provide the union the opportunity 
to address the employees during working hours at the new plants. The Board also or-
dered the employer to reimburse the union for expenses incurred in organizing the new 
plants.86 
Limits to Innovation in Remedies 
In a maneuver characterized by the CLRB as "Machiavellianism," a Montreal bank 
closed one of its branches following union certification and transferred all accounts to 
another, unorganized branch office. The CLRB certified the union as the bargaining agent 
at the new branch and ordered that employees be permitted to attend union meetings 
during paid work time. 
While upholding these aspects of the CLRB's order, the Supreme Court of Canada 
articulated an important limit: a remedial order must be reasonably related to the 
employer's breach of the statute. Thus, the Court quashed another part of the order 
requiring the employer to pay part of the savings gained from closing the unionized 
branch into a trust fund to promote the objectives of the statute. It also quashed an 
order to send a letter to all employees admitting violating their rights.87 
Leaving the Province 
Canada's primarily province-based labor law system raises problems of remedy when 
a plant closing and relocation occurs between provinces. After the first collective bar-
gaining meeting following certification of a newly organized union, a British Columbia 
nursing home company closed its facility, terminated all of the employees, and shifted 
operations to another province. 
86
 See (JEW, Local 504 v. Westinghouse Canada, Inc. (1980), 80 C.L.L.C. 16,053 (O.L.R.B.); 
upheld on judicial review Westinghouse Canada, Inc. v. UEW, Local 504 (1980), 80 C.L.L.C. 14,062 
(Ont. Div. Ct.). 
87
 See National Bank of Canada v. Retail Clerks' International Union (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 10 
(S.C.C.). 
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Examples of Plant Closing Cases in Canada (continued) 
The British Columbia Labour Relations Board found anti-union animus an element in 
the closing. However, since the company had ceased operations in the province alto-
gether, reinstatement was not a practical remedy. Instead, compensation equaling 2 
months' pay was ordered for each employee (less any income earned during that 2-
month period). Despite significant bargaining expenses to that point, the board refused 
to order the employer to reimburse the union.88 
A Subcontracting Case 
A Sudbury, Ontario, courier firm terminated all members of the proposed bargaining 
unit the day after a union seeking to represent its employees applied for certification. The 
company subcontracted all the work. The CLRB found that the employer failed to advance 
any convincing evidence that the subcontracting was undertaken solely for legitimate 
business concerns and that the timing of the move demonstrated anti-union animus. The 
Board distinguished this case from the general rule of not ordering an employer to reopen 
a closed business, since the employer continued to carry on the business in the same 
fashion in the same location. The Board ordered the employer to reinstate the employees 
with back pay and certified the union as the bargaining agent.89 
A Closely Watched Current Case 
The relative infrequency of anti-union closings and threats in Canada does not dimin-
ish the importance or the continuing timeliness of this issue in Canada. In a case being 
closely watched in Canadian and U.S. labor and management circles, a major U.S. com-
pany operating in Canada was found to have contravened the Ontario Labour Relations 
Act by a "subtle but extremely effective threat" to close if the employees unionized. 
In a question-and-answer publication to employees shortly before the election in May 
1996, the following questions were asked and answered by management (the questions 
were characterized by management as written questions from employees): 
Q: There is an overwhelming concern that if the store unionizes, [the company] will 
close the store. Is this true? 
A: It would be inappropriate for your company to comment on what it will or will not do 
if the store is unionized. 
Q: Some people have said that if the store unionized it would be illegal for [the com-
pany] to close the store. Is that true? 
See British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union v. Humanacare Counselling, 
unreported, November 30, 1995, (1995) B.C.L.R.B. 292-39. 
See United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 175 v. Insurance Courier Services (1993), 18 
CL.R.B.R.(2d)286. 
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For the period between January 1991 and May 1996, Table 7 shows figures that 
emerged from the review of data from the Federal CAB and the state CABs of Chi-
huahua and Nuevo Leon. 
Mexican CAB Data on Collective Conflict Cases 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 (through May) 
Collective Conflicts of an 
Economic Nature 
Collective Conflict Cases 
Involving Plant Closings 
24 
0 
41 
2 
25 
0 
47 
0 
28 
0 
11 
Total: 166 
0 
Total: 2 
The Local CAB of Chihuahua handled only one plant closing case under collective 
conflict procedures in 1994, and one in 1995. The CAB of Nuevo Leon had no such 
cases. 
Although these are just three among over 100 Federal and Local CABs, the results 
still indicate a negligible volume of plant closing cases under the "collective conflict of 
an economic nature" proceedings provided in Articles 892-899 and 900-919 of the 
F L L for such matters. 
However, these cases occurred in a context of widespread plant closings. In 1994, 
the IMSS noted 3,214 workplaces dropped from the rolls. In 1995, 5,794 workplace 
reductions took place, affecting more than half a million workers covered by Social 
Security.95 With so many plant closings taking place, the obvious question is why al-
most no "collective conflict" cases occurred. After all, this is the procedure in which 
unions could challenge a closing on grounds that it was motivated by anti-unionism, 
rather than by one of the permissible reasons for closing. 
The answer appears to be found in data obtained by the Secretariat from the Fed-
eral CAB on the number of collective agreements made between workers and employ-
ers under voluntary, mutual consent provisions for termination of the employment 
relationship under Article 53 or Article 401 of the FLL. These agreements are sub-
mitted to the CAB for its review and approval. This information reveals that this 
voluntary termination avenue is used extensively for resolution of plant closing issues, 
rather than the collective conflict procedure. 
Information obtained from IMSS sources by Secretariat staff 
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Table 8 indicates the volume of voluntary termination cases in federal private sector 
jurisdiction, 1991-1995. 
Table 8 
Mexican Federal CAB Approval of Collective Agreements 
for Termination, 1991-1995a 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
169 307 203 238 194 
Total: 1,111 
a see "Estadisticas Laborales, 2do Semestre 1994," STPS, Subsecretario "B" at 92. 
Analysis 
Certain findings can be considered on the basis of the foregoing information: 
1. Clear evidence demonstrates that the procedures created by the F L L for plant 
closings are not being used in the manner intended. In 5 years, only five cases arose in 
the CABs visited by Secretariat researchers, and those were ultimately resolved by an 
agreement between the parties rather than by a CAB order. Given the frequency of 
plant closings as derived from the Social Security Institute, the sample of CAB files 
reviewed by the Secretariat showed a massive difference between the total number of 
plant closings and the number of closings that proceed under the collective conflict 
provisions of the FLL. 
2. The F L L procedures for plant closings contained in Articles 892-899 and 900-
919 are long, burdensome, and technical. In contrast, the faster, more flexible proce-
dures available under Article 53 or Article 401 for voluntary termination of the em-
ployment relationship permit workers and unions to negotiate directly with employers 
over favorable severance terms in plant closing cases. The preference for this avenue 
is confirmed in the number of collective agreements on termination of the employ-
ment relationship approved by the Federal CAB, more than 1,100 in the sample stud-
ied. Moreover, even when employers initiate collective conflict proceedings, workers 
can immediately suspend those proceedings by exercising their right to strike and 
seeking to negotiate a voluntary termination of the employment relationship. As yet 
another alternative, workers can file individual claims for indemnizacion under the un-
justifiable discharge provisions of the law. 
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3. Significantly, the amount of severance pay available to workers under the collec-
tive procedures is less than that available under other procedures. Using the collective 
conflict mechanism, severance pay is 3 months' salary plus 12 days' pay per year of 
service. Under other procedures the 12 days' pay becomes 20 days' pay per year of 
service. This creates a powerful incentive for workers to avoid the collective conflict 
avenue in favor of the voluntary termination or unjustifiable discharge mechanisms, 
or to declare a strike and negotiate a strike settlement with the employer. Most nota-
bly, the voluntary, mutual consent mechanism permits workers to claim full salary 
from the date of closing to the date of a CAB order, in addition to their severance pay. 
All of these are lawful procedures before the same CAB that otherwise would hear the 
case under the collective conflict procedures. 
4. Workers can usually obtain their severance pay more rapidly under the voluntary 
termination mechanism than under collective conflict procedures. Employers are usu-
ally more eager to reach a severance pay agreement than to let liability continue to 
mount under the collective conflict provisions of the labor law, which require lengthy 
hearings and expert testimony, and permit various appeals. Such agreements reached 
directly between the parties involved in the plant closing are submitted to the relevant 
CAB for validation, thus avoiding the need for costly, burdensome litigation and sat-
isfying all parties' preference for a more rapid, practical resolution of the plant closing 
matter. The Secretariat's finding of 1,111 cases of voluntary collective termination of 
the employment relationship in the Federal CAB alone, which approved those termi-
nation agreements, confirms that this is a preferred avenue for reaching the same 
purpose of the rarely used collective conflict procedures, that of protecting workers' 
interests in plant closings.96 
96
 For U.S. and Canadian readers of this report, the importance of severance pay in the Mexi-
can system cannot be overstated. All workers are entitled to severance pay when they lose their jobs, 
unless they are discharged for one of the 15 specified acts of misconduct in Article 47 of the Federal 
Labor Law (falsifying an application, sabotage, insubordination, excessive absenteeism, etc.). There 
is no unemployment insurance system in Mexico, so the immediate provision of severance pay, in 
the highest possible amount, becomes of paramount interest to workers, both in individual dis-
charge cases and in plant closings. In actual practice, negotiating over severance pay is the most 
common activity of labor lawyers in Mexico, first, because it is a statutory benefit for all workers so 
there is a high demand for legal assistance, and second, because workers usually prefer to get the 
best possible severance pay settlement now than to be tied up in legal proceedings for months or 
years before their case is decided by the CAB. Conscious of their own limited resources and time* 
the CABs themselves normally press the parties to reach a private settlement for severance pay-
Workers' attorneys are entitled to a percentage of the total severance amount, which creates an 
incentive for them to get a settlement quickly but at the highest possible amount. In a general 
context of economic crisis where plant closings are frequent, workers realistically understand that 
using the "collective conflict" mechanism to try to keep a plant open is futile, so they turn instead to 
the "voluntary termination" route for faster resolution and higher severance pay. 
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Examples of Plant Closing Cases in Mexico 
The following examples of plant closings and collective terminations of the employ-
ment relationship illustrate the methods of applying procedures for a "collective conflict 
of an economic nature" established by the Federal Labor Law (FLL). Secretariat re-
searchers examined records of cases in the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board 
(CAB) and in the Local CAB of Chihuahua.97 
Steel Bars of Mexico and National Union of Mine and 
Metallurgical Workers (Federal CAB) 
The company initiated a collective conflict of an economic nature seeking CAB au-
thorization under the "special proceedings" provision of the FLL (Articles 892-899) to 
close the plant for lack of raw material not imputable to the fault of the employer. The 
company asserted that its chief supplier for the past 27 years had ceased producing the 
necessary raw materials. The union took exception, arguing that alternative sources 
could be found or that the plant could use substitute materials to maintain production, 
The union requested the CAB to order that the employment relationship remain in 
effect without alteration or suspension, that damages be paid to workers if the plant 
closed, that no reprisals be taken against the workers, and that a provisional lien be 
placed on the company's assets to satisfy potential claims. The CAB granted a prelimi-
nary order restraining the company from disposing of assets while the case proceeded. 
After several months of legal proceedings, the union and the company settled the 
matter between themselves and requested the CAB to halt proceedings and close the 
file. As required when such a request is made by both parties, the CAB closed the case. 
Volkswagen of Mexico and Independent Union of 
Automobile and Allied Industry Workers (Federal CAB) 
In July 1992 the company halted operations and advised the Federal CAB of the 
collective termination of the employment relationship and of individual labor relations 
with all unionrepresented workers. The company sought CAB approval for such termina-
tion on grounds of force majeure not imputable to the employer. The employer also 
denied recognition to 14 employees for not having been duly recognized as employee 
representatives by the labor authorities. 
The employer argued that the force majeure consisted of actions by workers inter-
mittently stopping production and blocking entrance to the site. Management blamed 
the situation on labor strife based on internal union rivalries and argued that because 
the employer was prohibited by law from intervening in an internal union dispute and did 
not know how long the dispute would continue, force majeure was even more compel-
ling. The company took action under Articles 53 and 434 of the FLL for approval of 
termination of the employment relationship and termination of the collective bargaining 
agreement, insisting that it took no position on the internal union dispute, which was for 
the workers alone to decide. 
97
 Case files were reviewed by Dr. Juan Jose Rios Estavillo as part of the empirical study noted 
earlier. The Secretariat also received anecdotal information on plant closings in newspaper articles 
on the subject, which are available along with other information from external consultants and 
contractors. 
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Examples of Plant Closing Cases in Mexico (continued) 
Worker representatives argued that (1) the employer acted unconstitutionally by 
declaring termination without authorization by the CAB in violation of Article 435, (2) 
no work disruption had occurred except that attributable to the employer's failure to 
provide transportation as required under the contract, and (3) no internal conflict 
existed in the union. 
After taking evidence and hearing arguments, the CAB ruled that (1) the employer 
could not avoid suspending work and that there was force majeure not imputable to 
the employer, (2) an internal union conflict existed, (3) the employer remained impar-
tial in the internal conflict, (4) the internal union conflict gave rise to work stoppages 
giving legal cause for terminating individual contracts and the collective contract, (5) 
the employer should pay indemnization of 3 months' pay plus seniority-based pay on 
the condition that the union recognize the validity of the payments, and (6) the indi-
vidual "employment relationships and the collective contract be terminated. 
Note: In August 1992, the union and the company reached an agreement, in talks 
joined by the Mexican Department of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS), to sign a new 
collective agreement and proceed to the re-engagement of workers under the terms 
of the new contract. In 1993 a different union sought title to the collective bargaining 
agreement at Volkswagen on the grounds that a majority of workers supported it as 
the workers' representative. This claim was found by the CAB not to conform to legal 
requirement for union registration. The case was closed on that basis.98 
Anahuac Foundry and Plating, Inc. and Radical Union of 
Metal and Allied Workers (Federal CAB) 
The company sought a ruling from the CAB through a collective conflict of an 
economic nature proceeding to terminate the individual contracts of union members. 
The company also sought termination of the collective employment relationship with 
the union on the grounds of failure to meet the costs of production. The company 
argued that it could not meet the cost of operations at its steel foundry. 
However, the union had earlier declared and. undertaken a strike, in which before 
the same CAB the union and the company reached an agreement for voluntary termi-
nation of individual and collective contracts with appropriate severance pay. The com-
pany thereupon dropped its case under the collective conflict of an economic nature 
provisions of the FLL, and the CAB closed the case. 
98
 The Volkswagen affair was a cause celebre in Mexico labor circles, giving rise to widespread 
commentary, analysis, and controversy. Many observers argued that the plant closing was an artifi-
cial device to eliminate militant unionists, thus interfering with their freedom of association. See, 
for example, Ludger Pries, "Volkswagen: Un Nudo Gordiano Resuelto?" 9 Trabajo 7 (1993). As 
indicated here, the labor authorities found that the closing was lawful. 
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Examples of Plant Closing Cases in Mexico (continued) 
Balanced Seeds of Mexico, Inc. (Local CAB of Chihuahua) 
The company invoked the special proceedings provisions in Articles 892-899 of the 
FLL for collective suspension of the employment relationship in the wake of an explosion 
that destroyed the plant and equipment for seed production. The company sought per-
mission for a 2-year suspension of the employment relationship. The CAB approved the 
suspension under provisions that some workers would return to work during the suspen-
sion and others would receive appropriate severance pay, in view of the fact that auto-
mation in the new plant would require fewer workers. 
Industrialized Concrete, Inc. (Local CAB of Chihuahua) 
The company brought an action of collective conflict of an economic nature for tem-
porary inability to meet costs. The company claimed lack of financial resources to oper-
ate the plant and impossibility of obtaining resources. Through CAB conciliation the 
parties agreed to terminate employment relations and close the plant with payment of 
3 months' salary plus seniority pay and pro rata vacation and holiday pay. 
The company's lack of cash led to non-compliance with the agreement, leading the 
workers to obtain a lien on the assets; At the time of the Secretariat's review, assets 
were being auctioned to satisfy the workers' claims under the agreement with the de-
funct firm. 
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PART FOUR 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Worker displacement in general, as well as displacement caused by plant closings 
in particular, takes place constantly and has a number of causes." Causes can include 
employer responses to economic concerns such as changes in factor prices, changes in 
market demand, import penetration, overcapacity, plants reaching the end of useful 
life, or new technology requiring new plant design, or they can include changes in 
public policy such as cutbacks in a heavily government-funded industry 
This study is not concerned directly with such natural market-driven or public 
policy reasons for plant closings. The focus of the study is the use of plant closings and 
threats of plant closing by employers to subvert the right of workers to form unions. 
However, it is important to establish a larger economic and social context for consid-
ering plant closings. 
Data in this section also provide an indication of when displaced workers were 
forewarned of their displacement. The sudden closing of a plant, regardless of the 
reason, can create serious adjustment problems for individuals, communities, and 
government institutions. Therefore, the issue of the "suddenness" of a plant closing is 
a key consideration in this part. 
DISPLACEMENT AND PLANT CLOSINGS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Plant closings have had a significant effect on employment in the United States 
over the past 2 decades. This effect has become even more important in the 1990s. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in its biennial Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) 
found that over the period January 1991 to December 1993, nearly 9.2 million work-
ers were displaced (Table 9). From January 1993 to December 1995, more than 9.3 
million workers were displaced, evidence of a continuing phenomenon (Table 10). 
Although various causes were listed, the primary cause of worker dislocation ac-
cording to the survey results was plant closings.100 Close to 3.6 million workers (39 
percent of all displaced workers) lost their jobs because of plant closings in the 3-year 
99
 Displacement includes workers who lost their jobs because their plant or company closed or 
moved, their position or shift was abolished, or there was insufficient work. 
IOO Yhis term includes plant and company shutdowns as well as plants and companies moving 
to another location. 
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period covered by the first survey and 3.4 million (36 percent of all displaced work-
ers) in the 3-year period covered by the most recent survey Of those displaced, non-
unionized workers made up the majority of those displaced as a result of plant clos-
ings, totaling more than 3.0 million workers (86 percent of those displaced by plant 
closings)101 from 1991-1993, and 2.9 million workers (86 percent of those displaced 
by plant closings) from 1993-1995. 
Another recent survey conducted by BLS provides additional though less compre-
hensive data on displaced workers. The mass layoffs survey provided data for the 
fourth quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996 and found that 270,598 and 
232,713 workers were separated from their jobs in those two periods, respectively 
Closure of work sites was responsible for 67,500 (25 percent) and 70,300 (25 percent) 
respectively of all workers laid off during that period. Unlike the DWS, the mass 
layoff survey covered layoffs of at least 31 days that involved 50 or more workers from 
the same establishment. 
An important aspect of the effect of plant closings on workers in general is the 
ability of these workers to be reintegrated into the labor force. Social programs de-
signed to provide a bridge for workers while they find new employment, or to provide 
training and readjustment services, are most helpful when they are able to respond in 
a timely way to dislocations. Therefore, dislocations that happen in a sudden and 
unplanned way can be more taxing on the social programs designed to assist workers. 
The DWS found that nearly 2.0 million workers (55 percent) in the first survey 
period and 1.7 million workers (50 percent) in the second survey period were given 
no advance notice that they were to be displaced because of plant closings. Sudden 
plant closings make the adjustment process more difficult for individuals, families, 
and institutions charged with helping these workers reintegrate into the labor force. 
Of those who were given advance notice, only 611 thousand (40 percent) in the first 
period and 703 thousand (43 percent) in the second period were warned more than 
2 months in advance. The existence of a union at the company being closed seemed to 
improve the likelihood of receiving advance notice. Approximately 182 thousand union-
ized workers (42 percent) in the first period and 154 thousand unionized workers (36 
percent) in the second period were displaced because of plant closings with no ad-
vance notice; compared to nearly 1.8 million non-unionized workers (57 percent) and 
more than 1.5 million non-unionized workers (52 percent) who were displaced be-
cause of closings (Tables 9 and 10). 
1
 This roughly mirrors the general rate of unionization in the United States. 
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Table 9 
U.S. Workers Displaced Because of Plant Closings in the United States, 
January, 1991-December 1993 
(in 1,000s) 
Displaced because of 
plant closing/move 
Re-employed after closing 
Unemployed after closing 
Not in the labor force 
Received advance notice 
Less than 1 month 
Between 1 and 2 months 
More than 2 months 
No advance notice 
Totals 
3,597 
2,416 
664 
517 
1,522 
248 
519 
611 
1,988 
Percentage 
100 
67 
18 
14 
42 
16 
34 
40 
55 
• 
Union 
Total 
(percent) 
432 
228 
109 
95 
251 
34 
77 
131 
182 
(12) 
(52) 
(25) 
(21) 
(58) 
(13) 
(30) 
(52) 
(42) 
Non-Union 
Total 
(percent) 
3,097 (86) 
2,143 (69) 
540 (17) 
414 (13) 
1,258 (40) 
319 (25) 
437 (34) 
479 (38) 
1,775 (57) 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 1994. Revised, 1996. 
Table 10 
U.S. Workers Displaced Because of Plant Closings in the United States, 
January 1993-December 1995 
(in 1,000s) 
Displaced because of 
plant closing/move 
Re-employed after closing 
Unemployed after closing 
Not in the labor force 
Received advance notice 
Less than 1 month 
Between 1 and 2 months 
More than 2 months 
No advance notice 
Totals 
3,404 
2,438 
459 
507 
1,600 
362 
464 
703 
1,717 
Percentage 
100 
71 
13 
14 
47 
22 
29 
43 
50 
Union 
Total 
(percent) 
421 
273 
62 
86 
258 
40 
65 
135 
154 
(12) 
(64) 
(14) 
(20) . 
(61) 
(15) 
(25) 
(52) 
(36) 
Non-Union 
Total ' 
(percent) 
2,948 (86) 
2,143 (72) 
396 (13) 
409 (13) 
1,328 (45) 
321 (24) 
396 (29) 
566 (42) 
1,558 (52) 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 1996. 
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Of those who were displaced because of plant closings, 2.4 million in the first pe-
riod (67 percent) and 2.4 million in the second period (71 percent), were re-em-
ployed. Approximately 664 thousand (27 percent) in the first period and 459 thou-
sand (18 percent) in the second period were still looking for work. Approximately 517 
thousand in the first period (21 percent) and 507 thousand in the second period (20 
percent) had left the labor force, i.e., stopped looking for work, for a number of rea-
sons. In the first survey period, approximately 1.1 million (47 percent) of those dis-
placed by plant closings who found a new job received unemployment benefits (Table 
11). That number was 1.0 million (41 percent) in the second survey period (Table 12). 
1,137 
340 
767 
454 
191 
258 
252 
172 
78 
47 
29 
67 
68 
42 
56 
48 
68 
30 
Table 11 
Unemployment Benefits of U.S. Workers Displaced Because of 
Plant Closings, January 1991-December 1993 
(in 1,000s) 
Total Percentage 
Re-employed—Received Ul (out of 2,416) 
Exhausted benefits 
Did not exhaust Ul 
Unemployed—Received Ul (out of 664) 
Exhausted benefits 
Did not exhaust Ul 
Not in labor force—Received Ul (out of 517) 
Exhausted benefits 
Did not exhaust Ul 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 1994. 
Table 12 
Unemployment Benefits of U.S. Workers Displaced Because of 
Plant Closings, January 1993-December 1995 
(in 1,000s) 
Total Percentage 
Re-employed—Received Ul (out of 2,438) 
Exhausted benefits 
Did not exhaust Ul 
Unemployed—Received Ul (out of 459) 
Exhausted benefits 
Did not exhaust Ul 
Not in labor force—Received Ul (out of 507) 
Exhausted benefits 
Did not exhaust Ul 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 1996. 
,017 
388 
591 
278 
108 
170 
212 
145 
63 
41 
38 
58 
60 
38 
61 
41 
68 
29 
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A similar study of displaced workers in the decade of the 1980s was conducted by 
the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO). That study found that approximately 
73 percent of all workers displaced in the 1980s found new jobs.102 However, almost 
half of those who were re-employed were paid less than they received at their old job. 
Whether they were re-employed at the time of the survey or not, most workers dis-
placed in the 1980s experienced an extended period of unemployment, with an aver-
age duration of joblessness of 30 weeks. The average displacement from 1981-1990 
was roughly 2.0 million per year, compared with an average of 3.0 million for the 
1991—1993 period. Since questions on unionization were not added to the BLS sur-
vey until the 1994 survey, no data are available in the CBO study regarding whether 
unionized workers fared differently from non-unionized workers. 
DISPLACEMENT AND PLANT CLOSINGS IN CANADA 
Data recently released from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynam-
ics (SLID) provide some insight into the displacement phenomena in Canada. The 
SLID was conducted in 1993 and provides information on displaced workers in Canada 
(Table 13). 
Table 13 
Job Separation in Canada, 1993-1997—Covered by a 
Collective Agreement 
Total Unionized 
Total Labor Force (ages 16-69) 
Total Separations 
Reason for job separation: 
Company moved 
Company went out of business 
Layoff/Business slowdown 
(not caused by seasonal conditions) 
18,073,000 
4,649,800 
31,400 
246,200 
784,600 
4,742,900 
n/a 
n/a 
25,000 
163,000 
The SLID found that of the 4.6 million Canadian workers displaced from their 
jobs during the survey period, 1,062,200 (23 percent) had been displaced because 
their plants or companies moved, shut down, or had layoffs and business slowdowns. 
102
 "Displaced Workers: Trends in the 1980's and Implications for the Future," Congressional 
Budget Office, Congress of the United States, February 1993. 
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The Canadian government also collected data similar to the above in the 1990 
Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS). According to a study by Statistics Canada, 
permanent layoffs have been above one million workers since 1981, during both peak 
and trough periods of the business cycle, suggesting displacement is acyclical.103 Dur-
ing 1988-1990, the LMAS also found the following characteristics among displaced 
workers: most were non-unionized, young, working in low-wage jobs, and held their 
jobs for less than a year. The survey found mixed results with respect to how long 
displaced workers took to be reemployed and how much they earned in their new jobs. 
Half of the males displaced between 1988 and 1990 started new jobs within 12 weeks; 
however, 5 percent of males were unemployed for 1 year before starting a new job. 
The median period of joblessness for men was approximately 12 weeks. Nearly half of 
all displaced workers experienced losses in earnings in their new jobs. 
An important finding of the survey that is relevant to this study is the difference 
between the rate of unionization among displaced workers and workers in the total 
labor force. As Table 14 illustrates, non-unionized workers were overrepresented among 
both men and women who were displaced in 1990. The LMAS did not address cau-
sality. However, it is an important factor in analyzing the effect of plant closings and 
displacement on unionization issues. 
Distribution of Displacement by Union Status in Canada, 1990 
Union Non-Union 
Percentage Percentage 
Men 
Displaced 28,3 
Total workforce 29.7 
Women 
Displaced 16.7 
Total workforce 25.6 
Source: Labour Market Activity Survey, 1990, Statistics Canada. 
103
 Garnett Picot, Zhengxi Lin, & Wendy Piper, "Permanent Layoffs in Canada: Overview 
and Longitudinal Analysis," Business and Labour Market Analysis, Statistics Canada, May 1996. 
65.4 
54 
76.7 
64.7 
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DISPLACEMENT AND PLANT CLOSINGS IN MEXICO 
Information from the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) indicates that 5,794 
workplaces were dropped from the registry in 1995, affecting more than 300,000 
workers.104 This reflects developments in the formal sector for firms that register with 
the Social Security system. No data are available on the total number of workers dis-
placed in Mexico. The number of unemployed Mexican workers who left their job 
involuntarily is the closest estimate available. Those data are discussed next. Mexico 
has not undertaken a specific survey monitoring how displaced workers fare with 
regard to re-employment and earnings in a new job. Since there is no unemployment 
insurance program in Mexico, the length of time displaced Mexican workers spend 
unemployed is likely to be lower than that in the United States and Canada. However, 
no data are available to confirm this. Overall, duration of unemployment is much 
lower in Mexico compared with Canada and the United States, suggesting that the 
lack of unemployment benefits reduces the duration of joblessness. 
ALTERNATE COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF DISPLACEMENT 
IN NORTH AMERICA 
The only comparative data on displacement in the three countries come from un-
employment statistics. As Table 15 illustrates, involuntary job losers make up between 
40 and 70 percent of all unemployed workers in the three NAFTA countries. Canada 
seems to be hardest hit by involuntary job loss. These data reflect displacement at a 
very broad level, covering workers who lost their jobs involuntarily for a number of 
reasons, including plant closings. 
Information obtained from IMSS sources by Secretariat staff 
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Table 15 
Job Losses3 in North America 
(in l,OOOs) 
Canada 
Total job losers 
Percent of total 
unemployed 
Mexico" 
Total urban job losers 
Percent of urban 
unemployed 
United States 
Total job losers 
Percent of total 
unemployed 
1990 
720.5 
61.9 
123.2 
33.7 
3,322.0 
48.3 
1991 
986.2 
66.1 
129.4 
35.7 
4,608.0 
54.7 
1992 
1,113.6 
67.9 
153.2 
38.9 
5,291.0 
56.4 
1993 
1,108.1 
67.2 
192.5 
38.8 
4,769.0 
54.6 
1994 
1,007.8 
65.4 
227.0 
42.6 
3,815.0 
47.7 
1995 
n/a 
n/a 
513.0 
54.2 
3,476.0 
46.9 
a
 This term includes only workers involuntarily unemployed who are not new entrants to the labor force. 
bFor Mexico, these figures represent only urban areas. Estimates are based on the National Urban Employment 
Survey, which covers 92 percent of the urbanized population and none of the non-urban population. 
IMPACT OF PLANT CLOSINGS ON WORKERS 
Workers who are displaced are often unemployed for long periods of time, and 
when they do find a new job, for most workers, it is at a lower wage. Workers also 
often lose health benefits when they are displaced, along with the seniority and other 
benefits that come with long tenure in a job. Given all these risks for workers, an 
employer faced with the possibility of a unionized workforce may effectively use the 
threat of closing a plant to discourage workers from forming a union. 
The existence of a safety net to help workers who are displaced because of plant 
closings can be crucial to ease the adjustment burden for workers and help them to be 
reintegrated into the labor market. Although several federal, state, and provincial ad-
justment programs exist, many workers, for various reasons, never avail themselves of 
these programs. (Appendix E provides a discussion of labor market adjustment pro-
grams available to workers in each country.) 
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EARLY WARNING AND SUDDENNESS OF PLANT CLOSINGS 
A key consideration for the adjustment of workers to plant closings is how much 
advance notice they were given to prepare for being displaced. The federal govern-
ments in Canada and the United States, as well as several provinces and several states, 
have recognized the importance of providing workers and communities with advance 
notice of a plant closing so that the adjustment process can occur more smoothly. 
Instead of requiring advance warning, Mexican law requires employers to obtain per-
mission from the labor authorities to close plants (although the procedure is rarely 
used—see Part Three, Mexico findings). 
Despite the fact that there is some evidence that such warning can be helpful in the 
adjustment process, most plant closings in the United States and Canada occur with 
no such notice, and the rapid adjustment costs are borne by workers, government 
institutions, and local communities. The following is a brief discussion of early-warn-
ing programs in the three countries. 
United States 
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) was enacted 
in 1988 to improve the adjustment prospects for displaced workers by providing workers 
and communities advance warning of impending dislocations. Under the WARN 
Act, certain firms are required to provide 60 days' advance notice to workers prior to 
a mass layoff or plant closing that will last more than 6 months and affect at least 50 
workers. 
In addition to the WARN Act, which is a federal requirement, numerous states 
have enacted advance warning legislation. Nine states enacted plant closing laws prior 
to the WARN Act enactment, and several others have since enacted such laws. The 
state requirements vary, with some exceeding the WARN Act 60-day requirement 
and others offering other improvements to the federal legislation. 
Two exceptions to the WARN Act allow reduced notice requirements that are par-
ticularly relevant to this study Given that the "intent" or "cause" of a plant closing is 
a key concern of this study, i.e., whether a plant closing was motivated by economic or 
anti-union reasons, exceptions to the WARN Act are useful to analyze. 
The first exception is the so called "faltering company" exception, which applies 
only to plant closings. Under the Act, companies are allowed to provide less than the 
required 60-day notice in situations in which the announcement of a closing would 
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adversely affect the company's ability to gain financing or new business that may keep 
the company afloat. Specifically, the exception applies if the company (1) is actively 
seeking capital or business at the time the 60-day notice would have been required, (2) 
possesses a realistic opportunity to obtain the financing or business sought, (3) has the 
ability to demonstrate that business sought would be sufficient to enable the employer 
to avoid or postpone the shutdown, and (4) believes in good faith that giving notice 
would preclude the employer from obtaining the needed capital or business. 
A second important exception to the WARN Act's 60-day requirement is the "un-
foreseeable business circumstances" exception, applied to a sudden, unexpected ac-
tion or condition outside the employer's control, such as the loss of a major contract, a 
strike at a major supplier of the employer, or a sudden dramatic economic downturn. 
Exceptions are also granted for temporary projects or facilities and strike or lockout 
situations. 
Except for those employers who meet the requirements for the exceptions allowed 
under the Act, employers that do not provide the required 60-day notice are liable for 
monetary damages to employees who should have been notified under the Act. Such 
employees are eligible for damages including 1 day's pay plus benefits for each day 
that notice was not provided, for up to 60 days. In addition, employers are liable to the 
local government for damages of up to $500 a day for each day without notice. 
A recent Supreme Court ruling reaffirmed the right of unions to file suit on behalf 
of employees to recover damages under the Act. This right had been questioned by 
some employers, who argued that only individual workers had standing to file these 
suits.105 
A 1993 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and related aca-
demic research since then have highlighted some of the shortcomings of the WARN 
Act.106 According to the GAO report, the WARN Act, in its current form, excludes 
98 percent of American businesses and leaves 64 percent of U.S. workers unprotected 
against sudden plant closings and mass layoffs. The flaws result primarily from the 
Act's narrow requirements, which cover only the following: (1) businesses with a total 
workforce of 100 or more employees; (2) plant closings that affect 50 or more work-
105
 See UFCW Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., U.S. (May 14, 1996). 
106
 "Dislocated Workers: Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act Not Meeting 
Its Goals" U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington D.C, February 1993; John Portz, "WARN 
and the States: Implementation of the Federal Plant Closing Law" (Paper presented to Annual 
Meeting, Midwest Political Science Association, 1992); see also Statement of Kary L. Moss, Ex-
ecutive Director, Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice, to Senate Committee on 
Labor and Human Resources Subcommittee on Labor, July 26, 1994. 
98 
P A R T F O U R : E C O N O M I C A N D S O C I A L C O N T E X T 
ers; (3) mass layoffs of 50 or more workers, where those workers represent at least 
one-third of the workforce at that site; (4) mass layoffs where 500 or more workers are 
affected; and (5) full-time workers (i.e., part-time workers are not covered). The 1993 
GAO report found that more than 10,000 WARN Act notice violations have occurred 
since its enactment, but only some 100 lawsuits for WARN violations have been filed. 
Canada 
Employment Standards legislation in Canada provides for two types of employee 
entitlement in the event of mass termination resulting from plant closing. First, most 
jurisdictions stipulate that terminated employees are entitled to an increased period of 
notice (or pay in lieu of), as compared to the notice required for individual termina-
tions.107 Second, employees terminated as a result of plant closing in some jurisdic-
tions are entitled to severance pay. At the federal level, the Canada Labour Code pro-
vides for a group termination notice period of 16 weeks when 50 or more employees 
are terminated within a 4-week period, as well as severance pay for employees with at 
least 12 consecutive months of service. Not all provinces set the threshold number of 
employees at 50. In addition to employee entitlements, a number of jurisdictions com-
pel the creation of joint committees, through which employers are to cooperate with 
employee representatives to search for alternative solutions to mass termination or to 
minimize the impact of terminations on employees. 
When appropriate notice is not provided, Ontario law requires an employer to pay 
termination pay in the amount equal to the wages the employee would have earned 
during the period of notice, in addition to benefit contributions for this period. In 
Ontario, employers may be required to provide the following information: (1) the 
economic circumstances surrounding the intended terminations, (2) any consulta-
tions that have occurred or that are planned with local communities or employees and 
their agents, (3) proposed adjustment measures and the number of employees ex-
pected to benefit from each, and (4) a statistical profile of the affected employees. Similar, 
although less detailed, notice requirements are provided in British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and federal law. Table 16 summarizes Canadian notice requirements. 
107
 H . W. Arthurs et al., Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Canada, Toronto: Butterworths, 
1988. 
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Table 16 
Canadian Advance Notice Requirements 
Jurisdiction and 
Legislation Number of Employees Notice Required 
Federal 50 or more, terminated within 
a period of 4 weeks, from the 
same establishment 
16 weeks; notice in writing to Minister 
of Labour, Minister of HRD, trade 
union, and Employment Insurance 
Commission 
British 50-100 
Columbia 101-300 
more than 300, terminated 
within any 2-month period, 
from the same location 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks; notice in writing to Minister 
of Labour, trade union, and each 
affected employee 
Manitoba ' 50-100 
101-300 
more than 300, terminated 
within a period of 4 weeks 
10 weeks 
14 weeks 
18 weeks; notice in writing to Minister 
of Labour, trade union, and affected 
employees 
New 10 or more, if they represent 
Brunswick at least 25 percent of the 
employer's work force, 
terminated within a period of 
4 weeks 
6 weeks; notice in writing to the 
bargaining agent, to the Minister of 
Advanced Education and Labour, and 
to each affected employee 
Newfoundland 50-199 
200-499 
500 or more, terminated within a 
period of 4 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks; notice in writing to each 
employee whose employment is to be 
terminated and to the Minister of 
Environment and Labour 
Northwest 25-49 
Territories 50-99 
100-299 
300 or more, terminated within a 
period of 4 weeks 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks; notice in writing to the 
labor standards officer 
Nova Scotia 10-99 
100-299 
300 or more, terminated within a 
period of 4 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks; notice in writing to each 
person whose employment is to be 
terminated; inform Minister of Labour 
Ontario 50-199 
200-499 
500 or more, terminated within a 
period of 4 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks; notice in writing to each 
person whose employment is to be 
terminated and Minister of Labour 
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Table 16 
Canadian Advance Notice Requirements (continued) 
jurisdiction and 
Legislation Number of Employees Notice Required 
Quebec 
Saskatchewan 
Yukon 
Territory 
10-99 
100-299 
300 or more 
10-49 
50-99 
100 or more, terminated within a 
period of 4 weeks 
25-49 
50-99 
100-299 
300 or more, terminated within a 
period of 4 weeks 
and to any individual affected 
2 months 
3 months 
4 months; notice in writing to the 
Minister of Manpower and Income 
Security 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks; notice to Minister of 
Labour, any affected employee, 
and trade union 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks; notice in writing to the 
Director of Employment Standards 
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SUMMARY AND ISSUES FOR FUTURE 
CONSIDERATION 
In each country party to the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC), labor authorities enforce laws to protect workers against interference with 
freedom of association and the right to organize, including when such interference 
involves the use of plant closings or threats of closing. However, results vary with the 
structure and administration of labor law among the countries. 
Outright, sudden, total plant closing to forestall union organization is not a com-
mon occurrence. Most employers faced with a union organizing drive do not respond 
by totally closing the workplace. Some employers respond to a union organizing effort 
with partial closings through product line relocation, subcontracting or "outsourcing," 
partial layoffs, and the like. These too are exceptional cases. 
Most plants or other work facilities involve investment, trained workers, existing 
supplier and customer links, and other features that complicate an immediate shut-
down in response to a unionization drive. At the same time, new technology and new 
forms of work organization make it increasingly easy to close plants, in contrast to 
earlier decades when massive capital investments in huge facilities made closings more 
difficult. 
More common than total or partial closings is the use of threats of closing to resist 
unionization. With new forms of capital mobility, information systems, communica-
tions technology, and similar developments in the economy, there is more frequent 
dislocation of work and workers. This makes threats of plant closing all the more 
convincing. The findings of this report suggest that plant closings and threats of plant 
closing can have adverse effects on workers' freedom of association and right to orga-
nize in the NAALC countries. 
In the United States, labor law authorities effectively enforce the law with respect 
to determining violations and ordering remedies, including orders to reopen closed 
facilities and rehire affected workers. The General Counsel and the regional directors 
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) actively prosecute plant closing and 
threat cases with a high level of success before the NLRB and the courts. However, 
while NLRB enforcement is effective in the cases it takes to a conclusion, many in-
stances of plant closings or threats of closing that continue to occur never reach the 
stage of a final decision. Taking such cases to a litigated conclusion involves a lengthy, 
multi-stage process subject to numerous appeals that is often forgone by potential 
complainants. 
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In Canada, federal and provincial labor laws on union organizing have established 
rapid procedures for holding union elections where elections are held. A majority of 
provinces permit a "card-check" certification, without the need for an election. This 
minimizes the "campaign" aspects of union organizing where plant closings or threats 
of closing tend to arise. 
Most unfair labor practice cases are heard relatively quickly in a single-stage pro-
ceeding by the relevant labor board or commissioner. Moreover, labor board deci-
sions in Canada normally are not appealable to the civil courts and are generally ac-
cepted by all sides as final. In general, legal doctrines, administrative procedures and 
effective enforcement appear to have a significant effect on the phenomenon of anti-
union plant closings and threats of closing in Canada. 
In Mexico, the labor law system and the union organizing system are fundamen-
tally different from those of the United States and Canada. Several features of Mexi-
can labor law prevent issues of plant closings or threats of closing from arising under 
Mexican law as they arise in Canadian and U.S. law. 
The certification process of union formation, accompanied by a campaign that gives 
rise to plant closings or threats of plant closing to influence an election, does not exist 
in Mexico. Unions are normally formed without elections or election campaigns. 
Employers in the formal sector tend to accept the existence of unions as an inevitable 
component of Mexico's labor relations system. Generally speaking, most workplaces 
likely to be unionized—medium and large firms in the formal sector—are already 
unionized, so new organizing efforts are limited in number. Most organizing that 
occurs is what is called "raiding" or "poaching" in the United States and Canada, 
where one union seeks to displace another as the collective bargaining agent at an 
already unionized workplace. 
While there are many plant closings in Mexico, discriminatory anti-union closings 
are not discernible in records of cases where the collective conflict legal procedure for 
plant closings is used. Virtually no cases arise in which a union challenges a plant 
closing by alleging anti-union motivation. In contrast, many cases arise in which the 
union grants mutual consent to the closing to obtain the best possible severance terms. 
Moreover, threats that are susceptible to an unfair labor practice charge and a test of 
proof in litigation in the United States or Canada are not unlawful in themselves in 
Mexico. Therefore, plant closing threats are not susceptible to research through re-
view of administrative and judicial records. 
Nonetheless, two very significant findings emerged in the review of Mexican ad-
ministrative data. The first was that the legal process created to deal with plant closings 
and to test the employer's motivation for closing the plant—which would enable unions to 
challenge the closing—is virtually never used by Mexican companies and unions. 
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The second finding was closely related to the first. A great number of workplace 
closings in Mexico follow an alternative legal route wherein the union consents to the 
closing. Using the "mutual consent" clause of the Federal Labor Law obviates a "col-
lective conflict of an economic nature" and the legal process meant to resolve it. Both 
of these findings, and the fact that they would not typically be expected in Canada or 
the United States, illustrate the extent of legal differences in the Mexican labor rela-
tions system. 
ISSUES FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION 
1. Improving Information on the Administration of Labor Laws 
Governments could seek to improve the quality and accessibility of administrative 
data in the three NAALC countries, which is essential for examination of the effec-
tiveness of labor laws. 
The information compiled for this report presents a partial picture, demonstrating 
the need for more empirical information about labor law administration in NAALC 
countries. For example, enhanced methods for capturing standardized information on 
the disposition of cases from decentralized labor law authorities—the NLRB regional 
offices in the United States, the State CABs and State labor departments in Mexico, 
the provincial labor boards and labor ministries in Canada—could develop a sharper 
national picture of labor law administration. Analysis would also require careful dis-
aggregation of data to adjust for population differences, industrial sector differences, 
union density differences, and other related information. Each country's federal and 
subfederal labor agencies are best capable of designing administrative data systems in 
each of their jurisdictions, but with a national and trinational coordination, a high 
level of comparability of the effectiveness of labor law enforcement might be achieved. 
2. Identifying Possible Further Research 
Subjects for consideration by labor researchers in the three NAALC countries for 
further treatment of matters raised in this report include the following: 
• review of the records of more or all of the remaining 31 regional offices of the 
NLRB to see if the pattern perceived in the sample of two offices is reflected in 
other offices; 
• in-depth examination of cases in which labor boards in Canada and the United 
States ordered remedies to be imposed, in order to study their effectiveness; 
• a survey of Canadian and Mexican unions for comparison with U.S. survey 
data used in this study; 
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• further study of Federal and State CAB records in Mexico to see whether the 
procedure for voluntary termination of the employment relationship (which ap-
pears to be a common avenue for plant closings) coincides with other procedures, 
such as those for disputes over title to collective agreements, or correlates to better 
severance arrangements, or has other effects, which may shed more light on pos-
sible effects of closings on the freedom of association; 
• examination of alternative routes for dealing with plant closings in Mexico, such 
as strike declarations or individual claims of unjustified dismissal, that would indi-
cate whether unions have developed strategies for using these procedures to obtain 
favorable severance terms; and 
• more analysis of the implications of the current labor market environment and 
the restructured "new economy" for labor laws that protect the freedom of associa-
tion and the right to organize. 
3. Linking to National and International Labor Relations Initiatives 
Consideration can be given as to whether this report can serve as a bridge to other 
national and international initiatives in the labor relations field, through special meet-
ings, conferences, studies, and so on, to promote awareness of the issues involved in 
the report and to relate them to current concerns in each country 
For example, the issues in this report could be considered in light of the "New 
Labor Culture" agreement recently developed in Mexico, which contains Principles of 
Ethics in Labor Relations. The principles establish a code of conduct between unions 
and employers based on "strict adherence to ethical and juridical principles in the 
exercise of legal representation." 
In Canada, the theme of this report could be examined in relation to major labor 
law reforms initiated by various jurisdictions over the past several years, including the 
current federal reform of Part 1 of the Canada Labour Code. 
The United States has seen much attention devoted to the development of Model 
Business Principles proposed by the Clinton administration, and other national or inter-
national codes of conduct developed by companies, by labor-management groups, 
and by non-governmental organizations, which could be related to the issues in this 
report. 
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All three N A A L C countries are members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ( O E C D ) , which has adopted, with the concurrence of 
employer and trade union advisory committees, the O E C D Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises,10* and of the International Labor Organization ( I L O ) , which has 
adopted the I L O Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enter-
prises and Social Policy.m Both these instruments deal with issues raised in this report, 
and could enhance trinational, tripartite discussions in the N A A L C context. 
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 Section 8 of the OECD Guidelines states that employers should, "while employees are exer-
cising a right to organize, not threaten to utilize a capacity to transfer the whole or part of an 
operating unit from the country concerned ... to hinder the exercise of a right to organize." 
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 Paragraph 52 of the ILO Declaration calls on multinational enterprises not to threaten to 
transfer all or part of their operations to other locations "with a view to undermining ... the work-
ers' exercise of their right to organize." 
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MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS-
SUBMISSION 9501 (SPRINT CASE) 
AGREEMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION 
The Secretary of Labor of the United States, and the Secretary of Labor and Social 
Welfare of Mexico, in accord with the provisions of the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation, have agreed to carry out consultations regarding labor law related 
with the effects of the sudden closing of a plant on the principle of freedom of association 
and the right of workers to organize. Both governments lend the greatest importance 
to such issues, and therefore have reached the following agreement: 
1. The Secretary of Labor of the United States agrees to continue to keep the 
Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare of Mexico fully informed of developments 
related to submission 9501 (Sprint case) as appeals are considered under the 
United States legal system. The Department of Labor of the United States will 
present an appropriate report to the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare of 
Mexico within 120 days of final adjudication of the case by United States competent 
authorities. 
2. The Secretaries of Labor of the United States and Mexico, after consultations 
with the Minister of Labour of Canada, will instruct the trinational Labor Secre-
tariat, located in Dallas, Texas, to conduct a study on the effects of the sudden 
closing of a plant on the principle of freedom of association and the right of work-
ers to organize in the three countries. 
° The study shall be completed within 180 days. 
3. The U.S. Department of Labor will organize and conduct a public forum in San 
Francisco, California to allow interested parties an opportunity to convey to the 
public their concerns on the effects of the sudden closing of a plant on the prin-
ciple of freedom of association and the right of workers to organize. Mexican and 
Canadian tripartite delegations will be invited to attend. 
° The forum shall take place within 120 days. 
° The proceedings of this event shall be recorded by the U.S. Department of 
Labor. 
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The outcome of each of the agreed actions shall be promptly made available to 
the public. The Secretary of Labor of the United States and the Secretary of 
Labor and Social Welfare of Mexico shall decide on the form and timing of the 
public announcements. 
Completion dates are effective from the date of the agreement. 
The aforementioned is agreed to and becomes effective on 
1996. 
m 1 3 1996 
mL my) &/&A_ 
Robert B. Reich 
Secretary of Labor 
United States of America 
Bonilla 
Secretario del Trabajo y 
Prevision Social 
Mexico 
The Government of Canada endorses the agreements on implementation reached by 
the United States and Mexico in the Ministerial Consultations and agrees to participate, 
as appropriate, in the follow-up activities it contains. 
tisterof Labour 
Canada 
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APPENDIX B 
U.S. FEDERAL COURT DECISION DATA 
(89 cases decided by U.S. Courts of Appeals on issues of 
plant closing and threats of plant closing) 
Time Period: 1986-1993 
Table B.l 
By Type of Complaint 
Type of Conduct 
Complained of 
Closures 
Partial Closures 
Threats 
Sub-Categories of Conduct 
Straightforward closures 
Closures with later reopenings 
(nonunion) 
SUBTOTAL 
Refusal to hire/rehire union employees 
Subcontracting out of union work 
Closure of unit or department, or 
substantial reduction in work 
SUBTOTAL 
TOTAL 
Number of Charges 
5 
10 
15 
6 
5 
7 
18 
56 
89 
(6%)b 
(11%) 
(17%) 
(7%) 
(6%) 
(8%) 
(20%) 
(63%) 
a
 Cases in which both a threat and an actual closure (either partial or total) occurred have only been included 
in the "closure" category. Thus, the category "threats" includes only cases where no closure actually occurred. 
b
 Percentages of total number of cases may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. This total includes 
one case where all employees had been dismissed. 
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Table B.2 
By Disposition of Complaint (where NLRB found that an unfair labor 
practice occurred) 
Nature of 
ULP 
violations3 
Cases Explicitly 
Coded as Such5 
Cases that Appear 
to Fall Within 
Category 
Total of 
Preceding 
2 Columns 
8(a)(1) 
8(a)(3) 
Upheld 34 
Rejected 3 
Remanded re: result1 0 
Upheld 16 
Rejected 0 
Remanded re: result 1 
(92%)c 
(8%) 
(0%) 
(94%) 
(0%) 
(6%) 
28 
0 
0 
20 
1 
0 
(100%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
(95%) 
(5%) 
(0%) 
62 
3 
0 
36 
1 
1 
(95%) 
(5%) 
(0%) 
(95%) 
(3%) 
(3%) 
a
 Neither 8(a)(5) (failure to bargain) nor illegal lock-out cases were included in the analysis. In cases where 
both a threat of closing and an actual closing occurred, those issues are in separate categories here, in 
contrast to'their combining in Table B.l. (See note a supra in Table B.l.) 
b
 This includes cases that, although not explicitly coded as 8(a)(1), implied an 8(a)(1) coding (such as cases 
that involved threat and other 8(a)(1) violations). However, it does not include cases that stated "other 8(a)(1) 
and 8(a)(3) violations." 
c
 Percentages are of each particular type of complaint. 
d
 As contrasted with cases remanded regarding specific remedies. 
Table B.3 
By Remedy Awarded (by the NLRB, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals) 
Remedy3 
Reinstatement, job offer, or recall 
Make whole 
Back pay 
Cease-and-desist order 
Return subcontracted work to bargaining unit 
Reopen/resume operations 
Restore status quo 
Apply terms of last collective agreement 
Post notice 
President of company publicly read notice 
Gissel bargaining order or order to bargain with an 
existing union 
Vacate election results and/or order a new election 
Expunge anti-union by-law 
Remand (in whole or in part) to Board for remedy 
a
 Many of the cases involved other unfair labor practice (ULP) complaints, in addition to those related to plant 
closures and/or threats. There is no way of ascertaining which remedies were specifically designed to deal with 
ULPs that are related to plant closing without an in-depth analysis of each case opinion, not possible within the 
Secretariat's time frame. 
b
 Percentages are of total number of cases; percentages may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding 
and because of multiple remedies being awarded in individual cases. 
Number of Times 
Awarded" 
47 
26 
27 
77 
2 
5 
2 
3 
66 
1 
25 
12 
1 
7 
(53%) 
(29%) 
(30%) 
(87%) 
(2%) 
(6%) 
(2%) 
(3%) 
(74%) 
(1%) 
(28%) 
(13%) 
(1%) 
(8%) 
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Table B.4 
New Organizing v. Existing Unions 
Status of 
Relationship 
New organizing 
Existing union 
Sub-Status 
Successor/alter 
ego employer 
Same employer 
Number of Cases 
70 (79%) 
14 (16%) 
5 (6%) 
Table B.5 
Successful and Unsuccessful Complaints, by Status of 
Bargaining Relationship 
Status 
New organizing 
Existing union 
No. of 
Sub-Status Cases 
70 
Successor/ alter 
ego employer 14 
Same employer 5 
Successful 
Complaints 
67 (96%) 
14 (100%) 
3 (60%) 
Unsuccessful 
Complaints8 
3 (4%) 
0 (0%) 
2 (40%) 
a
 This category includes both cases that were rejected and cases that were remanded with respect to disposition. 
Table B.6 
Chronological Progression of Complaints 
1986 
1 
1987 
6 
1988 
9 
1989 
12 
1990 
11 
1991 
18 
1992 
4 
1993 
28 
Total 
89 
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Table B.7 
Particular Unions Involved 
International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (IBT)—17 
United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW)—13 
United Auto Workers 
(UAW)—9 
United Steel Workers of 
America (USWA)—6 
International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers (IBEW)—5 
GCIU—3 
United Electrical Workers 
(UE)-3 
Allied Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (ACTWU)—3 
United Mine Workers of 
America (UMWA)—2 
International Association of 
Machinists (1AM)—2 
HERE—2 
OCAW—2 
Woodworkers—2 
Laborers—2 
Glass, Plastic, & Allied—2 
Other AFL-CIO—13 
Unaffiliated—3 
Table B.8 
Geographic Location of Employers in 89 Cases Studied3 
Michigan—10 cases 
Ohio—9 cases 
Pennsylvania—7 cases 
New Jersey—7 cases Kentucky—5 cases 
California—6 cases Indiana—4 cases 
Tennessee—5 cases West Virginia—4 cases 
New York—7 cases 
Remaining 25 cases spread among 15 other states. 
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U.S. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
DECISION DATA 
(319 cases decided by NLRB on plant closing and threats of 
plant closing) 
Time Period: 1990-1995 
Tabled ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
By Type of Complaint 
Type of Conduct 
Complained ofa 
Closures 
Partial Closures 
Total and Partial 
Closures Combined 
Threats 
Sub-Categories of Conduct 
Straightforward closures 
Closures with later reopenings 
(nonunion) 
SUBTOTAL 
Number 
15 
15 
30 
Refusal to hire/rehire union employees 7 
Subcontracting out of union work 23 
Closure of unit or department, or 49 
substantial reduction in work 
SUBTOTAL 79 
TOTAL 
109 
210 
319 
' of Charges 
(50%)b 
(50%) 
(9%) 
(9%) 
(29%) 
(62%) 
(25%) 
(34%) 
(66%) 
a
 Only cases in which both a threat and an actual closure (either partial or total) occurred have been included 
in the "closure" category. Thus, the category "threats" includes only cases where no closure actually occurred. 
b
 Percentages of total number of cases; percentages may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. 
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By Disposition of Complaint 
1990 1 9 9 1 1992 1 9 9 3 1994 1 9 9 5 Total 
Complaint (23)a (71) (77) (53) (38) (57) (319) 
ULP Upheld 14 (70%)b 45 (90%) 52 (95%) 31 (89%) 24 (96%) 46 (82%) 212 (88%) 
Rejected 5 (25%) 3 (6%) 2 (4%) 4 (11%) 0 (0%) 9 (16%) 23 (10%) 
Remanded 1 (5%) 2 (4%) 1 (2%) 0 (3%) 1 (4%) 1 (2%) 6 (2%) 
SUBTOTAL 20 50 55 35 25 56 241 (76%) 
Objections Upheld 3 (75%) 20 (95%) 20 (91%) 17 (94%) 12 (92%) 0 (0%) 72 (91%) 
Rejected 1 (25%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 1 (6%) 1 (8%) 1(100%) 6 (7%) 
Remanded 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
SUBTOTAL 4 21 22 18 13 1 79 (25%) 
Total * Upheld 16 (70%) 65 (92%) 72 (94%) 48 (91%) 36 (95%) 46 (81%) 283 (89%) 
Cases Rejected 6 (26%) 4 (6%) 3 (4%) 5 (9%) 1 (3%) 10 (18%) 29 (9%) 
Remanded 1 (4%) 2 (3%) 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 1 (%) 7 (2%) 
TOTAL 23c 71 77 53 38 57 319d 
a
 The total number of cases from each year is provided in parentheses. 
b
 Percentages are of each particular type of complaint (e.g., 70 percent of ULP complaints in 1990 were 
upheld); percentages may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. 
c
 The total of 23 cases is less than the sum of ULP (20) and Objections (4) cases, as one case was included 
under both categories. 
d
 The total of 319 is 1 less than the sum of the subtotals (241 + 79 = 320) because of the dual categorization 
mentioned in the preceding footnote. 
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Table C.3 
By Remedy Awarded3 
Remedy 
1990 
(23) 
1991 
(71) 
1992 
(77) 
1993 
(53) 
1994 
(38) 
1995 
(57) 
Total 
(319) 
Make whole 
Reinstate 
employees13 
Reinstate 
department and/or 
subcontracted work 
Reopen 
Relocate 
Restore status quoc 
Bargaining order 
New election/set 
aside election 
Open and count 
ballots 
Certification 
Pay union 
costs of case 
4 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(17%) 
(13%) 
(0%) 
(4%) 
(0%) 
(4%) 
(22%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
8 
7 
5 
0 
0 
0 
14 
16 
1 
0 
0 
(11%) 
(10%) 
(7%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
(20%) 
(23%) 
(1%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
10 
10 
1 
2 
1 
3 
25 
10 
1 
1 
0 
(13%) 
(13%) 
(1%) 
(3%) 
(1%) 
(4%) 
(32%) 
(13%) 
(1%) 
(1%) 
(0%) 
7 
10 
3 
2 
0 
1 
18 
8 
0 
1 
0 
(13%) 
(19%) 
(6%) 
(4%) 
(0%) 
(2%) 
(34%) 
(15%) 
(0%) 
(2%) 
(0%) 
6 
5 
0 
0 
0 
2 
9 
6 
1 
0 
0 
(16%) 
(13%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
(5%) 
(24%) 
(16%) 
(3%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
7 
5 
5 
1 
0 
1 
12 
2 
1 
0 
1 
(12%) 
(9%) 
(9%) 
(2%) 
(0%) 
(2%) 
(21%) 
(4%) 
(2%) 
(0%) 
(2%) 
42 
40 
14 
6 
1 
8 
83 
42 
4 
2 
1 
(13%) 
(13%) 
(4%) 
(2%) 
(0%) 
(3%) 
(26%) 
(13%) 
(1%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
a
 Almost every case contained a standard cease-and-desist and posting remedy. 
b
 This includes only reinstatements where at least 10 percent of the bargaining unit had been laid off or 
discharged. This does not include reinstatements for individuals (or small groups) such as union organizers who 
had been laid off. 
c
 In addition to express orders of status quo ante, this category includes orders to restore terms of earlier 
collective bargaining agreements and orders to rescind unilateral changes. 
Table C.4 
New Organizing v. Existing Unions 
Status of 
Relationship 
1990 
(23) 
1991 
(71) 
1992 
(77) 
1993 
(53) 
1994 
(38) 
1995 
(57) 
Total 
(319) 
New organizing 17 (74%) 61 (86%) 66 (86%) 45 (85%) 32 (84%) 51 (89%) 272 (85%) 
Existing union 6 (26%) 10 (14%) 11 (14%) 8 (15%) 6 (16%) 3 (5%) 44 (14%) 
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Table C.5 
Successful and Unsuccessful Complaints, by Status 
of Bargaining Relationship 
Status 
No. of 
Cases 
Successful 
Complaints 
Unsuccessful 
Complaints3 
Remanded 
Complaints 
New organizing 
Existing union 
Unclear 
Total 
272 
44 
3 
319 
245 
37 
1 
283 
(90%) 
(84%) 
(33%) 
(89%) 
21 
7 
1 
29 
(8%) 
(16%) 
(33%) 
(9%) 
6 
0 
1 
7 
(2%) 
(0%) 
(0%) 
(2%) 
1
 This category includes both cases that were rejected and cases that were remanded with respect to disposition. 
Table C.6 
By Chronological Progression of Complaints 
1990 
23 
1991 
71 
1992 
77 
1993 
53 
1994 
38 
1995 
57 
Total 
319 
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CANADIAN LABOUR BOARD DECISION DATA 
(36 cases decided by labour boards in Canada on 
plant closing and threats of plant closing) 
Time Period: 1986-1995 
Table D.l 
By Type of Complaint 
Type of Conduct 
Complained of 
Actual closure 
Partial closure or 
contracting out 
Threats of closure 
CAa 
(2) 
1 (50%)b 
1 (50%) 
BC 
(17) 
9 (53%) 
5 (29%) 
3 (18%) 
AB 
(3) 
3 (100%) 
SK 
(3) 
2 (67%) 
1 (33%) 
ON 
(8) 
3 (38%) 
2 (25%) 
3 (38%) 
PQ 
(1) 
1 (100%) 
NB 
(2) 
1 (50%) 
1 (50%) 
Total 
(36) 
16 
9 
11 
a
 The total number of cases summarized from each jurisdiction is provided in parentheses. 
b
 Percentage of total number of cases; percentages may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. 
Table D.2 
By Disposition of Complaint 
Complaint 
Unfair 
labor 
practice 
Breach of 
duty to 
bargain in 
good faith 
Illegal 
lockout 
Upheld 
Rejected 
Upheld 
Rejected 
Upheld 
Rejected 
CA 
(2) 
2 (100%)b 
1 (100%) 
BC 
(17) 
8 (47%) 
9 (53%) 
2 (100%) 
1 (100%) 
AB 
(3) 
2 (67%) 
1 (33%) 
SK 
(3) 
2 (67%) 
1 (33%) 
1 (50%) 
1 (50%) 
ON 
(8) 
4 (57%) 
3 (43%) 
2 (50%) 
2 (50%) 
PQ 
(1) 
1 (100%) 
NB Total3 
X2) (36) 
1 (50%) 20 
1 (50%) 15 
4 
5 
1 
0 
a
 The total in this column is greater than the number of cases (36) because multiple complaints were made 
in individual cases. 
b
 Percentages are of each particular type of complaint (e.g., 40 percent of unfair labor practice complaints 
were upheld by the British Columbia Board). 
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Table D.3 
By Remedy Awarded 
Remedy3 
Reinstatement and/or 
compensation for 
employees 
Cease-and-desist 
order/declaration of 
breach of statute 
Return of work to 
bargaining unit, either at 
present or new location, 
either mandatory or as 
one option for employer 
Order to resume 
negotiations 
Order concerning access 
to employees for union 
Reimbursement of costs 
of organization of 
bargaining 
Letter dictated by Board 
Creation of trust fund for 
union 
Posting/mailing of 
decision 
Automatic certification 
or refusal to decertify 
Tribunal to remain 
seized re: remedy 
No remedy (no violation) 
CA 
(2) 
1 (50%)c 
1 (50%) 
1 (50%) 
1 (50%) 
1 (50%) 
BC 
(17) 
7 (41%) 
5 (29%) 
1 (6%) 
1 (6%) 
1 (6%) 
2 (12%) 
1 (6%) 
5 (29%) 
AB 
(3) 
1 (33%) 
1 (33%) 
1 (33%) 
SK 
(3) 
2 (67%) 
1 (33%) 
1 (33%) 
ON 
(8) 
4 (50%) 
2 (25%) 
1 (13%) 
1 (13%) 
2 (25%) 
1 (13%) 
3 (38%) 
PQ 
(1) 
1 (100%) 
NB 
(2) 
1 (50%) 
1 (50%) 
1 (50%) 
Total5 
(36) 
14 
10 
2 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
5 
3 
4 
11 
a
 Many of the cases involved other ULP complaints, in addition to those related to plant closures and/or threats. 
There is no way of ascertaining which remedies were specifically designed to deal with the ULPs related to plant 
closing. Thus, the numbers are likely inflated. 
b
 As with the preceding table, the total of this column is greater than the number of cases (36) because of 
multiple remedies being awarded in individual cases. 
c
 Percentages are of total number of cases; percentages may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding 
and because multiple remedies were awarded in individual cases. 
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Table D.4 
New Organizing v. Existing Unions 
Mature 
Relationship 
12 (33%) 
Organizing 
11 (52%) 
New Organization 
2 1 (58%) 
Applied Newly 
for cert. certified 
2 (10%) 6 (29%) 
Is tCA 
negot. 
1 (5%) 
Unknown 
3 (8%) 
IstCA 
reached 
1 (5%) 
Table D.5 
Successful and Unsuccessful Complaints, by Status of 
Bargaining Relationship 
Status 
New 
organization 
j 
Mature 
Unknown 
Sub-status No 
Organizing 
Applied for 
cert. 
Newly 
certified 
1st CA negot. 
1st CA reached 
SUBTOTAL 
TOTAL 
. Cases 
11 
2 
6 
1 
1 
2 1 
12 
3 
36 
Successful 
Complaints 
9 
2 
3 
0 
1 
15 
5 
2 
22 
(82%) 
(100%) 
(50%) 
(0%) 
(100%) 
(71%) 
(42%) 
(67%) 
(61%) 
Unsuccessful 
Complaints 
2 
0 
3 
1 
0 
6 
7 
1 
14 
(18%) 
(0%) 
(50%) 
(100%) 
(0%) 
(29%) 
(58%) 
(33%) 
(39%) 
Table D.6 
Chronological Progression of Complaints 
1986 
3 
1987 
3 
1988 
4 
1989 
0 
1990 
7 
1991 
1 
1992 
3 
1993 
7 
1994 
3 
1995 
5 
Total 
36 
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Table D.7 
Particular Unions Involved3 
RWDSU (Sask)—3 
USWA—3 
IWA—3 
UFCW—2 
IBT—2 
UAJAPPI—2 
CUPE—2 
GCIU—2 
{Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store) 
{Steelworkers) 
{Woodworkers) 
{Food and Commercial Workers) 
{Teamsters) 
{Plumbers and Pipefitters) 
{Public Employees) (also, BCGEU—1) {British Columbia 
Government Employees) 
{Graphic Communications) 
1
 Only unions that were involved with more than one case are included in this list. 
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LABOR MARKET ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS 
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
States Unemployment Insurance 
The most widely used and accessible program in the United States is the federal 
and state Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, established by the Social Security 
Act of 1935. The UI program provides displaced workers with income assistance in 
the form of weekly cash benefits. The amount of benefits varies among states, with the 
average weekly benefit equal to 40 percent of the worker's previous wage. Most states 
provide benefits up to 26 weeks, with the possibility of extension in exceptional cir-
cumstances. Funding for the program has increased steadily as the number of disloca-
tions has increased. 
In exceptional circumstances, as when a state experiences an unusually high rate of 
unemployment, the Extended Benefit (EB) program provides up to an additional 13 
weeks of benefits to eligible workers. Almost all wage and salary workers are covered 
by the UI program. Railroad workers, veterans, and civilian federal employees are 
covered by separate federal programs. In 1990, $17 billion was dispersed in pay-
ments. That number grew to an estimated $24 billion in 1996. (See Table E.l.) 
Table E.l 
Estimated UI Program Activity for Fiscal Year 1996 
Civilian unemployment rate 5.7 percent 
Number of workers covered 112 million 
Average duration of benefits 14 weeks 
Number of recipients 9 million 
Average weekly benefit $182 
Total benefits paid $24 billion 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, March 1996. 
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Most unemployed workers in the United States do not receive U I benefits, in part 
because of the sometimes restrictive eligibility criteria. Only half of all employed workers 
in the 1980s were eligible for benefits, as UI does not cover new entrants, re-entrants, 
or voluntary job leavers. Other criticisms of the UI program include the fact (1) that 
the program pays only limited attention to helping workers find new jobs; (2) that it 
does not include training; and (3) that it is not sensitive to difficulties that individual 
workers might experience, such as age, family status, education level, or location.110 
The Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment 
Assistance Program 
Another important labor market adjustment program is Title III of the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act QTPA). As amended by the Economic Dislocation and Worker 
Adjustment Act of 1988 (EDWAA), the Act provides states with federal funding to 
deliver training and related adjustment services to displaced workers. Under the pro-
gram, each state is required to respond rapidly to large displacements of workers, 
including plant closures. Under the program, these workers are eligible for job search 
assistance, retraining, and income maintenance. Workers who have lost their jobs and 
are unlikely to return to their previous industry or occupation are eligible for the 
program. 
EDWAA provides several services: 
• Rapid response—Each state receives notices of plant closures and mass layoffs 
covered under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) 
Act and responds with on-site services to displaced workers. States may also 
help set up labor-management committees at the workplace and coordinate 
efforts to avoid dislocations. 
• Retraining services—Displaced workers receive one or more of the follow-
ing: occupational skills, on-the-job training, basic and remedial education, 
entrepreneurial training, and literacy/language training. 
• Readjustment services—Readjustment includes outreach and intake, testing 
and counseling, labor market information, job search and placement, support-
ive services such as child care and transportation allowances, and relocation 
assistance. 
• Needs-related payments—Workers who have exhausted their UI benefits may 
receive special payments while they complete training programs. 
• Certificates of continuing eligibility—Workers are allowed to defer the start of 
training or to obtain their own training. 
110
 See, for example, Howard Rosen, "Training: Who Gets It; Does It Work?" Competitive-
ness Policy Council Working Paper, March 1996. 
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'1 
Of EDWAAs budget, 80 percent is allotted by formulas to the states. The remain-
ing 20 percent is retained by the Secretary of Labor for discretionary projects involv-
ing workers affected by plant closings and mass layoffs and other special projects. 
The JTPA was amended twice in 1990 to assist workers displaced by the effects of 
two new pieces of legislation, the Clean Air Act and the Defense Economic Adjust-
ment, Diversification, Conversion, and Stabilization Act. The funds for all of these 
programs are used primarily to provide training and job search assistance to eligible 
workers. 
Relatively few EDWAA participants have received income support beyond their 
UI benefits (26 weeks or less), and therefore few have participated in long-term train-
ing programs. The most common criticism of the program is its relatively low participa-
tion rate: less than 20 percent of displaced workers use the program. (See Table E.2.) 
Table E.2 
JTPA Title III Analysis, Program Year 1993 
Total participants 306,340 
Total terminations 164,850 
Total entered employment 112,210 
Average hourly wage at dislocation $7.90 
Average hourly wage at termination $9.40 
Average weeks of participation 39 
WARN notices received 2,690 
Source: Employment and Training Administration, 
U.S. Department of Labor, 1995. 
Trade Adjustment Assistance 
A program targeted to one of the many causes of displacement is Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance (TAA), which is designed to assist workers who are displaced or 
whose hours of work or wages are reduced as a result of increased imports. TAA 
provides several benefits to assist displaced workers, including training, job search 
allowances, relocation allowances, and other re-employment services. Special income 
payments, called trade readjustment allowances (TRA), may be provided to workers 
who have exhausted their UI benefits but who are still enrolled in a training program. 
Certified workers can receive benefits for up to 2 years from the date of dislocation. 
To be eligible, workers must be displaced or put on a reduced work schedule (hours of 
work reduced to 80 percent or less of workers' average weekly hours and wages re-
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duced to 80 percent or less of worker's average weekly wage). Services are adminis-
tered by state-designated agencies. 
The program has undergone several changes since its inception in 1962. It started 
as a program to provide income maintenance along with training benefits for workers 
affected by trade liberalization. The eligibility requirements have since been changed 
several times in an attempt to make the program more accessible to affected workers. 
In its current form, TAA's primary function is to provide income support to trade-
affected workers. The training and job search components of the program have di-
minished significantly. 
The program was funded at $179 million for benefits and $98 million for training 
in fiscal year 1995. (See Table E.3.) 
TAA Program Analysis, 1995 
Applicants for reemployment services 
Placed directly in jobs 
Entered training 
Relocated 
Income support (TRA) applications 
Received TRA benefits 
Average weekly benefit 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment, and 
Training Administration, 1996. 
NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program 
The North American Free Trade Agreement Transitional Adjustment Assistance 
(NAFTA-TAA) program is a special program designed specifically for employees 
affected by the NAFTA. The program provides benefits to workers who are dis-
placed because of increased imports from Mexico or Canada or by the relocation of a 
U.S. plant to one of those countries. The program combines elements of the EDWAA 
and TAA programs to provide rapid response to the threat of unemployment along 
with income maintenance and training opportunities. Workers in companies indirectly 
affected by NAFTA, such as suppliers of affected firms, are also eligible. Farmers are 
also eligible for benefits if they worked at least 8 weeks during the previous year. 
Under the program, each state where a petition is filed makes a preliminary determi-
nation of eligibility, and then the Department of Labor makes a final determination 
43,440 
11,620 
27,600 
1,529 
52,297 
27,900 
$192.63 
126 
A P P E N D I X E: L A B O R M A R K E T A D J U S T M E N T P R O G R A M S 
within 30 days of the state's finding. The NAFTA-TAA program combines many of 
the best elements of EDWAA and TAA into a comprehensive program that includes 
rapid response and basic readjustment services, employment services, training, in-
come support, job search allowances, and relocation allowances. 
To date, 936 workplaces employing 116,418 workers have been certified as 
having lost employment as a result of NAFTA-related trade. Of these workers 
eligible for NAFTA-TAA benefits, 4,566 applied for assistance in 1995. (See 
Table E.4.) 
Table E.4 
NAFTA-TAA Program Analysis, 1995 
Applicants for reemployment services 4,566 
Entered training 2,300 
Relocations 105 
Income support (TRA) applications 3,313 
Received TRA benefits 1,600 
Average weekly benefits $192.16 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and 
Training Administration, 1997. 
Health Benefits Under the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act 
In the United States, most full-time workers have health insurance through group 
coverage provided by their employer. Before 1986, displaced workers lost health in-
surance when they lost their job. With the passage of the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) in 1986, these workers were allowed to con-
tinue in the health insurance plan by paying the premium themselves at group cover-
age rates for a limited period of time. Under the law, health care insurance companies 
must allow displaced workers the opportunity to choose to continue their coverage. 
Since employers normally pay a significant portion of the health insurance premium 
for employed workers, continued COBRA coverage is much more expensive for those 
workers who choose it, because they must pay the entire premium, plus a small ad-
ministration fee. However, coverage under COBRA at group insurance rates is usu-
ally less expensive than health coverage at individual rates. The COBRA obligation 
covers employers with 20 or more workers. 
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ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS IN CANADA 
Like the United States, Canada has myriad labor market adjustment programs for 
unemployed and displaced workers. The basic income support program was Unem-
ployment Insurance (UI). With recent changes in Canadian law (see below) the pro-
gram is now called Employment Insurance (EI).111 Several other programs target 
displaced workers specifically or try to improve the skills of workers to ease their 
adjustment and reintegration into the labor force. 
Employment Insurance 
Canadian workers who lose their jobs are eligible for the federal EI program. While 
many EI recipients use only the income support portion of the program to sustain 
them until they find a new job, many others require training to upgrade their skills so 
that they can find a new job. Developmental Uses programs provide a comprehensive 
framework of training for unemployed workers, including job search assistance, coun-
seling, job placement, and skills training. Approximately 530,000 workers used the 
program in 1993. The Work Sharing program allows workers to continue to receive 
part of their EI benefits while sharing a work week with another worker. The Job 
Creation program continues benefits for workers doing community projects. Both 
help ease the adjustment process for displaced workers. 
Self-Employment Assistance 
Under EI, funding is provided for individuals who wish to start their own busi-
nesses. Participants receive EI benefits in addition to supplementary allowances while 
they implement their business plan. Counseling, training, and other support is also 
provided while participants make the transition to self-employment. A review of the 
program prepared as a briefing paper for the 1995 G-7 meeting showed that partici-
pants in the program had fewer UI claims and received fewer paid weeks of U I ben-
efits in the 3 years after the program than in the same period before they entered the 
program. Participants also improved earnings compared to preprogram earnings and 
compared with non-participants. 
Work Sharing 
The Work Sharing program enables employers to avoid layoffs by shortening the 
work week, thus paying reduced wages. Workers benefit by not being entirely sepa-
rated from their jobs and not suffering as much of a reduction in earnings. The EI 
program pays regular benefits for the days not worked. Workers can often use these 
111
 The terms EI and UI are used interchangeably in this section, both refer to insurance pro-
vided to unemployed workers either under the old Unemployment Insurance system, or under the 
new Employment Insurance system. 
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paid days off to acquire training or to search for another full-time job. A review of the 
program found that participants in the program were more likely to be employed than 
those who did not participate in the program. 
Job Creation 
Workers in this program receive EI benefits while working on community projects. 
It is designed to help unemployed workers get back into the workforce and learn some 
new skills so that the transition to a regular job will be easier. 
New Labor Market Adjustment Proposal 
Canadian unemployment, training, and adjustment programs are currently in a 
process of major reform. In May 1996, a new labor market proposal was sent by the 
federal government to the provinces offering them more jurisdiction over unemploy-
ment programs. Under the new proposal, provinces would have authority and fund-
ing to provide services such as wage subsidies, income supplements, support for self-
employment, and partnerships for job creation. The new proposal would also give 
provinces the option of taking over services currently provided by the federal govern-
ment, such as screening and employment counseling and labor market placement. 
The federal government would withdraw from labor market training as soon as prov-
inces wished, but in no longer than 3 years. The new legislation took effect July 1, 
1996, and provinces can begin signing agreements with the federal government. 
These agreements will implement the following set of labor market policies for 
unemployed Canadians: 
• Targeted wage subsidies: wages will be subsidized for workers hired by employ-
ers who will provide on-the-job training and the possibility of a permanent job. 
• Targeted earnings supplements: provided to assist individuals re-entering the 
labor force. 
• Self-employment assistance: financial and other assistance will be provided to 
individuals wishing to start their own businesses. 
• Job creation partnerships: provincial and community plans and priorities for 
dealing with displaced and unemployed workers will be a more central part of 
the approach. 
• Skills loans and grants: funding will be provided directly to qualified individu-
als, who will decide on their own what kind of training they need. Grants and 
loans will be provided for tuition, books, and other expenses related to acquiring 
training. 
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Under the new plan, the federal government has already or will soon withdraw 
from existing programs, including the purchase of training from public and private 
sources, cooperative education for college students, workplace-based training, and 
project-based training. 
Funding for the new measure will come from the EI account (approximately $2 
billion). The federal government would continue to be responsible for managing the EI 
account and for delivering insurance benefits (approximately $12.3 billion in 1996-1997). 
Industrial Adjustment Services 
One of the most important adjustment programs that will not be affected by the 
new labor market proposal is Industrial Adjustment Services (IAS), which targets 
laid-off workers for assistance. The IAS is a committee-based program that brings 
together employers, workers, and community groups to try to better manage the worker 
adjustment process. When a potential adjustment problem exists, IAS representatives 
approach the parties involved (usually the workers and employer representatives) to 
create an IAS committee to address the adjustment. If the parties agree, a committee 
is established with equal representation from employers and employees and other in-
terested parties. The committee develops a strategy for addressing the adjustment 
problem. The outcome can include three types of agreements: firm-level agreements, 
which address individual plant closures and similar changes that could cause adjust-
ment pressures; association agreements, which deal with adjustment problems of a 
more general nature affecting several firms in a given industry or occupation; and 
community agreements, which try to address regional adjustment pressures brought 
about by major plant closures, and similar localized events. 
The program will fund up to 50 percent of the cost of an Industrial Adjustment 
Committee (up to $200,000). For nonprofit associations and special hardship cases, 
the federal contribution can cover up to 100 percent of the cost (up to $100,000) and 
up to $500,000 over 3 years for agreements with associations. 
According to a review of the program by the Ekos Consulting Group, the IAS is 
less effective than the general programs.112 The Ekos study found that IAS partici-
pants spend more time in job search, possibly explaining the longer periods of unem-
ployment. The major weakness of the IAS, according to the Ekos study, is that many 
workers involved in the program say that while the program is good for identifying 
adjustment problems and devising action plans for resolution of those problems, the 
committee system is not effective at implementing the solutions. More important, 
112
 "Industrial Adjustment Services Program Evaluation," Ekos Research Associates, Inc., for 
Employment and Immigration Canada, Ottawa, November 1993. 
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according to the study, workers participating in the IAS process tended to suffer 
larger income losses and longer unemployment periods than those in the general 
population. 
Program for Older Worker Adjustment 
A Canadian adjustment program that deviates from the general approach, the Pro-
gram for Older Worker Adjustment (POWA), was implemented in 1988 to replace 
the benefits provided to laid-off older workers under the Labour Adjustment Benefits 
Act (LABA). Although POWA did not have industry or regional requirements like 
the LABA, the qualifying criteria were still difficult to meet. The criteria related to 
the size of the layoff relative to the local labor force, the proportion of older workers 
affected, and the likelihood that workers will not become re-employed. Annuities are 
purchased for qualifying workers and benefits are paid by the institution to the worker. 
Benefits are payable only after UI benefits have been exhausted. 
Sector Councils 
The Employment Programs and Services Framework was introduced in 1991 to 
improve adjustment services available to displaced and other unemployed workers. 
Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) sponsors Sector Councils that 
offer adjustment assistance on a sectoral basis. The largest and most active has been 
the Canadian Steel Trade and Employment Congress (CSTEC), which has tried to 
address the adjustment problems faced by the extreme downsizing of the Canadian 
mining and primary metals industries. The CSTEC approach focused more on re-
training workers than on providing job search assistance. CSTEC-assisted workers 
experienced higher re-employment levels and higher earnings than those who partici-
pated in other programs or in no program at all. 
Earnings Supplementation Project 
HRDC introduced a pilot income supplement project in March 1995 to see whether 
such an approach would improve re-employment possibilities for displaced Canadian 
workers. The earnings of participants are supplemented by 75 percent of the differ-
ence between their old job and their new job, up to a maximum weekly supplement of 
$250. The idea is to get displaced workers back into a job quickly to improve their 
chances of being reintegrated in the workforce. 
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MEXICAN ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS113 
In 1995, the Mexican economy suffered the most severe economic crisis since the 
1930s, and the adjustment to it had a serious impact on employment. In response to 
this situation, training and support programs directed toward unemployed workers 
were reinforced, special incentivesvto promote the incorporation of the unemployed 
population into the workforce were established, and emergency and temporary em-
ployment programs were launched. 
Mexico has no unemployment insurance system such as in the United States or 
Canada. However, a series of instruments and active placement policies exist, such as 
PROBECAT (discussed below), that offer training and supplemental income during 
that training to a portion of the unemployed population. Workers can also be aided 
during adjustment periods by continued benefits provided under the Mexican Social 
Security system described below. 
In addition, Mexican law normally requires a substantial severance payment (ind-
emnizacion) to be paid to workers affected by plant closings. Severance pay can amount 
to 3 months' salary plus 12 days' pay for each year of service, depending on the cir-
cumstances of the displacement. Workers are entitled to free legal assistance from the 
Labor Ombudsman Office (Procuradurta Federal de la Defensa del Trabajo), an organ-
ism coordinated by the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, to settle disputes over 
severance pay and other labor matters. 
National Employment Service 
The Mexican National Employment Service {Servicio Nacionalde Empleo—SNE) 
was created in 1978 to promote the placement of workers. It has been the primary link 
between employers and job seekers (unemployed and underemployed)114 through a 
network that comprises 99 offices located in 84 Mexican cities. 
In 1987, the actions of the SNE were strengthened with a substantial increase in 
resources allocated to the Human Resource Training Program {Programa de Calidad 
de la Mano de Obra—PCMO) by the federal government, with partial funding from 
the World Bank. The activities of the SNE were further advanced from 1993-1997 
with the Labor Market Modernization Program {Programa de Modernizacion del 
Mercado Laboral—PMMT). For 1997-2001, a new program will be inaugurated 
with financial support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 
113
 Source: Programa Nacional de Desarrollo 1995-2000, Programa de Empleo, Capacitacion 
y Defensa de los Derechos Laborales 1995-2000, Informe de Avance de Ejecucion del Plan Nacio-
nal de Desarrollo 1995, Informe de Labores de la Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social 1995-1996. 
114
 This includes employed workers looking for a better, different, or additional job. 
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In 1996, the SNE received 992,397 applications; posted 337,716 vacancies; re-
ferred 321,480 candidates; placed at least 127,151 workers; and promoted the train-
ing of over 500,000 applicants. 
PROBECAT 
• PROBECAT (Programa de Becas de Capacitacion para Trabajadores Desempleados) is 
a training scholarship program established by the SNE in 1984 to provide grants that 
aid unemployed and underemployed workers as they adapt their knowledge, abilities, 
and skills to the requirements of the labor market and employers' demands. This 
program has become the most important retraining program for unemployed workers 
in Mexico and one of the most important active labor market policies. From 1984 to 
1995, PROBECAT trained 1,054,231 workers through 99 local SNE offices. In 
1996, 544,026 grants were awarded. 
Training periods last between 1 and 6 months (3 months on average), and partici-
pants receive a monthly stipend equal to the minimum wage plus medical and trans-
portation expenses. General eligibility criteria include the number of economic de-
pendents, prior work experience, level of basic education, and recent unemployment. 
Additional requirements include age (16—55) and registration at a local employment 
office. 
The majority of program participants enroll in classroom training, primarily in 
short-term vocational courses offered through contracts with local private and public 
institutions. Courses are organized to respond to the needs of the local labor market 
and are designed to address local shortages of workers with particular skills. Those 
needs are determined through systematic communication with employers and their 
organizations. 
Currently, PROBECAT includes the following subprograms: 
Classroom Training Program 
This skills training program is divided into theoretical and practical training. The 
above-mentioned eligibility criteria apply for participation in this program, except for 
the age requirement (participants must be at least 18 years old). The courses are held 
at facilities used for vocational and technical education. Besides the scholarship, a 
stipend for transportation is provided. 
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On-the-Job Training Program 
This joint government-private sector program consists of on-the-job training un-
der special agreements between STPS and firms seeking large numbers (15 or more) 
of new workers. PROBECAT provides a scholarship. The company pays for training 
costs (trainer salary and material) and provides facilities for the training, transporta- ! 
tion, and compensation insurance for the participants. Employers are committed to 
hire 70 percent of the participants. Eligibility criteria mentioned above apply to par- ! 
ticipants. j 
Local Employment Initiatives \ 
This scholarship program is provided to small groups of underemployed workers 
living in the poorest areas of the country by involving them in local productive projects j 
and by improving infrastructure of highly marginalized communities. I 
Self-Employment j 
This program is similar to the classroom training program but is more flexible in I 
terms of age (16 years old and up). Higher performing students are provided with a | 
tool package to help them to set up their own business. j 
School-Industry Link 
This program is also a joint private/governmental program, but it is focused on [ 
small groups of participants, with small enterprises. Training is aimed at very specific I 
needs of the companies involved. 
Health Care Training 
This program provides targeted training for traditional health care workers living 
in the poorest areas to improve health care conditions in the area. Courses are mainly 
designed to train midwives, nurse assistants, and other health care workers. ; 
PROBECAT was evaluated by the World Bank, which found that (1) participants I 
on average tended to find jobs more quickly than workers not participating in the 
program; (2) workers were more likely to be employed 3 and 6 months after training; i 
(3) training increases the monthly earnings of male trainees increased with training I 
(but this effect varied by level of schooling); and ( 4) in general, monetary benefits of
 ( 
training outweighed the cost of the program.ns 
115
 Ana Revenga, Michelle Riboud and Hong Tan, "The Impact of Mexico's Retraining Pro-
gram on Employment and Wages," World Bank, WPS 1013 (1992). 
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The World Bank analysis stated that 
although the Mexican retraining program has proven to be effective, 
several issues need to be considered before such programs are replicated 
on a large scale in other countries: 
(1) As the impact of the program depends on the characteristics of the 
unemployed, it appears essential to analyze the structure and character-
istics of unemployment prior to implementing any training program. 
(2) Results and cost-effectiveness of the program also appear to be sen-
sitive to other factors such as the length of the program and the overall 
state of the labor market. In the case of Mexico, the program may have 
been helped by the fact that unemployment remained moderate and 
employment fairly stable during the program implementation period. 
(3) For the above reasons, implementation of these types of training pro-
grams should be gradual, and accompanied by a strong monitoring and 
evaluation system. 
CIMO 
In 1992, the P C M O became the Integral Quality and Modernization Program 
{Prograrna de CalidadIntegraly Modernization—CIMO). C I M O provides incentives 
for small and medium-sized firms to train their workers and raise productivity.116 The 
program operates through 60 Training Promotion Units and provides integrated bu-
siness consultant services, contacts with other institutions, and training for active 
workers in small- and medium-sized businesses. The program provides technical and 
financial support for a limited period to encourage the development of training 
programs, enhancement of productivity, and access to industrial and market 
information. 
The program is jointly funded by the federal government (including World Bank 
loans), organizations of entrepreneurs, and participating firms. In 1996, 549,095 work-
ers participated in the program. 
PROSSE 
The Essential Social Services Program {Prograrna de Servitios Sociales Esenciales— 
PROSSE) is a multi-faceted social program partially funded by the World Bank and 
the IDB. One of the primary components of the program is a retraining and employ-
ment-creation program. From 1995-1996, retraining stipends were awarded to sev-
eral hundred thousand workers participating in PROBECAT 
116
 Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social, "El Mercado de Trabajo en Mexico, 1970-1992." 
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A second component of PROSSE is the Short-Term Employment Program 
(Programa Emergence de Empleo Temporal—PEET) that provides employment related 
to infrastructure development projects in low-income areas. Projects must provide 
public benefits such as construction and maintenance of rural roads, spot road im-
provements, cleaning of drainage canals, garbage removal, reforestation, and conser-
vation programs for soil and water. 
Workers earn 80 percent of the minimum wage in the program. Expenditures were 
US$283 million in 1995, and the 1996 budget increased to US$418.2 million. The 
program is partially funded by loans from the World Bank. 
In 1996, under the Temporary Employment Program, managed by the Ministry 
of Social Development (Secretaries de Desarrollo Social—SEDESOL), 751,717 jobs 
were created in highly marginated rural areas with elevated levels of poverty. 
With the Emergency Program to Lessen the Drought Effects in northern Mexico, 
in 1996, the National Water Commission promoted the rehabilitation of wells and | 
channels in 19 different districts, paying 2,718,544 days' wages that benefited 113,950 f 
families. j 
In collaboration with this program and under the Emergency Employment Pro- i 
gram, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation invested 383 million pe-
sos on roads, paying 20.4 million days' wages. 
Social Security j 
Article 118 of the Social Security Law guarantees that a worker can continue to 
receive medical assistance for up to 8 weeks after termination of employment, at no j 
cost to the employee. This insurance covers general and specialist care, surgery ma- | 
ternity care, hospitalization or care in convalescent homes, medicines, laboratory ser- j 
vices, dental care, and eye care. 
The Program to Reinforce the Unity Agreement to Overcome the Economic j 
Emergency {Programa de Action para Reforzar el Acuerdo de Unidad para Superar la 
Emergencia Economica—PARAUSSE) implemented on March 9, 1995, and extended 
the coverage period after termination of employment to 6 months until December | 
1995. The new Social Security Law117 that will come into effect in July 1997 reinstates i 
the 2-month coverage period. 
Displaced workers 60 years of age or older are allowed to take early retirement 
benefits at a reduced rate, providing 95 percent of the old-age pension as an unem-
ployment benefit for up to 2 years (the normal retirement age is 65). Old-age benefit 
amounts are based on multiples of the minimum wage of the Federal District, ranging 
117
 Ley del Seguro Social, Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, 1997. 
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from one to six times the minimum wage. 
Other Available Income Support 
Displaced workers age 60 or older may withdraw their funds from their individual 
retirement accounts {Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro—SAR).118 The same elderly 
workers may also withdraw their credited funds from the national housing fund 
(INFONAVIT, a subsidized housing program for workers). 
Workers up to 60 years of age can withdraw up to 10 percent of their SAR funds 
during periods of unemployment one time, at intervals of 5 years. Displaced workers 
liable for monthly payments to the national housing fund may obtain a suspension of 
payments without penalty for up to 1 year, but only once. If after 1 year the worker is 
still unemployed and has a balance in his or her SAR, transfers can be made from this 
fund for INFONAVIT monthly payments. 
118
 SAR is an integrated retirement system for all workers registered in the Mexican Social 
Security Institute (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social—IMSS) and in the Social Security Sys-
tem to Public Employees (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabaj adores del 
Estado—ISSSTE). Workers receive a deposit equivalent to 2 percent of their monthly salary in a 
personal bank account paid by the employer. Those deposits are not taxed and will pay a real annual 
rate no less than 2 percent. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
9:40 a.m. 
MR. ZEE: Before we have the formal start of today's program, I would like to 
make some comments on some procedural details which I hope will make the meeting 
go by a little more smoothly 
First, you will notice that there is interpretation equipment at all the tables. Chan-
nel 4 is English and Channel 3 is Spanish. Of course, if you don't understand En-
glish, you don't know that Channel 3 is Spanish, but Channel 4 is English, Channel 3 
is Spanish. 
There are a variety of materials at the table in the back as you come in. I think 
most people have taken those materials. They are for you and please feel free to take as 
many as you want. 
If you need something, I will be around throughout the course of the meeting. 
Please let me know and I will help get those materials for you. 
There is a section on the side here reserved for the media and I ask only that the 
reporters not do any interviews in this room during the course of the meeting. There 
will be plenty of opportunity during the break at lunchtime. And also if you have an 
interview scheduled with somebody during the course of this meeting, please just do 
it outside the room. And there's also a mult box set up if any reporters require the mult 
box and that's at the back of the room also. 
All the speakers, by the way, will come up to this podium, there will be no speak-
ers or questions or comments from the floor, so we do ask that the speakers sit at these 
first two tables up here to minimize the time traveling back and forth and to help us 
expedite today's program. 
I believe that's all I have. If you have any questions, as I said, I will'be around. 
And with that, I am going to turn the meeting over to Deputy Under Secretary for 
International Affairs Jack Otero and he will chair today's program. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Bob. 
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. 
Muy buenos dias, senoras y senores. Bienvenidos a todos. 
My task today is to chair this public forum on behalf of Secretary of Labor 
Robert Reich. I would like first of all to identify those at the head table with me for 
your benefit. 
First, to my extreme right is Mr. Warren Edmondson, who represents the Hu-
man Resources Department in Canada and he is the leader of the tripartite Canadian 
delegation which involves government, unions and management representatives. 
143 
P L A N T C L O S I N G S A N D L A B O R R I G H T S 
j 
l b his left is the representative of the Mexican Government, Dr. Luis Miguel [ 
Dias, from the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare of Mexico. He, too, is leading a 
tripartite delegation composed of union, management and government. 
To my immediate right is Mrs. Irasema Garza, who is the Secretary of the United 
States National Administrative Office, which is the first line agency set up at each 
government's level for the purpose of implementing the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation. 
And to my left is Mr. Bart Widom, who is from the Solicitor's Office of the 
Department of Labor. He is my legal advisor and both he and Mrs. Garza will be 
assisting me should there be any question for technical or legal questions which I may 
be not able to answer on my own. 
I would like to thank all of you today for being here promptly and at the outset I 
should also say that I am delighted to see such a large number of people present as 
well as to see so many faces in the audience which are familiar to me. 
We also have headsets for simultaneous interpretation. I ask each and every one 
of you to please not inadvertently take them out of the room, leave them in your place 
when you go out to lunch and when the meeting is concluded today because they do 
not belong to the Department of Labor, they have been rented for the purpose of this 
meeting. 
The public forum that we are conducting today is being conducted pursuant to 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation which is in the vernacular 
known as the labor side agreement to the NAFTA trade agreement. 
As you know, the NAFTA agreement itself is supplemented by an agreement 
on the protection for the environment and an agreement on the protection of workers' 
rights. But this forum is specifically conducted today as a result of a ministerial con-
sultations implementation agreement on Case 95-01. This agreement was reached by 
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich and Mexican Secretary of Labor Javier Bonilla on 
December 15, 1995. And I would like to say in passing that the agreement was en-
dorsed and signed by the government of Canada through the Labor Minister, Luzian 
Robilliar. 
This public forum presents an opportunity for public debate on the freedom oi 
association and the right to organize, principles on which the three NAFTA signatory 
countries place the highest of importance. 
Ministerial consultations were held on Submission 95-01 under Article 22 of 
the Labor Supplemental Agreement following the Mexican National Administrative 
Office issuance of a public report on May 31, 1995. Submission 95-01 was filed with 
the Mexican NAO on February 9, 1995 by the Telephone Workers Union of Mexico. 
The submission alleged that the Sprint Corporation closed its facility known as La 
Conexion Familiar, a Spanish-language telemarketing subsidiary in San Francisco, in 
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July of 1994 just one week prior to a scheduled union representation election, thereby 
dismissing over 200 employees and denying them the right to freedom of association 
and the right to organize. 
Mexico's public report on this submission requested ministerial consultations to 
address the effect of sudden closure of a workplace on the workers' freedom of asso-
ciation and the right to organize in the United States of America. 
The agreement negotiated by the United States and Mexico during these min-
isterial consultations recognizes the importance of this issue and provides several ac-
tion items, one of which is, and I quote, "that within 120 days of the agreement the 
United States Department of Labor will organize and conduct a public forum in San 
Francisco, California to allow interested parties an opportunity to convey to the public 
their concerns on the effect of the sudden closure of a plant on the principle of the 
freedom of association and the right of workers to organize." 
That, ladies and gentlemen, is why we are all here today. Notice of today's forum 
was published in the Federal Register on January 25, 1996. In that notice, advance 
registration procedures for all presentations were outlined with the intent of ensuring 
an orderly process and allowing sufficient opportunity for all interested parties to par-
ticipate within the time allowed each speaker. 
This is a one-day event, scheduled to end today no later than six p.m. We will 
have a break for lunch at approximately 12:30 and we will return to work at two p.m. 
The published guidelines allow me as chairman of this event today to allow each 
speaker no more than 10 minutes and I ask each speaker to be mindful of this require-
ment so as not to encroach on someone else's right to speak. 
Only those people who have registered in advance with our office will be permit-
ted to speak today. We have compiled a list with the names of persons who wish to 
speak and who registered timely with the United States Department of Labor. That 
list containing the names of persons speaking today is available at the table located at 
the rear of this room. 
If you have registered to speak, please locate your name on the list because to the 
extent possible I will try to follow the order in that list and will call your name accord-
ingly. 
I request again your cooperation and assistance in conducting an orderly pro-
ceeding so that all those who have registered can make an oral presentation and have 
the opportunity to do so without any encumbrances. To this end, I request that all oral 
presentations be limited to the issue before us today, Submission 95-01, and the gen-
eral objective of the forum is to analyze the effect of the sudden plant closures in the 
United States have on workers' rights to organize and on the freedom of association. 
After each presentation, I will have the discretion to question the presenters if 
appropriate or necessary. There will be no questions from the audience to the present-
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ers. At any time during the forum I will have the leeway of calling a recess if I deem it j 
appropriate. j 
In addition to the recording of today's proceedings, written statements which j 
have been submitted to the United States National Administrative Office will be in-
cluded in the public record of this forum. The complete record of these proceedings 
will be available to the public upon request. 
I would like to thank all of you in advance for your cooperation in ensuring the 
orderly process of these proceedings and I would like also to announce to the present-
ers that it is their choice to address this audience either in English or in Spanish as we 
have simultaneous interpretation provided for this event. 
Having said that, it is my pleasure at this point, first of all, to recognize the 
leader of the Mexican delegation and invite him to make a few remarks, Dr. Luis 
Miguel Diaz from Mexico. 
DR. DIAZ: First of all, I would like to thank the Department of Labor for orga-
nizing this event and I would like to express my appreciation to the local authorities 
for having us here. 
( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) 
My presentation will be a short one and it will focus on three points. They are, 
number one, a new way of focusing on the worker; number two, the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation as a venue for cooperation; and, third, I would like 
to highlight the situation of labor in the framework of labor relations between the 
United States, Mexico and Canada. 
Regarding the first point, in recent years the subject of labor and labor condi-
tions as opposed to the original approach taken has been focused in a more broad 
manner. Workers are approached as human beings and working conditions now take 
into account their economic situation, productivity of companies and the well-being 
of nations. On the other hand, the worker is considered in the light of his environment 
and work environment. This theory focusing on the worker as an economic being and 
as a generator of wealth and environment is relatively new. 
The topic is clearly identified as one of the typical topics in the globalization we 
are experiencing and has been dealt with by the ILO, the WTO, the Organization for 
Economic Development, OECD, and by the United States, Canada and Mexico 
within the Organization of American States. However, within this debate the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation seems to have taken the fore since it is an 
agreement which along with NAFTA and along with the environment cooperation 
agreement is an international agreement binding for the three countries. 
The preamble of the NAFTA agreement says that one of its objectives is the 
well-being of workers. The preamble of the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation in several ways insists on this purpose. And, finally, article first of the 
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cooperation agreement refers to the objective of raising the standard of living of work-
ers within an international context, within a context of creation of jobs and the expan-
sion of workers' rights. 
Now Til turn to the second point and with your permission I would like to 
highlight five specific aspects of the cooperation agreement which brings us here. 
The first aspect is that the agreement is based on a tenet which is a respect for 
labor legislation in each of our three countries. Article 2 says that all mechanisms set 
forth are based on this principle by virtue of which in each country the corresponding 
labor authorities are the only ones acting in the matter. This agreement does not aim to 
and, as Article 42nd would say, this agreement cannot be interpreted as substituting 
authorities from one country to the other. 
The second point has to do with one of the objectives of Article 1 which says that 
the countries undertake to find transparency in the implementation of labor laws. The 
three countries want to discuss all matters openly and we want all elements of society 
to participate in this debate and this is why at this forum we are showing that we are 
taking seriously this obligation. 
The other point has to do with the establishment of national administrative of-
fices. Dr. Otero referred to this. And this means that in order to comply with the 
agreement the three countries established three offices which aim to serve as points of 
contact among themselves or with local and state organizations in the three countries 
and then to establish contact with a labor secretariat created by three countries. It is an 
institution created by the three countries with equal composition from Canada, Mexico 
and the United States. It is based in Dallas, Texas. 
The other point I wanted to highlight is that the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation, breaking with an internationalist tradition, does not set forth new 
rights nor new obligations for the parties in a substantive way. The basic concern of 
the three countries was to seek ways to effectively implement our laws which result 
from our traditions, our idiosyncrasies and our aspirations. 
So the reason we are here, the specific reason we are here is to discuss the prin-
ciple of freedom of association and organization which is contemplated in our national 
laws and which we have specified as common principles. This is not a new right. It is 
not a new right but we would like for this right to be more effective. 
And, finally, on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, I wanted 
to say and underscore that this is an international instrument and if we are to analyze 
it in keeping with international law, it is a perfect law. It is a perfect law because the 
document itself sets forth a series of requirements so that sanctions may be applied 
and penalties maybe applied. It is not merely a declaration of principles of good will, 
of political will, it is a legal instrument which is binding and so non-compliance can be 
corrected through penalties. 
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The last point I wanted to make was that the area of labor is something which 
the United States and Mexico have focused on and have reached an understanding to 
address problems. It is a way to detect possible irregularities and problems, to analyze 
them and to expose them to the public so that our authorities can be more effective. 
A second point that I wanted to underscore is that the composition of this forum 
breaking with the traditional pattern is not just a forum of government entities. No. 
We have tripartite delegations with us representing different sectors of our societies, 
so the representation of what we are, what we want to be, is very broad to the extent 
that we are represented here in a tripartite way, and I would even say four parties 
because we have invited sectors of our society which are not representative of govern-
ments or companies or workers, they represent society at large. 
And, finally, I wanted to end by saying that through me the Secretary of Labor 
of Mexico, Secretary Bonilla, believes that this forum is a demonstration of the fact 
that there is communication to address problems, there is political will present and we 
are expecting concrete results. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Dr. Diaz. 
I now would like to introduce Mr. Warren Edmondson, Director General of the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, Human Resources Development, 
Canada, representing the government of Canada. 
MR. EDMONDSON: Thanks very much, Jack. And it's always a pleasure when 
traveling from Canada to visit our neighbors in the south not only to renew acquain-
tances but also to escape some of the colder climates that we become exposed to at this 
time of year. 
As a partner to this North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, we're 
certainly pleased to be here to participate in this public forum dealing with a very 
important subject, the subject of freedom of association and rights of workers to orga-
nize. These issues, of course, and this process, the process for the resolution of com-
plaints under the North American Agreement are of considerable importance to us in 
Canada, not only to the government of Canada and to the provincial governments but 
also to our trade unions and our employers, so we look forward to today's proceed-
ings. 
We certainly hope that our participation here in this forum will further contrib-
ute to improving the dialogue that exists between business, labor and government in 
our three countries and will further assist us in our efforts in achieving the objectives 
of the North American Agreement. 
Accompanying me today from back east, northeast, are Mr. Dick Martin from 
the Canadian Labour Congress, which is the largest Canadian central labor organiza-
tion in Canada, Dick is seated over here at the left, and Mr. Larry Bertuzzi, a practic-
148 
A P P E N D I X F: T R A N S C R I P T OF PUBLIC F O R U M 
ing labor lawyer from Toronto who has had considerable experience in representing 
companies in many jurisdictions in Canada and also in the United States. Both of 
them are experienced labor relations practitioners and I understand that they have 
been scheduled to speak later on today on the subjects at hand and I look forward to 
hearing their views. 
I can certainly assure you from my experience in dealing with them that neither 
one of them is shy and if they happen to agree or disagree with anything that I happen 
to say today that I'm sure they will do so and will certainly give you their perspective 
on the Canadian experience in dealing with labor law 
Those of you who are familiar with Canadian labor law know that the constitu-
tional jurisdiction for labor law in our country is divided between the federal govern-
ment and our provincial governments. Each jurisdiction has its own labor laws, pro-
tecting workers' health and safety, basic employment standards, equity laws and laws 
providing, of course, the right to organize unions and laws governing the process of 
collective bargaining. 
Although there may be some differences, and some of them significant, between 
these respective laws in our country and also in the way in which they are adminis-
tered, fundamentally they are all based on the U.S. Wagner Act model. And those of 
you, of course, in this room who are familiar with labor law will know the model well. 
They all recognize in the statute, in the respective statutes, the fundamental 
right of workers to organize and become members of trade unions of their choice, 
whether they be local unions, national unions or international unions. This, of course, 
is consistent with the basic rights and freedoms of association found in our Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as in Convention 87 of the International 
Labor Organization which has been ratified by Canada. 
Our Federal Minister of Labour, Mr. Gagliano, who asked me to bring his 
greetings to this group, is the minister responsible for the Federal Canada Labour 
Code. Part 1 of that code is the part that establishes a framework for collective bar-
gaining for federally regulated industries and these industries include industries such 
as airlines, telecommunications, railroads, longshoring, grain handling and many of 
the major infrastructure industries in Canada. Although I think about 10 percent of 
the workforce is governed by the federal labor law, the law, as I said, applies to a 
number of significant industries. 
This part of the code was recently reviewed by an independent task force which 
submitted its report to the minister on January 31st of this year. The report contains a 
number of important recommendations and underscores once again the value of our 
system of collective bargaining as an effective instrument in Canada of both social and 
economic policy, which is a particularly important statement, I think, as we move into 
the 21st century. 
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To quote from the report of the task force chaired by a Mr. Andrew Simms who 
was the former chair of the Alberta, one of our provinces, labor boards, he states, 
"Canada must continue to facilitate means by which individuals can express them-
selves through democratic intermediary groups. Free collective bargaining is an im-
portant example." 
He goes on to add, "It is not only the absence of rights and freedoms that can 
lead to the growth of disorder, but also and perhaps more importantly the sense of 
injustice that results from the inability to secure these rights and freedoms." 
It's worth noting that during that process of the task force process that with the 
assistance of government key labor and management representatives in the industries 
affected by this legislation met jointly to discuss a number of the issues included in the 
terms of reference of the task force. The fact that they were able to reach consensus on 
a significant number of points I believe is an indication of their mutual respect, their 
ability to work together and as well an indication of their faith in the system of collec-
tive bargaining and their mutual interest in designing a system that works for them. 
That's not all to say that there is peace and harmony between labor and management 
in every situation in Canada, but I think it's an important indication of their ability to 
work together. 
I should point out that the percentage of unionized workers in Canada remains 
relatively constant at approximately 37 percent of our workforce, despite the significant 
impact of changes in government policies such as deregulation, privatization, and the pres-
sures of worldwide competition on Canadian companies and workers in recent years. 
Wage increases in Canada remain relatively low at an average of about 1.4 per-
cent while inflation is running at 2.1 in an environment of, again, relatively high un-
employment within our country of 9.6 percent. 
Discussions at collective bargaining tables like here in the United States have 
generally focused on the need for concessions, as many companies attempt to remain 
competitive or to increase profits. 
Companies have attempted to reduce labor costs by seeking lower wages, seek-
ing reorganized and more flexible workforces, and attempting to increase productiv-
ity by introducing new technology. 
Governments also who are faced with large debts and deficits are finding it 
necessary to adopt some of the strategies of the private sector in their efforts to balance 
their budgets. 
And yet the number of work stoppages in Canada, perhaps understandably, are 
at an alltime low. Last year, 982,000 person days were lost due to work stoppages, 
compared to 3.5 million days in 1990. 
However, in this difficult environment, organized labor in Canada has managed 
to hold its own. As I said, it remains at about 35 percent, 31 percent. 
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Canada's laws, and in particular its labor laws, and the efficiency of its arm's 
length labor boards which are responsible for determination of bargaining unit struc-
tures, for the investigation of unfair labor practice complaints, for the certification of 
trade unions and their respective jurisdictions, I believe may be in a large part ac-
countable for the ability of trade unions in Canada to organize and maintain their 
membership in this complex environment. 
For example, when we examine the experience of labor boards in our three larg-
est jurisdictions, the provinces of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, the statis-
tics are revealing. 
In Ontario, in 1993-94, the numbers indicate that there were 11,066 applica-
tions for union certification filed with the Ontario Labour Relations Board, of which 
829 were granted, 102 were dismissed and 204 were withdrawn. Most importantly, 
the median time taken by the board to grant certification was 22 calendar days. Dur-
ing that same period, there were only 110 applications for decertification, 53 of which 
were granted and 26 were dismissed. 
In the province of Quebec for the year '94-95, relatively similar numbers: 854 
applications with 555 granted, 87 dismissed. 
Again, similar in the province of British Columbia. In the province of British 
Columbia, the average time taken to grant an application is 27 days. 
I will confess that our federal labor board, those of you who want to take the time 
to read the report of the task force, will note that it is not quite as efficient. I'm sure that 
will probably improve as a result of the recommendations that Mr. Simms has made. 
While certainly Canada's system of industrial relations is far from perfect, and 
we've seen the pendulum swing in various provinces on various occasions, I think 
both labor and management would not find too much argument with the fact that in 
general our labor laws are being enforced. Not only are they being enforced, but I 
think they might also agree that they are being enforced fairly, effectively and effi-
ciently. 
In a highly competitive global marketplace where the rate of technological change 
is accelerating at a breathtaking pace, there is much speculation about the future of 
work. We find apparently competing interests between the quest for corporate sur-
vival and profitability on one hand and the pursuit of meaningful work and improved 
standards of living for workers and the protection of worker rights on the part of trade 
unions on the other. 
These competing interests are not irreconcilable, but rather need to be balanced, 
not only through a fair and effectively administered legislative framework but also 
through changing attitudes, I believe, on the part of labor and management in our 
countries, through cooperation, through good faith, mutual trust, which unfortunately 
we can't legislate. 
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While many companies and unions in Canada take their traditional adversarial 
stances and appear to want to do battle at almost every occasion, there are currently 
many Canadian success stories in industries such as telecommunications, steel, manu-
facturing and others where organized labor and management are working together to 
find innovative and creative ways to advance their mutual interests. 
They have recognized the competitive advantage and the benefit to both social 
partners to be gained by tapping the resources of a well trained, well motivated, em-
powered and represented workforce. 
I believe that effective labor laws efficiently administered will allow us to move 
to the next dimension and perhaps change the traditional paradigm and enable labor 
and management as we move into the 21st century to work more effectively together 
to the mutual benefit of all three countries and workers in Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. 
In closing, let me simply say that we are here to listen. We are here to learn. And 
I look forward to the day's proceedings and hearing the views of the various speakers. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you very much, Mr. Edmondson. 
And now that we have completed the introductory statements by the three coun-
tries signatory to the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, we will 
move on with the forum itself. 
I would like to ask the presenters to please come to the podium to make their 
presentations. And, again, I ask all of the presenters to be mindful of the time allotted. 
The first presenter this morning is Mr. Francisco Hernandez Juarez, President 
of the Telephone Workers Union of the Republic of Mexico. 
Mr. Hernandez, please. 
MR. HERNANDEZ: ( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) 
Thank you very much. Good morning. 
Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Francisco Hernandez Juarez, as you have 
just heard, Secretary General of the Telephone Workers Union. 
I would like to point out that the organization that I represent has approximately 
50,000 affiliates throughout the country. Actually, we are represented in 31 of the 32 
states that make up the Mexican Republic. 
First of all, I would like to express my great appreciation to the representatives 
of the Labor Department of the United States and Canada, as far as the Labor De-
partment goes, for having hosted this meeting. 
Secondly, I would like to point out that I am here not only because of the fact 
that the Telephone Workers Union of Mexico is responsible for having initiated this 
whole procedure within the framework of the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation, I am also here and above all because in my entity as a unionist, I believe 
and I trust in solidarity of workers and as a worker and as a union leader in a global-
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ized and complex work of intertwined economies that are interdependent, I wish to 
trust in the aquitative dialogue, in bargaining, in negotiation, injustice and laws and 
institutions as being the best instruments to improve the relationship between man-
agement and workers and to conciliate their problems. 
I would also like to point out that the decision to initiate these procedures to its 
ultimate consequences was not a coincidence, nor the result of a personal decision. It 
was the unanimous decision of our national congress celebrated in January of'95 in 
which we affirmed the commitment that we have with the alliance that we have with 
the workers union of telecommunications from the United States and Canada in Feb-
ruary of 1992, as well as our participation in the international trade unions for postal 
workers and communication workers. 
In the case of La Conexion Familiar, it was a particular concern for us, not only 
the fact that certain laws were being violated in such an obvious manner, but that there 
was also a racist aggression and also that this was not by just a small fraction of a 
systematic aggression towards labor organization on behalf of Sprint with whom 
Telefonos de Mexico has a strategic alliance. 
I would like to make as a complementary observation the following. Through a 
high executive of Telefonos de Mexico, it was tried to convince me not to speak this 
day, precisely because it would demerit the presence of Sprint in its alliance with 
Telefonos de Mexico. 
I pointed it out to this executive that that would mean that Sprint meant to 
change its attitude in the situation of La Conexion Familiar but he told me that he 
could not assure that it would happen. Therefore, I answered that I could not there-
fore not attend this meeting. 
Since this violation of the rules were published, we want justice to be carried out 
towards the people from La Conexion Familiar but also we want to send a clear mes-
sage, not only to Sprint but to all telecommunications companies in the region, the 
continent, throughout the world, about what workers and trade unions are willing to 
do if they stand together to defend each other and to make progress as far as our rights 
go, in spite of the aggressions and offenses that have taken place against workers' 
rights. These affect not only the workers but the companies themselves, even though 
this might not seem too evident for the general public. 
We wish that this is a message of the defense of basic human rights because 
labor rights and trade union rights are part of human rights. We would also like to 
appeal to the transnational companies, to multi-nationalist companies, that they should 
keep open this dialogue with trade workers, with trade unions all over the world re-
gardless of their nationality 
We wish that the multi-national companies should understand that progress is 
not necessarily something that is in conflict with the right of workers, with the assur-
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MR. BAHR: I am Morton Bahr, the president of the Communications Workers of 
America. CWA represents about 600,000 workers, primarily in the telecommunica-
tions and information industries. 
I want to commend the Secretaries of Labor of the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada for their decision to hold this public forum on Sprint's sudden shutdown of 
La Conexion Familiar. 
We were stunned when Sprint fired all of the workers within one week before 
they were scheduled to vote in a union election. This forum will help expose and we 
hope stop the use of sudden plant closing and other legal and illegal anti-union behav-
ior which prevent workers from exercising their right to organize. 
I also want to thank Deputy Under Secretary Jack Otero for presiding over this 
forum and giving the discharged Sprint workers the opportunity to finally be heard. 
Finally, on behalf of the workers of LCF, I want to thank the Mexican Tele-
phone Workers Union, STRM, and its president, Francisco Hernandez Juarez, for 
taking up the cause of the LCF workers and filing a formal complaint under the 
provisions of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. 
I will submit for the record my complete written statement and attached exhib-
its. In this testimony I lay out in greater detail CWA's relationship with Sprint, Sprint's 
anti-union philosophy, and an overview of the events which occurred at LCF. Today, 
given our limited time, I will focus on the importance of this forum and the recom-
mendations we wish to present to the governments which have convened it. 
The decision to hold this forum is a breakthrough for workers in Canada, Mexico 
and the United States who want to improve their working conditions and their stan-
dard of living by joining together to form a union. The forum has focused public 
attention on one of the worst cases of corporate abuse of workers' rights and on the use 
by companies of a sudden plant or office closing to prevent their workers from orga-
nizing. Sprint's action epitomizes decades of increased attacks by corporations on 
workers' rights. 
This forum has focused attention also on the inability of U.S. labor laws to 
protect workers' rights and the inability of the United States Government to enforce 
its own laws. 
The National Labor Relations Act is broken and our enforcement mechanisms 
are ineffective. We must act now to fix them. We hope this forum will contribute to 
efforts here and abroad to educate the public and our elected officials that meaningful 
reforms are needed if we want workers to organize and to bargain for a better life. 
This public forum is important too because it demonstrates that the NAFTA 
labor side agreements provide another vehicle to hold Sprint and other companies 
who violate workers' rights accountable for their actions. 
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As our country's integration into global economy deepens, we must look to trade 
agreements to establish an international code of conduct towards workers and their 
elected representatives. Foreign companies want access to the lucrative U.S. market 
and U.S. companies want to leverage their financial, technological and managerial to 
penetrate markets outside the U.S. 
Companies on all sides want to increase opportunities for international trade 
and investment. Governments must balance these opportunities with the responsibili-
ties of creating good jobs and respecting the rights of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively. 
The Preamble and Annex 1 of the NAALC contain all the necessary objectives: 
the right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, the need to create employment 
opportunities, improve working conditions and raise living standards and the need to 
"protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights." 
What is missing are effective remedies for violations of these objectives and 
prompt enforcement of these remedies. Under the current provisions of the NAFTA 
labor agreement, companies do not face any risks for blatantly violating the agree-
ment. Yet there is nothing that companies understand better than risk. They manage 
for it every day of the year. 
In the current political environment, where trade agreements are drawing more 
criticism, the governments of the U.S., Mexico, and Canada are in a unique position 
to tell these companies in no uncertain terms that more trade agreements will never fly 
unless there are improved protections for workers, their jobs and their rights. The 
agreements must provide meaningful penalties for violation of these rights. 
Today we are recommending that the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation be amended to include an international code of conduct for enterprises 
operating in the three countries which are parties to the NAFTA agreement. 
CWA together other telephone unions affiliated with our international trade 
secretariat, PTTI , propose a code of conduct which in summary would require com-
panies: 
(1) To disclose to employees and their elected representatives company plans for 
investment, employment levels, technological change, and movement of work. 
(2) To meet annually with all their unions to discuss organizational rights, equal 
employment opportunities, safety and health, and education and training. 
(3) To not interfere in worker organizational efforts where they conduct business. 
(4) To recognize a union when the workers show the appropriate level of support. 
(5) To not shift work from one nation to another to avoid a union. 
The full text of the code of conduct is in my written statement. 
In my written statement, we also make three recommendations to the govern-
ment of the United States. I will summarize them here. 
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(1) We need meaningful penalties to deter companies from illegally interfering 
with their workers' right to organize. In the Sprint case, the violations were astound-
ing yet the remedy was a mere notice to employees who have already been thrown out 
of work that the company will not do it again. This only added insult to injury. 
(2) We advocate a change in the law which would deter companies from using 
the subterfuge of alleged business considerations to close a plant to avoid a union and 
prevent a first contract. Under current law, injunctive relief is heavily weighted to-
ward the employer and has been awarded by the courts in only a few cases. We recom-
mend that if a union has filed for an election or if an election has been won by a union 
but a first contract has not been reached, a company which is considering a shutdown 
for business reasons (a) must open its books to the employees and the union represen-
tatives and (b) must prove its business case to an independent arbitrator before it can 
shut a facility down. 
(3) The Federal Government can refrain from doing business with major labor 
law violators. Defense contractors who have defrauded the taxpayer have had their 
right to bid on new contracts suspended. The U.S. Government should extend this 
practice to companies which have been found to have committed major violations of 
labor law. 
Above all else, this forum is very important because it gives the Sprint workers 
their first real opportunity to tell the story of what happened at LCF. This is a story of 
a company, the Sprint corporation, the third largest long distance telephone company 
in the United States, that tells its managers that their main job is not to provide for 
quality telephone service, but to keep the union out at all costs. It's in their hand-
book. 
It is a story of more than 200 workers, mostly Latino women, .who had the 
courage and determination to withstand the threats, the coercion, and the spying by 
management to stand up for their rights. They got within 1 week of accomplishing the 
unprecedented feat of forming a union at Sprint's long distance division. 
This is also the story of how a company used every trick in the book to try to stop 
these workers and in so doing committed over 50 violations of law. 
It is also the story of a management which suddenly realized they were about to 
lose their first union election and decided to shut the place down. 
It is the story of a senior Sprint executive, the vice president of labor relations, 
who fabricated evidence submitted to a government agency to make it appear that the 
closure was done for business reasons. 
It is the case of a company which not only shut down a facility, suddenly and 
brutally in 1 day, to prevent these workers from voting in the union election, but did it 
in a way which sent a chilling message to all of its other employees that unionization is 
off limits. 
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You will hear today from the Sprint workers themselves who will describe for 
you in vivid detail the poor working conditions at this company, the energy and spirit 
of their organizing efforts, the anti-union campaign launched by Sprint against their 
drive, and the residual long-term effects of the shutdown on their lives. 
You'll hear from many others about the international repercussions, the outrage 
in the Latino community, the concern among elected officials that current law is inca-
pable of protecting workers in the public interest, and the extent to which Sprint's 
actions have been commonplace in the private sector. 
The workers of L C F are still waiting for a remedy in the legal case which is 
outstanding against Sprint. More than 2 years will have passed when the National 
Labor Relations Board finally issues its order. And it will be years more before all 
appeals are exhausted. This situation is simply unacceptable. 
That is why this public forum is so important, not only to the workers of LCF 
but to others who will face similar circumstances in the future. Sprint must be re-
minded again and again that CWA and all those who have stood up for the rights of 
these workers will never give up this fight until Sprint provides them with meaningful 
remedies, including compensation and job opportunities at other Sprint locations. 
We know that in spite of the chilling effect of the LCF closing on other Sprint 
workers and the continued fear and intimidation by Sprint management Sprint work-
ers will again stand up and seek to be recognized. 
These workers in Sprint need to know that when that time comes the world will 
be watching and fair-minded people will be ready to act against any attempt by Sprint 
to interfere with its workers' rights. 
This forum gives the Sprint workers new hope that when that time comes the 
federal government and their elected representatives will have fixed our system of 
labor laws and be ready to enforce them. 
The workers are not asking for handouts or entitlements. They are simply ask-
ing the government to level the playing field so they can stand up for their rights 
without the fear of reprisals from their employers. They should be able to organize 
into a union without the fear of losing their jobs. 
We hope the testimony presented in this forum and the 6-month study by the 
international labor secretariat will cause the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States to take the necessary measures to strengthen the NAFTA agreement to 
prevent the recurrence of the travesty suffered by the Sprint workers. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Mr. Bahr. 
I would like to now invite the next presenter, Professor Roberto L. Corrada, 
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, who has 
registered to speak on behalf of Sprint Inc. 
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Professor Corrada, please. 
PROFESSOR CORRADA: Good morning. My name is Roberto Corrada. I am an 
assistant professor of law at the University of Denver, College of Law, Denver Colo-
rado. I have been teaching labor and employment law courses and courses in contract 
law and administrative law at the law school since 1990. 
In December 1995,1 was asked by Sprint Corporation to conduct an indepen-
dent review of the regulatory activity undertaken and the two opinions that have been 
issued in a labor dispute involving La Conexion Familiar, LCF, a business entity that 
had been affiliated with Sprint. The questions posed to me were (1) whether the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board's actions in this matter demonstrate enforcement of the 
National Labor Relations Act, NLRA, the United States labor law implicated by the 
dispute, and (2) whether the two opinions in this matter have applied the appropriate 
NLRA standard in deciding the dispute. 
My conclusion based on a review of the decisions as well the enforcement activ-
ity undertaken by the NLRB in this matter is that United States labor laws involving 
the NLRA have been enforced and the proper standards applied. 
In this testimony, I will first talk briefly about the origin and acceptability of the 
standard, the Wright Line test applied by the district court judge deciding whether to 
issue a 10(j) injunction in the case and the administrative law judge deciding the 
merits of the case. 
Next, I will assess the regulatory activity undertaken by the NLRB in this mat-
ter and finally I will discuss the two opinions, the district court opinion and the ad-
ministrative law judge's opinion that have been issued in this case. 
First, with respect to the standard applied, this matter implicates the NLRA, 
the United States labor law that governs relations between unions and management in 
the private sector. 
MR. OTERO: Professor Corrada, they want you to slow down so that the transla-
tion can take place. Take your time. 
PROFESSOR CORRADA: Excuse me. Maybe I had a little bit too much coffee this 
morning. 
In particular, it involves a dispute under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, which estab-
lishes at its core that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in 
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment, to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. 
Administrative Law Judge Wacknov and District Court Judge Walker both 
applied the NLRB's Wright Line standard in deciding the claims of the parties involv-
ing Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The NLRB general counsel also argued for application 
of the Wright Line standard in this case. 
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The standard was announced by the National Labor Relations Board some 16 
years ago in its 1980 decision in Wright Line and was upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court in its 1983 decision in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corpora-
tion as a reasonable interpretation of the requirements of Section 8(a)(3). 
The Wright Line standard may well represent the best approach to deciding who 
should prevail when legitimate but competing interests of labor and management must 
be reconciled under Section 8(a)(3). According to the Board, a dual-motive case is 
presented under Section 8(a)(3) when there is evidence of employer reaction to union 
organizing activity but there is also believable competing evidence that an employer 
has acted pursuant to a legitimate business reason. This existence of both a good and 
a bad reason for the employer's action requires further inquiry into the role played by 
each motive. 
In Wright Line, the NLRB adopted a standard that was used by the United 
States Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy v. Doyle to decide a constitutional rights dispute 
between a school board and a teacher. The Supreme Court stated that a rule of causa-
tion which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played a part, substantial or 
otherwise, in a decision not to rehire could place an employee in a better position as a 
result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occu-
pied had he done nothing. 
Most importantly, according to the court, the constitutional principle at stake is 
sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is place in no worse position than if he had 
not engaged in the conduct. 
Following the Supreme Court's analysis in Mt. Healthy, the Wright Line test 
announced by the NLRB places the initial burden on the Board's general counsel to 
make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct 
was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. Once this is established, the bur-
den will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same action would have taken 
place even in the absence of protected conduct. 
The Wright Line test is a well-reasoned standard for governing dual-motive cases, 
is consistent with the legislative history of the NLRA and fairly accommodates the 
legitimate competing interests of labor and of management under the Act. 
The Wright Line standard has been broadly accepted and indeed has become a 
fixture in United States labor and employment law. Since the Supreme Court's affir-
mance of the Wright Line standard in 1983, it has been faithfully applied in scores of 
Section 8(a)(3) cases, yielding results in favor of both unions as well as employers. 
The NLRB has applied the Wright Line standard to partial closing cases similar 
to the LCF case on a number of cases. For example, the CM. Breyer Corporation case 
in 1993, Cub Branch Mining in 1990, and the Redwood Empire case in 1989. 
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Moreover, the test has been used in cases involving employer action impinging 
constitutional rights, as in the Mt. Healthy case, and in non-employment cases involv-
ing dual motives where constitutional freedoms are implicated, as in the Arlington 
Heights case. 
The test has also become an important standard in employment discrimination 
law in the United States. In 1989, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins in which it applied the Mt. Healthy Wright Line test to dual-
motive cases brought under Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which protects 
against discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. 
Let me now turn to the application of the Wright Line standard in the matter 
involving La Conexion Familiar, LCF. I will discuses first the NLRB's enforcement 
activity in the case, then the district court decision involving the 10(j) injunction and, 
finally, the administrative law judge's decision on the merits of the case. 
In conducting my review of the NLRB's enforcement activity and the decisions 
by District Court Judge Walker and ALJ Wacknov, I have examined the written opin-
ions as well as the briefs filed by both parties. This opinion is limited to a review of the 
written materials in this matter. I have not personally reviewed the documents filed 
with the ALJ or the district court and have relied on the characterizations made of 
them in the written ALJ and district court decisions and in the briefs filed by the 
parties. In addition, there can be no effective review of ALJ credibility determinations 
by persons like myself who have not personally listened to witness testimony 
Given all of that, with respect to the NLRB's enforcement activity, it is my con-
sidered opinion that the level of enforcement activity undertaken by the Board in this 
matter has been extraordinary. It is not common, for example, for the NLRB to seek 
a Section 10(j) injunction in a labor dispute. General Counsel Fred Feinstein stated in 
October of 1995 that, "The Board is filing more 10Q cases although they still represent 
only about 3 percent of the total number of unfair labor practice complaints issued." 
In addition to the NLRB 10(j) filing, the NLRB's general counsel's office has 
proceeded aggressively to enforce the NLRA in this matter. The NLRB general 
counsel's brief in this case filed with the ALJ is in excess of 250 pages in length, 
detailing a large amount of evidence and testimony. The brief is impressive with re-
spect to the way it has organized the evidence and with respect to the way that it argues 
that the evidence should be assessed under the Wright Line standard. 
When the brief is considered alongside the NLRB's decision to seek a 10(j) 
injunction in the case it is more than fair to conclude that the Board's efforts in LCF 
have been above average in quality and extensive in scope. 
As I mentioned before, the NLRB regional director, as part of its enforcement 
of the NLRA in this case, filed a petition in federal district court for the issuance of a 
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10(j) injunction. In the 9th Circuit, district courts must weigh the likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits against the possibility of irreparable injury, mindful both of public 
interest and a federal court deference to NLRB decisions. 
In assessing whether the Board was likely to prevail or merely had a fair chance 
of success on the merits, the district court properly chose to apply the Wright Line test. 
The district court first analyzed the Board's evidence to determine whether a prima 
facie case had been presented. Based on the hearsay nature of the Board's evidence as 
well as the position of the persons making the allegations against respondent and the 
context in which alleged threatening statements were made, the district court charac-
terized the Board's chances at a prima facie case as fair at best. 
The district court nevertheless and in line with the Wright Line requirements 
shifted its focus to analyze the quality of the respondent's evidence supporting its 
action as motivated by legitimate business reasons. Ultimately the district court was 
persuaded by the extent of the evidence presented by the employer that showed sub-
stantial losses by LCF. Rather than a projected profit of 7.9 million, LCF's actual 
earnings in January and February of'94 projected a year-end loss of 3.9 million. 
In addition, between January and March 1994, the evidence showed that LCF 
lost 10,000 customers and that the churn rate, which is the percentage loss of cus-
tomer base, was greater than 20 percent higher than projected. 
The district court went on to weigh the hardships of an injunction on the parties 
and found that since the facility had already been closed for a time, the hardship of 
reopening would fall squarely on Sprint without much gain to the workers involved, 
many of whom were by that time unreachable or had already secured new employ-
ment. Thus, having failed to meet the burdens for a 10(j) injunction, the district court 
refused to grant preliminary relief. 
Although the circumstances are certainly unfortunate, in my opinion it is hard 
to find fault with the district court's opinion. The court followed the standards for 
10(j) injunctions in the 9th Circuit to the letter, engaging in a step-by-step approach 
to each requirement. Thus, in my opinion, the district court evaluated the evidence on 
both sides and applied the burden shifting analysis of Wright Line in an appropriate 
manner. 
A hearing was held on the merits of the L C F case in San Francisco during 
November and December of 1994. The hearing was presided by Gerald Wacknov, an 
administrative law judge in the NLRB's division of judges. At the outset, I find it 
striking and significant that both the district court deciding the Section 10(j) matter 
and the ALJ deciding the merits of the case both viewed the evidence in a similar 
fashion. The fact that two independent decision makers reviewing much of the same 
general evidence have reached similar conclusions with respect to such evidence tends 
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to corroborate and lend credence to the view that the Wright Line standard was prop-
erly invoked and appropriately applied. 
The ALJ applied the Wright Line standard in deciding the dispute between 
management and labor. In my view, this standard was appropriately applied given the 
quality of the evidence presented by both management and labor. It is precisely when 
there is good evidence on both sides of a dispute that the Wright Line standard is 
appropriate invoked. There is nothing in the opinion that is unusual or remarkable 
compared with other ALJ decisions that I have reviewed that apply the Wright Line 
standard in a dispute of this nature. 
A review of the record evidence shows a sufficient amount of evidence to make 
out a prima facie case under a Wright Line analysis. However, the record also shows 
substantial evidence to conclude that the employer met its burden of proving that 
LCF would have been closed for legitimate financial reasons. 
The employer's evidence concerning a $12 million variance in forecasts versus 
outlook for LCF in 1994 and the employer's evidence concerning the future of LCF 
given competition by MCI and AT&T was persuasive, tending to support the ALJ's 
conclusion that the employer's burden under Wright Line was met. 
Based on the very detailed findings of facts set out in over 30 pages of the ALJ's 
decision, I can fairly conclude that the ALJ reached a reasonable decision under the 
Wright Line approach. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Professor Corrada. 
The chair is advised that one of the registered speakers, Mr. Calvin McDaniels, 
is unable to be present with us this morning. Should Mr. McDaniels appear in the 
hall later today, we will allow him the opportunity to make his presentation. 
At this time, we will call the next person that registered in sequence. 
I would like to invite to the podium Ms. Dora Vogel, who is a former employee 
of La Conexion Familiar. 
MS. VOGEL: Buenos Dias. 
MR. OTERO: Good morning. 
MS. VOGEL: (UNTRANSLATED TESTIMONY IN SPANISH.) 
( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) ... terrible conditions under which we had 
to work. I had to know how to sell the service and I could reach my quota that we had 
to fulfill. The manager told us that we would fill our quota, we would get a commis-
sion and continuously we were being reminded how much more we could make with 
this commission. Sometimes the sales quota would go up. If we would manage to sell 
15 sales, then the quota immediately went up to 18. It was never important to see how 
many sales we made. We never got the commission, even though we would ask when 
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are we going to get this commission. They always had a reason or an excuse why we 
were not being paid that commission for our quota. 
We could not speak amongst ourselves. We were told to continue working, that 
we had to keep making call after call after call. The pressure to sell was enormous and 
constantly we were being watched to see what we were doing. We were allowed to go 
to the bathroom at lunchtime or during our rest periods. We had to ask for a special 
permission to go to the bathroom if it wasn't done during our rest period. Sometimes 
we would ask for permission and they would tell us that we would have to wait until 
the regular time to go to the toilet. 
Whenever we had the meetings with our supervisors, we were told that we should 
not drink too much water so that we didn't have to go to the bathroom all the time. 
Since we were on the phone constantly, we got very thirsty, but we didn't have any 
water to drink. There was a water fountain for everybody, for the 130 telemarketers, 
and this was broken. It didn't work. Most of us would bring our own water. 
About the first of May, the manager announced that the work schedule was 
going to change. That very same day we were told what was going to be our next 
schedule. We had two schedules. Monday to Fridays we worked from 12:30 to 9:00 
and Tuesdays and Saturdays we worked from 10:00 to 5:00 p.m. My schedule was 
changed for Tuesday and for Saturday. I was very frightened because I could not work 
on Saturdays because I had to take care of the children. My mother-in-law would look 
after my two children during the week. My baby was barely 4 months old and I knew 
that my mother-in-law could not take care of them on Saturdays because she worked 
on Saturdays. 
So therefore other workers and myself went to talk to the manager about this 
problem, but we were told that this schedule would not be changed, that we had to 
work according to the days that were given to us. For me, this meant more expenses 
because I had to pay somebody to baby sit my children on Saturdays. 
Also, besides the tensions that we felt all the time because we had to make so 
many calls to make our quota, we also had the tension that we were going to be fired 
any moment. 
One day, one of the colleagues was called to the manager's office. She's here. I 
saw her. She used to sit in front of me. All of us who sat around here were waiting 
anxiously to find out what had happened to her, what had the manager said to her. A 
while later, she came back with the manager. The manager was shouting at her, saying 
that she couldn't take anything out of her desk and that she had to leave immediately. 
The manager told her that he was going to call the security guard so that he would see 
and escort her out of the office. This is what they would do always with any worker 
who was being dismissed. 
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My colleague said that the guard would have to bodily carry her out because she 
was not going to be escorted out. All this was going on around me. I got very nervous 
but I looked around and then I broke out in tears. I started to cry Others started to cry 
also. I just could not hold back my tears. Somebody came and helped me to the bath-
room. They gave me a little bit of water. And I couldn't believe that somebody could 
be so shabbily treated in front of all the colleagues and all the other workers. Every-
body heard and saw what was going on. 
When I found out about the union, I felt a little better. I was a little calmer. I felt 
that we needed a union in order to improve our working conditions. When somebody 
asked me to sign up, I did so immediately and I even asked around and took the 
petition around for others to sign to. 
At the beginning of June, we all used union T-shirts to show our solidarity. And 
even though we were also nervous because we didn't want to so openly show our 
support of the union, nevertheless we felt pretty good about wearing our T-shirts 
because we saw that the majority was supporting the union. 
Then I heard rumors that if I went into the union the office would close, but I 
didn't believe it because why on earth would they close? They were selling very well. 
We knew that the business was going very well because we were the ones that were 
making the calls that were bringing in the sales. I felt that many of the workers were in 
unions and I figured that Sprint would then pay us better. 
The supervisors tried to show us that sales were very low. During a meeting they 
had different graphs where they showed us that sales were off, but we knew better 
than that. 
On the 14th of July, the day that they announced the closing down of the facility, 
I heard somebody saying that the office would be closed and I saw that there was a lot 
going on and I suspected that something was up. 
When they made the announcement, we were all taken by surprise. I thought 
that I would call my husband, but then I figured how upset he was going to be be-
cause I was really being the only breadwinner in my family. My husband could not 
work. He had hurt his wrist. There was no money. How were we going to pay our 
rent? How were we going to purchase food? What was going to happen to the children? 
After the office closed down, it was very tough. My husband went back to work 
even though he still was in pain. His wrist had not healed completely. And to this day, 
he hurts because it was never healed properly. 
We borrowed from other members of the family in order to continue living. 
Catholic Charities paid our rent one month. The food that we got from the union 
helped us to put some food on the table. It took us 1 year in order to be able to get on 
our feet economically once again. 
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I will never be able to forget the way they made us work, the promises they gave 
us that they never came through and all the pain and suffering that was brought about 
only because they did not want a union. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Ms. Vogel. 
Mr. Federico Anaya, president of the Law Firm of Anaya Valdepena, Manage-
ment Attorneys and Consultants, who are also counsel to the Confederation of Cham-
bers of Commerce and Industry of Mexico. 
Mr. Anaya. 
MR. ANAYA: ( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) 
Thank you very much. Good morning. 
I would like to compliment Mrs. Vogel for her outstanding presentation. Cer-
tainly, we are all fired up after listening to her so that we can look after and try to 
resolve these type of problems that affect humanity. 
I would like to divide my talk in three parts. First of all, I would like to talk 
about some legal aspects. Number two, I want to talk about some commercial aspects 
and the third part will talk about the labor relations. 
In the first place, I would like to tell you that the world is full of contracts. The 
contracts are accords and agreements of goodwill. Let's give an example. Let's say I 
come out of the university. I have just graduated as a lawyer and I don't have any 
clientele. I don't have any clients. I must have clients. In order to have the clients, I 
must be able to demonstrate that I am capable and I am professional. The title alone is 
not going to bring me clients. 
We can also say that if I open up a business or a store the fact that I am just 
opened up for business is not going to bring clients to buy my wares and we can think 
the same about a union. 
A union has to be formed because the laws of international says so. This is laws 
all over the world. But setting up a union per se does not mean that it is automatically 
a collective automatization and I am not trying to justify in any way the attitude of 
certain companies. I am not justifying it. But as I was saying, we need the goodwill of 
the person who is going to make a collective contract with workers. We cannot do 
anything against anybody's will. 
It is so much so that at least in my country there is a very clear standard that 
determines the following. When a union tries to have a collective contract, they have 
to follow a certain procedure and this procedure is a document has to be written, 
officially sent to the National Board of Arbitration and the threat by the union is that 
they will shut down the company if this contract is not signed. What does the com-
pany do? What is the defense of the company? 
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The company either signs the contract or it doesn't want to sign the contract for 
other reasons and does not go before—what can happen is that they will have to pay 
off the workers. But if these workers are fired unduly, the law protects the workers that 
belong to a union and when there is a dismissal of such grand magnitude, the compa-
nies also have to pay indemnization, which means paying 3 months' salary if the con-
flict is not resolved. 
Therefore, it is very clearly set forth that when the companies make use of their 
right not to have this collective contract they have to then pay damages and severance 
pay In other words, they get penalized and they have to pay off all of the workers that 
are dismissed. 
When a company is made up this company has a whole series of factors that are 
very specific to them and the company has to select vendors, personnel, the bank they 
are going to work with and also, why not say so, the company has the right to, let's say, 
lean toward certain factors that are going to make the company successful and to make 
things easier for the company When there are great dark clouds in the sky, the com-
pany takes evasive action, just like a pilot does when he goes to a higher altitude or a 
lower altitude to avoid the bad weather that lies ahead. This, I think, occurs to every-
body who is head of any company 
Now, regarding the third point that I mentioned, I would like to say to all of you 
that in my modest opinion nobody can discuss the fact that the workers don't have a 
right to unionize and nobody has to say anything against—nobody can say anything 
against that the companies can also do something to protect themselves. Nobody can 
do that. So the value of the union value is parallel to the company whether it's going to 
select or not select or sign or not sign a contract with this or that union, which maybe 
will bring on problems later on. 
I would like to insist on the fact that at this forum we are not just addressing an 
individual case. We are talking about the prospects for understanding between union-
ized employees and a group of companies which also have the right to carry out their 
program and I say this because there are assembly lines, there are organized services, 
financial services, commercial services, there are systems such as these, so the workers 
have the need to continue their associations. They exist as a need to defend the needs 
of organized employees. 
What are these interests or needs? There are basically two: just wages and also 
just and fair working conditions that have to do with benefits and hygiene conditions 
and so on. 
The businessman invests capital for a profit and when the economic conditions 
are adverse, for example, the price of materials does not allow him to be competitive in 
the market or when banks withdraw financial support, fear regarding a new and un-
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known trade union, and this happens to everybody when we don't know what's hap-
pening, a trade union which is coming about of which you know only that it is being 
created, it is sending a red flag regarding a risk. You don't know what will happen with 
a nascent or new trade union. You don't know the intentions of this group. It's not the 
same thing with a trade union that has been in existence for a time and the business-
man knows what this trade union does day by day. 
So you have to see what's happening. There are trade unions that would increase 
the risk factor for companies. This is not a problem regarding the law but a problem 
regarding attitudes and as Warren Edmondson said when he addressed the forum, 
you cannot legislate attitude, you cannot legislate goodwill, the desire to understand 
each other. This comes out of the quality of human beings and the quality of trade 
unions and companies. When companies seek only profits and they forget, as I told a 
son of mine, the best thing you have in your company is your workers and you should 
deal with them as though they were your best customers. When you forget this, prob-
lems crop up. 
This social phenomenon, the establishment of a new trade union, makes every 
businessman think whether it is not better not to deal with this trade union because he 
doesn't know whether this trade union will be something he cannot control. He ig-
nores whether his authority will be undermined. There is this fear installed. You don't 
know whether there will be a lack of discipline, a lack of respect and whether down the 
road this will mean that the company will go bankrupt or that productivity will go 
down, that you don't work so hard because in any event the employee will feel ex-
ploited, whether the trade union would be an enemy of the company or whether the 
trade union leaders are going to ask for special perks and benefits. 
That is why if the trade union is known, is a known quantity, if it is famous for 
being a professional and authentic, an objective and a modern trade union, these risk 
factors go down to the extent that the trade union has shown that it has goodwill, that 
it wants to get involved in the company's decision making, that it shows respect for 
management, that it promotes order and hygiene and good working conditions, and 
that it has concerns in terms of reducing waste for the company, that it wants to par-
ticipate to increase productivity through training of workers, that it seeks friendly 
resolution of conflict without resorting to strikes, that it wants to improve the environ-
ment, the overall working environment, in the company and that it wants to bring up 
ideas that may lead to higher competitiveness for the company and increase profits 
which may be distributed among workers. 
This is a good-quality merchandise which you always buy. When companies 
and trade unions change their positions radically and get, closer collective bargaining 
will always be an instrument of goodwill and peace and you will have balance and 
justice in labor relations. 
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MR. OTERO: Thank you. 
The chair wishes to correct the record. I failed upon introducing Mr. Anaya to 
underscore that he represents part of the tripartite delegation from Mexico, represent-
ing the employers' side. 
At this juncture in the proceedings, I think it is fair that the chair express deep 
appreciation to all the presenters for the extraordinary discipline that you have shown 
in observing my admonition. Some of you have not used the 10 minutes that is allo-
cated to you and in balance, we are doing very well on time. I want to thank you very 
much for this. We have also had a presenter that did not appear this morning, so we 
are doing well time-wise, but I want to signify my appreciation for your discipline and for 
your cooperation with the chair in ensuring the orderly process of these proceedings. 
I would like to ask also if Mr. John Zucker from Congressman Tom Lantos' 
office is in the audience. If he is, please stand up. Okay. Thank you very much. I don't 
see Mr. Zucker. 
Now, I will like to call to the podium the next presenter, Maria Blanco, Associ-
ate Director of the Women's Employment Rights Clinic at Golden Gate University 
School of Law. 
Ms. Blanco. 
MS. BLANCO: Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you. Good morning. 
MS. BLANCO: Good morning. Good morning. My name is Maria Blanco and, 
as indicated, I am an associate professor of law at Golden Gate University School of 
Law here in San Francisco, a couple of blocks over. 
Together with the director of the clinic, Marcy Seville, who is also here, and our 
clinic students, our clinic represents currendy over 60 La Conexion Familiar employ-
ees who were denied California unemployment benefits after they were fired from La 
Conexion Familiar. Our lawsuit is a challenge to the California Unemployment In-
surance Appeals Board decision that workers who had received offset payments, in 
other words, payments because Sprint closed its plant in violation of the notification 
law, the Board decided that they could not simultaneously receive unemployment benefits. 
I am very honored to be here at this forum which is really historic and one of a 
kind and I think that given the globalization of labor and capital that others have 
talked about today it's no coincidence that the first case of this kind brought in the 
United States under the labor agreement is one in California involving Latino workers. 
It brings together many of the elements that many of us working in the labor 
movement and unemployment issues and immigrant worker issues in California have 
been seeing develop over the years. 
The purpose of my testimony here today is to describe how the sector of the 
United States workforce represented by the more than 200 employees fired from La 
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Conexion Familiar is often unable to enjoy or assert the labor rights they are entitled to 
theoretically under state and federal labor laws. When I say this sector of the workforce, 
I am referring to fairly recent immigrant workers who are at the bottom of the eco-
nomic ladder here in California and other parts of the country. 
As you will hear today and have already heard, the workers at La Conexion 
Familiar were primarily Latinas, non-English speaking and, for the most part, un-
skilled. For many, this was their first full-time permanent job. Many of us in San 
Francisco thought a company like La Conexion Familiar represented the welcome 
possibility that the very consumers targeted by companies attempting to capture the 
Spanish-speaking market might also result in good jobs for those consumers. This 
would have been a welcome change from the concentration of immigrant workers in 
low-paying, dead-end jobs which in spite of the anti-immigrant clamor heard in many 
quarters these days few other workers are willing to perform. 
Initially, the employees, and you will probably hear this today, of La Conexion 
Familiar felt fortunate beyond all their dreams when they got their jobs. With Sprint, 
they thought they had the unique opportunity to work at above the minimum wage and to 
be employed at jobs where their native language was an asset and not a drawback. 
Yet the job also had problems. Very big problems. The hours, the speed-up, as 
Ms. Vogel testified today, the lack of breaks. Non-payment of wages. Non-payment of 
commissions. So the workers who felt so fortunate to have this job had the courage, or 
some would say the nerve, to assert their right to decent working conditions through 
seeking to join a union, their right under United States labor laws. 
Unfortunately, as highlighted by the complaint filed by Mexico, United States 
labor relations law has failed them and for these highly vulnerable workers, the failure 
has occurred on several fronts, not just the National Labor Relations Act that we have 
heard about today. 
For example, and I'll start with the National Labor Relations Act. You will hear 
substantial testimony today about the circumstances surrounding Sprint's closure, 
how the company sales were growing, how employees told that the workforce was 
going to grow. That is until over 50 percent of the workers indicated their support for 
representation by the Communications Workers of America. 
Despite the decision by the National Labor Relations Board judge that Sprint s 
transfer was purely economic, the workers, the Union, many experts and non-experts 
and many people here today who followed this case very closely are convinced and 
know that the company's move was nothing but good old-time illegal union busting-
To the workers of La Conexion Familiar, the protections of Section 8 and Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act proved meaningless. And the fact 
remains that La Conexion Familiar ex-employees will never see a remedy for Sprint s 
illegal actions and this forum is not a remedy. We are glad we are here, but it is not. 
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Even if back pay were ever awarded, this would not compensate for the lost jobs, for 
the havoc created for the workers who faced this job loss, and for their then having to 
be thrust in a labor market where they face the triple barrier of being unskilled immi-
grant women of color with very few chances of employment in a city like San Francisco. 
Violation of federal plant closure laws. La Conexion Familiar employees were 
also treated to a clear violation of federal law that required Sprint to give 60 days5 
notice to its employees before plant closure. This protection is set forth in the Worker 
Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act, known as WARN by many of us, which 
was passed in Congress in 1989. Thus, Sprint compounded its unfair labor practice 
with a violation of the WARN Act. The purpose of this long-fought-for provision is 
to give employees time to retrain, adjust, and seek work when informed that their 
place of employment is about to close. No workers have ever needed notice to retrain 
and prepare more than those of La Conexion Familiar. 
Often knowing minimal English and with few economic resources, the sudden 
closure threw their lives and that of their families into complete turmoil. I know you 
are going to hear more about that this afternoon. 
Denial of California unemployment benefits, perhaps the part of this that I am 
the most familiar with. The process of applying and obtaining unemployment benefits 
should have been relatively simple for the ex-employees of La Conexion Familiar. 
Instead, their attempt to obtain this basic safety net turned out to be a nightmare. As 
a result of the California Department of Unemployment's decision that any penalties 
paid by Sprint for its violation of the WARN Act made the workers ineligible for 
unemployment benefits, the fired workers went months without unemployment. Even 
more incredible, the fired employees had penalties imposed upon them by the Unem-
ployment Insurance Department that accused them of lying on their application when 
they stated that the plant closure fines they received were not wages. Thus the fired 
employees face two sets of unemployment hearings: one to determine their eligibility 
to benefits and another to prove that they had not made false statements and not be 
assessed penalties. 
Failure to receive wages under California wage and hour laws. Among the work-
ing conditions at Sprint La Conexion Familiar which fueled the unionization drive 
was the employer's failure to consistently pay overtime penalties and commissions, as 
required by California law and regulations. To resolve this breach in the law, the work-
ers turned to traditional federal labor law remedies, the National Labor Relations Act 
and the Section 7 right to join unions and pursue collective bargaining. 
When the plant closure effectively eliminated that avenue of resolution for the 
wage claims, the employees were left to individually file wage claims. Next month, 
more than a year and a half after La Conexion Familiar closed, many of the claims for 
unpaid wages will finally go to a hearing before California's labor commissioner. With 
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no union to help them, the ex-employees, many of them non-English speaking and 
from countries with no comparable laws, face this complex wage claim process alone. 
Fortunately, here in San Francisco La Rasa Central Legal has stepped forward to help 
with the wage claim and is representing many of the workers. 
Thus, 2 years after Sprint's sudden closure of La Conexion Familiar in order to 
avoid collective bargaining, the majority of the workers are still unemployed, still en-
gaged in complex legal proceedings to recover partial unemployment benefits, still 
trying to recover unpaid wages which Sprint owes them, and the NLRA case is wind-
ing its way through the legal process. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that in the eyes of many of La Conexion 
Familiar workers the United States system of labor laws has not worked. Wage laws, 
unemployment laws, labor relations law, plant closure notification laws, all failed in 
this case example. It is not an exaggeration to say that many believe that their attempt 
at unionization and collective bargaining fared no better here in the United States' 
system of labor relations than in other countries where labor rights are considered to 
be notably less than in the United States. 
For now, they are left with serious doubts about the true right to freely associate 
and it may be a long time before they recover their faith in our legal system. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Ms. Blanco, before you depart, first of all, would it be possible for 
us to have a copy of your statement? 
MS. BLANCO: Yes. I brought some copies. 
MR. OTERO: And, secondly, I did not quite follow the sequence of your presen-
tation. I was distracted, so I apologize. 
MS. BLANCO: Perhaps it was me. 
MR. OTERO: From the sequence of the WARN Act and the role of the California 
state unemployment insurance, would you please repeat that for the record, please? 
MS. BLANCO: Sure. Do you want me to explain or to read it? 
When Sprint closed without giving the 60 days' notice required under the law, 
what it did was it gave the employees what are called offset payments. What an em-
ployee is allowed to do when a plant closes without notice is take the employer to 
court. That's the remedy. You take the employer to court for violation of the notice 
requirement and then you can get 60 days' salary because you didn't have the advance 
notice. 
Some employers rather than go to court anticipate that they're going to lose in 
court and they offset that and they give it to the fired employees at the time that they 
fire them. 
The employees in this case received those offset payments and as a result when 
they applied for unemployment benefits and they filled out the section that says have 
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you received any wages they said no because these are not wages. This is a penalty 
which actually you have to normally go to court to obtain. And the unemployment 
appeals board in California has decided that they are wages and we are currently ap-
pealing that decision and arguing that those payments are really a fine meant to en-
force the plant closure law and they should not be considered wages. 
MR. OTERO: The California state board has interpreted that that 60-day pay-
ment was wages. 
MS. BLANCO: Exactly 
MR. OTERO: I see. Okay That's the portion that I had not quite understood 
before. 
MS. BLANCO: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you very much, Ms. Blanco. 
The chair now calls to the podium Ms. Liliette Jiron, a former employee of La 
Conexion Familiar. 
Ms. Jiron? 
MS. JIRON: Good morning. 
MR. OTERO: Good morning. 
MS. JIRON: Hello. My name is Liliette Jiron. 
MR. OTERO: Do you want a glass of water? 
MS. JIRON: A tissue would do. 
MR. OTERO: A tissue? I don't have a tissue. 
(Pause) 
MS. JIRON: Thank you. 
My introduction to Sprint's anti-union tactics of threats and intimidation began 
on my job interview. I applied for a telemarketer position at Sprint La Conexion Fa-
miliar in the spring of 1994. During my interview, I was told the Union was trying to 
organize at L C F but the troublemakers would get fired eventually. I was told I should 
have no part of them. I was told that some people who worked at L C F were ungrate-
ful. My interviewer said that these people don't deserve a job this good because they 
don't speak any English. He continued to say they should be happy to have this job. 
Although the tension in the workplace frightened me, I desperately needed the 
job so when it was offered I said yes. 
I had been out of work for 6 months. My fiance was our sole supporter. Our 
bills were piling up and we were unable to pay rent — 
MR. OTERO: Take your time, Ms. Jiron. Take your time to compose yourself. 
There is no hurry. 
MS. JIRON: We were unable to pay rent on our apartment. We had to move with 
my two children into a studio apartment. This job was an opportunity to make some 
money to help pay the rent, buy food, diapers, and clothing for my children. 
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Within 3 weeks of arriving at LCF, I was asked to spy on my co-workers. As I 
was on probation for my first 90 days, I felt I had no choice but to do as asked. I 
couldn't lose this job. My supervisor asked me to search through my co-workers drawers 
after hours to see if anyone in my group was hiding union materials in their desks. I 
was also asked to talk with my co-workers and find out who was the leader of union 
supporters in my group. 
During break, my supervisor would ask me what I had learned about my co-
workers' involvement with CWA. I was hired along with four other women. Two of 
them signed their names to the union petition. My group supervisor told me to talk 
with them and try to get them to take their names off the petition. I was told they 
would find a reason to fire any new person who signed the petition. They said it would 
be easy as we were still on probation. There was a constant fear that we would be fired 
if we supported the Union. 
About 10 days after I started working at Sprint, they fired someone at her work-
station right in front of everyone. They told her to get her things and get out. I don't 
know why she was fired but I felt even more threatened. I couldn't believe that they 
would fire someone like that in front of everyone. It made me want to stay away from 
the union supporters. 
But I understood why my co-workers wanted to form a union. We had problems 
getting paid. Also we had a commission program. I never received a commission 
check. They kept changing the rules on the number of sales we needed. Every super-
visor had a different quota. At one group meeting I asked about the commission pro-
gram. I was yelled at and made to feel stupid for asking the question. 
We were not allowed to go to the bathroom until our break time. Also, we were 
on the phone all day and our throats got dry and sore. They told us not to drink a lot 
of water so we wouldn't need the bathroom breaks. 
On payday, we had to wait until our supervisor wanted to give us the paychecks. 
She said she didn't want to give them to us at lunchtime because we would go to the 
bank and take longer lunch. We were under such tight control all the time. They just 
didn't respect us. 
One day when they were remodeling the floor above us, horrible fumes came 
through the vents. People were coughing. I got a rash on my arms, but they wouldn't 
let us leave. Finally, after 2 hours we were told we could go home. 
We all knew we needed a union but the frightened and intimidated many of us. 
We were too afraid to say it publicly. They kept telling us if we voted for the Union, 
the office would close down and their threats to close the office came true. 
A week before our chance to vote in the union election we were called in the 
conference room. It was just before lunch. They locked all the doors. There were 
security guards at each exit. They told us L C F was closing that day They said we had 
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until 4 p.m. to clear our stuff. As we left, we were each personally searched and they 
went through our belongings. 
For me, everything fell apart that day. I couldn't face being out of work. I started 
abusing alcohol. I was so depressed. I fought with my fiance and I yelled at my chil-
dren. It was hard for me to get out of bed. I didn't want to do anything. I felt so 
helpless. 
Financially, we were having a hard time. I was too depressed to look for work 
and the bills were piling up. I was unable to pay for my car insurance, so it was even-
tually canceled but I still had to drive so I did and I got caught. I had to spend 5 hours 
in jail for driving without insurance and a license. 
It took me a year to finally make sense of everything and to start to get myself 
together. I thank my fiance for seeing me through this. I got another job through the 
unemployment with an Internet provider. Next month I celebrate my year anniversary 
at this job. 
After a very tough year, I am happy. My fiance and I are still saving money 
hoping to buy a home. 
But my experience at Sprint changed everything for me. I will always carry 
around the fear of being fired and I will remember the threats to close if we voted for 
the Union. And I will remember the day that they did what they said. And to think all 
we wanted was a union. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Ms. Jiron. 
We had two no-shows this morning which added to the cooperation of all the 
presenters have made the morning session go faster than we had anticipated. 
I wonder if I could perhaps call someone who is scheduled to be here this after-
noon, have one more speaker, and then we will recess until the afternoon session to 
allow the interpreters an opportunity to have a longer rest. They have been doing an 
excellent job and we have not given them the opportunity to rest. 
So I wonder if Mr. Sergio Tapia is in the audience and I wonder if he would 
mind speaking now rather than later. Is that okay? 
Let me introduce formally Mr. Sergio Tapia, who is with the Consultants Asso-
ciates in Monterrey, Mexico. Mr. Tapia is a management consultant and we invite 
him to come to the podium. 
MR. TAPIA: ( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) Thank you very much, Mr. 
Otero. I thank you for this opportunity to speak to you. 
Actually, I had brought with me the paper I wanted to submit to this forum this 
afternoon. However, I believe it's not worthwhile. I think that I will present in a some-
what different format and I am modifying it or I am adapting it to what I have heard 
so far. 
175 
P L A N T C L O S I N G S A N D L A B O R R I G H T S 
With due respect, I think it sounds like an encounter between the good guys and 
the bad guys. Naturally, the presentation of working conditions in such a dramatic 
manner under which—or the dramatic way in which the workers have presented how 
they were working at Sprint make us believe that they are the good ones and also the 
presentation or the introduction that was given to this forum recognizing, of course, 
the sacred right to unionization of workers not only in this country but in the three 
countries represented here and also in most parts of the world and, of course, that 
leads us to admit it is a real situation. The press, the media, are present and this also 
gives recognition to the good guys, only the poor management I think in this case is 
very poorly represented. The manager of the company, I think, was under shock and 
did not want to attend. The attorney who submitted the case and who explained the 
legal resolutions already left—I can see that he already returned but, I mean, he only 
received applause by three people, I counted them very discretely. 
Mr. Anaya, who represents an important section of the Mexican management, 
also received only very little recognition on behalf of the forum but, of course, I be-
lieve this is rather natural considering this intense participation and attendance on 
behalf of representatives of the workers. 
Considering all these circumstances, I can only adhere to the good guys and 
recognize, of course, the sacred right of workers to form a union. I don't think that any 
rational person in this day and age denies that. Of course I recognize the success Mr. 
Hernandez Juarez has had in directing his trade union and the success he has had 
achieved for his union. It is very impressive what successes have been achieved also on 
behalf of other union leaders throughout the world. This dramatic representation of 
the Sprint case really motivates us, really fills us with emotion, feelings of empathy 
towards workers. I can think of other dramatic and emotional cases that have been 
shown on the big screen. For example, the case of Norma Rae, there's a great movie 
by Depardieu called Termination about the workers in Europe and simply the kind of 
epilogue I would like to talk about in the last part of my presentation. 
I want to make the following reflection. Social justice traditionally tends to cre-
ate a balance between opposed rights or opposing rights. Also traditionally workers' 
rights have been considered weaker or more vulnerable than the rights of its counter-
part or the complement which is the employer, the management. However, in recent 
years, this situation has tended to revert and has created situations in which workers 
rights exceed sometimes those of the management, recognizing that these circum-
stances, of course, vary from one region to the other or from one industrial sector to 
the other. For example, we could say that labor rights of the agricultural worker in 
California are weaker than those of the steelworker in Pittsburgh or that the labor 
rights of the workers, for example, in the state Chiapas are weaker than those of the 
workers in general in the State of California. 
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Therefore, we need to be very cautious in studying case by case and not making 
generalizations and saying that the workers' rights are in general more vulnerable or 
weaker. 
I believe that workers have the right to unionize if they so wish, but I also defend 
the right of the employer to close a plant if it's not cost-efficient or if it's strategically 
convenient for his business. I also believe that this forum in a certain way cannot really 
resolve the controversy that is being presented here. It is a controversy that the United 
States through its legitimately represented agencies and through its laws that have also 
been approved in this country have resolved. 
Unfortunately in this case, for the employer—of course I believe that the work-
ers have the right to unionize, that is something that the forum needs to recognize, but 
also the forum needs to recognize that the employer has the right to create successful 
businesses. 
I believe that by recognizing these rights this forum will have fulfilled its com-
mitment with specific cases with such as Sprint's case in this country or Sony which 
will soon be admitted to Mr. Otero and maybe some other people of this forum in 
Monterrey, my hometown, will be resolved according to the laws of each country and 
according to the circumstances of each specific case. 
Thank you very much and I know that I will not get a lot of applause. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Mr. Tapia. 
"four presentation gives the chair the opportunity to wrap up this morning's 
session by underscoring two or three points that I think are germane. 
The intent of this forum was never to put in question the process of law that has 
been pursued through the National Labor Relations Board. That is a process that 
speaks for itself. A decision was made by the judge. The Union is appealing. The 
general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board is appealing that process. It's 
there on its own. 
The reason we are here today is because we have a duty under the North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation to examine the question of labor law and its 
application in the three NAFTA countries. Mexico, the United States, and Canada 
pay the greatest of importance to the principle of freedom of association and the right 
to strike and we want to underscore by this forum and by a number of other activities 
how sacred we, the three countries, the three governments, believe that such freedom is. 
We had hoped through this forum, and we still have this afternoon plus a num-
ber of other activities, to try to examine in more detail and an in-depth analysis of the 
impact that the sudden closure of plants and factories have on that very principle of 
freedom of association. 
Naturally the forum is generated as a result of the case that was filed with the 
Mexico NAO pursuant to the Sprint case and that's what gave rise to this forum, but 
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we hope that in the process of this discussion, as well as in the study that we have 
commissioned through the Labor Secretariat in Dallas that we will be able to examine 
cases other than just the case of Sprint, other instances in the United States, in Mexico, 
and in Canada where similar sudden closures may have an impact on that very basic 
freedom which is embodied in Convention 98 of the ILO. 
And so it is in that context that we hope that these discussions as well as the 
study of the Labor Secretariat will enable us to examine in more detail what impact the 
incidents have on that freedom of association, which is one of the main components of 
our labor agreement on cooperation between the three countries. 
So I thank you, Mr. Tapia, for giving me the opportunity to make this clarifica-
tion just before we break for lunch. 
Let me suggest that we will have a little longer period of recess than we had 
anticipated. We will not come back here until 2:00 this afternoon, but I will ask you if 
you will kindly be here before 2:00 so that we can proceed on time precisely at 2:00. 
This forum is now recessed for lunch. Thank you very much. 
(Whereupon, the forum was recessed, to be reconvened this same day, Tuesday, 
February 27, 1996, at 2:00 p.m.) 
A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N 
2:00 p.m. 
MR. OTERO: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. 
Muy buenos tardes a todos, sefioras y senores. 
I ask that you take your seats, as we are about to begin the second session of this 
public forum today 
I would like to announce that in view of the fact that we have received word that 
some of the registered speakers are unable to come to present the testimony, we are 
going to have a little more time this afternoon than I had anticipated and I also have a 
special request from the interpreters. 
This morning, some of the speakers because of the pressure of having to give 
their speech in 10 minutes, they spoke too rapidly, thereby making it difficult for the 
interpreters to properly translate and enunciate every word. 
So this afternoon, I am taking the liberty as chair to expand the period of each 
speaker from 10 to 12 minutes, given the fact that we have some vacancies in the 
speaker slots. 
But I will ask the speakers if you already have a 10-minute speech, try to give it 
in 12 minutes, all right? Let us not be running far afield, but you can speak slower so 
that you can allow the interpreters to do their job very well. 
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And I would like to say parenthetically that I have been listening to the speakers 
from time to time and the interpreters are doing an excellent job of accurately and 
properly doing both English to Spanish. 
(Applause.) 
Very well. The program this afternoon calls for the first speaker to be the Hon-
orable Mayor of the City of San Francisco, Mr. Willie Brown, but we have not heard 
whether he is on his way or not, so we are not going to prolong the meeting any longer. 
We do know, however, that Congressman Tom Lantos, who is from this district 
is unable to be here, but we are very fortunate that Mr. Lantos has asked one of his key 
collaborators in the Congress, Mr. John Zucker, who is a member of his staff, he is a 
legislative assistant, and he is here with us to deliver a presentation on behalf of Con-
gressman Lantos. 
So I would like to ask Mr. Zucker to come forward to the podium. 
Please proceed. 
MR. ZUCKER: Thank you, Mr. Otero. 
Thank you to the Bureau of International Labor Affairs. And I have timed this 
speech, it's only about 8 minutes. 
My name is John Zucker. I am a legislative aide to Congressman Tom Lantos in 
his Washington office. 
Congressman Lantos wishes to express his profound gratitude for being invited 
to participate in this important public forum and his sincerest regrets at not being able 
to attend. As you may know, the Congress is now back in session and several impor-
tant votes were scheduled for today. He was therefore compelled to return to Wash-
ington. Nevertheless, he feels very strongly about the purpose and importance of this 
forum, and so he asked me to deliver his address to you exactly as he wrote it, so I will 
begin. 
STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN TOM LANTOS: I would first like to commend 
you for holding this hearing which is the first of its kind under the terms of the NAFTA 
agreement on a case involving violations of workers' rights in the United States. 
As you know, I was strongly opposed to NAFTA, but it is now the law of the 
land and we must live by its provisions. I will be the first one to make sure that the 
spirit and intent of the principles contained in NAFTAs side agreement on labor 
cooperation are given maximum attention in the enforcement of NAFTAs provi-
sions. 
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation states plainly that ev-
ery effort will be made to guarantee to all workers the right of freedom of association 
and the right to union representation. The Sprint workers who are the subject of 
today's hearing were clearly denied these rights. 
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Sprint's shutdown of La Conexion Familiar demonstrated that reality falls well 
short of the goals of the NAFTA agreement on labor cooperation. This is the case of 
a company which willfully violated our labor law and which was cited with more than 
50 violations. It is also a case of human pain and suffering. 
As you know, on July 14, 1994, 235 individuals were thrown out of work by 
Sprint. Many of these workers live in my congressional district. Today we heard and 
will hear from several of these workers who have told us in their own words the tur-
moil they have had to endure. I have heard their pain from the beginning of this tragic 
situation and I have observed firsthand the wrenching consequences of Sprint's be-
havior on these workers' lives. 
In a split second, these workers were unemployed. Their families were in disar-
ray and the promise of the American dream was destroyed. 
"How could this happen?" they asked, "After all, this is America where laws as 
supposed to mean what they say and are supposed to be enforced to the letter." 
When Sprint abruptly shut its La Conexion Familiar facility 1 week before an 
organizing election, we had a classic case of U.S. labor law not adequately protecting 
American workers. Two hundred thirty-five workers lost their jobs, victims of an ille-
gal campaign against workers' rights. 
More than a year and a half after losing their jobs, the workers at La Conexion 
Familiar are still struggling and awaiting justice. Out of the 177 workers who were 
scheduled to vote in the union election, fewer than half are working. The rest are still 
out of work. 
The National Labor Relations Board moved as quickly as current law permit-
ted, but in spite of their efforts it took over 4 months until the case was heard and well 
over a year until a decision was issued and the process is far from over. As of today, this 
case is 593 days old and it will take many more months before the Board issues a final 
decision, even as they expedite the case. 
It will take years before all parties exhaust available appeals. In the meantime, 
the workers are the ones paying the price for the inability of our system to provide 
prompt and effective remedies for this obvious and egregious violation of the law. 
The Sprint case is not atypical. The latest data available from the NLRB show 
that by the end of 1994 the median number of days it took for an unfair labor practice 
case to reach a decision by an Administrative Law Judge was 360 days and the median 
number of days to reach a Board decision was 601 days. What this means is that half 
of all these cases took even longer. 
The average age of cases pending before the Board as of September 30, 1994 
was 758 days. After that, years of appeals through the courts and we have to recognize 
that our current system of labor law is in fact an easy and inexpensive tool for compa-
nies to use to break the law rather than abide by it. 
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It is simply unjust for workers who have lost their jobs as a result of unfair labor 
practices by their employers to have to wait so long for a remedy Our labor laws and 
their enforcement mechanisms must be strengthened. 
Under these circumstances, I admire the courage of the workers at La Conexion 
Familiar. They stepped up to the plate and took a swing at their rights. They did not 
know that the game was rigged against them and that Sprint was throwing a spitball. 
What would you do if you were a worker in a plant or a facility such as La 
Conexion Familiar and you were told by your supervisor or your manager, look, don't 
even try to organize because we'll shut the plant down and it will take you 4 to 5 years 
to prove that the company did anything wrong? In the meantime, you'll be out of 
work. 
Under these circumstances, would anyone try to organize? There's no question 
that the average worker would say no. 
This is what's so admirable about the Sprint workers at La Conexion Familiar. 
In spite of all the threats, the coercion, and the spying, they still tried. They demon-
strated that the importance of organizing a union is not from a bygone era but that 
organizing a union is more relevant than ever. 
It is our system of labor law and its enforcement which must be brought into the 
21st century. This is why I am testifying today in support of Sprint workers and all 
workers who want to organize. I will continue to do everything I can to seek a remedy 
in this case and will continue to push for labor law reform which provides prompt and 
effective penalties against labor law violators. 
Workers must feel secure in their belief that they can exercise their right to orga-
nize without fear of retaliation by their employer and without running the risk of 
losing their job. 
One reason I opposed the NAFTA agreement was that it perpetuated the inef-
fectiveness of U.S. law in protecting workers' rights. In the case of the right to orga-
nize, the NAFTA agreement provides only a mechanism for exposing violations of 
these rights and this forum is part of that mechanism. 
It is important for workers to demonstrate the widespread abuse of workers' 
rights, but it's clearly not enough. The objectives of the NAFTA side agreement on 
labor cooperation are admirable, but the law itself should contain penalties against the 
companies who benefit from expanded trade opportunities but at the same time vio-
late their workers' rights, whether in Mexico, Canada, or the United States. 
I will fight hard to ensure that the NAFTA agreement is amended to include 
real penalties and appropriate enforcement provisions. 
I support calls for an international code of conduct for all companies operating 
on a global scale. This code will ensure that workers' rights which we in the United 
States are at least committed to on paper and which are contained in the NAFTA .side 
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agreement on labor cooperation will become part and parcel of acceptable behavior in 
international commerce. 
The promise of international investment and trade must go hand in hand with 
the promise of improved working conditions and living standards for workers both in 
the United States and abroad. By recognizing and protecting the rights of workers to 
form unions and engage in collective bargaining, we are not giving workers entitle-
ments or handouts. We are giving them the tools to stand up for themselves and claim 
their fair share of economic progress that they had a hand in producing. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Mr. Zucker, speaking on behalf of Congressman Tom 
Lantos. 
Next on the list is Fernanda Recio, a former employee of La Conexion Familiar. 
We ask Ms. Recio to come forward. 
' MS. RECIO: Hello, everybody. 
This is a very special day for those of us who used to work in Sprint La Conexion 
Familiar. We thank our union brothers and sisters in Mexico for caring enough about 
us to file a NAFTA complaint and today provide us with a unique opportunity to tell 
our story and give us hope that other workers won't lose their job in the future simply 
because they want a union. 
This experience has provided me with both joy and sorrow. One positive result 
was an invitation I received from the telephone workers union in British Columbia to 
visit them and tell the La Conexion story. They were so outraged by Sprint's behavior 
they demonstrated outside a performance by Sprint spokeswoman Candace Bergen. 
It was a wonderful experience to meet with my Canadian union members who cared 
about our plight. 
I continue to be amazed at the support this case has generated round the world. 
Although we were devastated by the closing, it is heartwarming to know others care. 
When I began working in Sprint La Conexion Familiar in August of 1993,1 
had high hopes. I thought if I worked hard there would be opportunities for me to 
move ahead. But soon after my arrival at Sprint, I realized Sprint's public image is 
very different from its behavior as an employer. 
From the start, I had problems getting paid my commissions. I was in sales and 
my motivation to sell was based on extra money I got for each sale. Every time I asked 
my supervisor to explain the payment procedure, I got the run around. 
When I asked why I wasn't getting paid for sales I knew I had made, I was told 
I had to wait for the computer report. Then the report would be delayed. When it 
came, I was told it was wrong. I spent a lot of time meeting with my supervisor and the. 
manager and got nowhere. 
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I felt I had to hire a lawyer. When I told my supervisor I was being represented 
by an attorney, suddenly he was able to give me a commission check. But it wasn't for 
the full amount due me. The check simply stated "commissions due." There was no 
breakdown of how many sales, when the sales were made, or anything. It was impos-
sible to get an accounting from Sprint. 
I kept a daily list of what I sold, so I had the records, even if Sprint didn't, and 
the check never matched my records. I still haven't cleared up the commission prob-
lem and I am working with a lawyer to get paid what Sprint owes me. 
The difficulty in getting our commission was the main reason many of us were 
interested in forming a union. Everyone was having the same problem. We felt they 
weren't being fair to us and we weren't getting paid want we were owed. This was very 
frustrating. 
There was a total lack of respect for us by management. The supervisors often 
yelled at us. They thought that we were children. 
We had to sign a piece of paper to go to the bathroom. The paper lists the time 
that we left and the time we returned. We had to give this report to our supervisor 
each time we went to the bathroom. 
We also were frustrated with the small cafeteria. There weren't enough chairs 
for us to sit and eat our lunches. We weren't allowed to eat at our desks. And there was 
only one microwave. We had 30 minutes for lunch and 30 people had to use the micro-
wave in half an hour. We'd spend much of our lunchtime in line waiting to heat our food. 
In October, I was promoted to an In Charge Supervisor. I was doing very well 
as a supervisor and still one of the top sales people. But, at the end of January 1994,1 
went with a few of my co-workers to a meeting with an organizer from the Communi-
cations Workers of America. When I returned to the office, my co-workers asked me 
where I had been and I told them about the meeting with CWA. 
My supervisor heard me talking and started asking me all kinds of questions. 
He told me I shouldn't be talking with others about the union. I didn't know I needed 
to be secretive about wanting to form a union. In Chile, where I am from, being for 
the union is a good thing. 
Many of us felt the union was our only hope. 
On June 1st, we wore this T-shirt to show our support for the union. This is the 
only we thought we could make the things better. 
We wanted to be treated fairly and with respect. We felt we didn't have anything 
to lose to join CWA, but we were wrong. 
My supervisor asked me all the time about my connection with the union. My 
co-workers were told not to talk to me. If they did talk with me during a break, they 
were immediately asked what we were talking about, were we discussing the union? 
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For me, once they knew I supported the union, the rules changed. I was told to 
take a vacation day if I got sick. When I was too late to work, instead of getting a 
verbal warning like everybody else, I received a written warning in my file. 
They couldn't bother me about my sales because they were so high, but they did 
other things to harass and intimidate me. One day there weren't any seats left in the 
cafeteria so I brought my soup to my desk. There wasn't anyone working in the area at 
the time. The supervisor came and told me I couldn't eat at the desk. He told me to go 
and eat in the bathroom. I couldn't do that. I threw away my soup. 
After a few months of this pressure every day, I started getting palpitations. I 
went to the doctor, who gave me a monitor to wear to test my heart. A co-worker asked 
me about the monitor and how I was feeling. I said not too good. My supervisor came 
over and gave me a warning for talking. 
I got so nervous. I couldn't talk to anyone and my co-workers were afraid to talk 
to me. 
When I went to the bathroom, my supervisor would log out my computer so 
that when I returned I had to log back on. This took time to do which affected my 
productivity which affected my wages and commissions. No one else had to do this. 
We heard over and over that if we voted for the union the office would shut 
down. We knew that this was against the law, that they couldn't shut us down, but they 
still told us all the time. Some employees did believe our supervisors and were afraid 
to support the union. 
By April 1995,1 couldn't take the pressure any more and my doctor advised me 
not to return to work and get in treatment for my stress. By the time I felt ready to try 
to return to work, Sprint had closed the facility. 
I talked with my supervisor a year after the closing and I asked him, "Why did 
you treat me like that? I thought that you liked me." 
And he said, "Fernanda, I had to follow instructions. I didn't have a choice." 
My experience at Sprint has taught me many things. I am still a strong union 
supporter. I believe we would have been able to make things better at La Conexion 
Familiar if we formed a union. But I also learned that Sprint is a company that is 
willing to do anything to keep the union out and that frightens all of us. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Ms. Recio. 
The next presenter is Veronika Altmeyer, Managing Executive, from the Ger-
man Post and Telephone Workers Union of Germany. 
Ms. Altmeyer, welcome. 
MS. ALTMEYER: Thank you. 
( T H R O U G H INTERPRETER) Ladies and gentlemen, as a representative 
of the largest union in the postal and telecommunications industry in Germany with 
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more than 530,000 members in Germany, I would like to thank you very much. I 
would like to thank the United States Department of labor and the representatives of 
Canada and Mexico for giving me the opportunity to express my union's point of view 
in front of this very important panel. 
Through our international cooperation with the CWA, the union of communi-
cations workers in the U.S., we learned from Mr. Bahr in June 1994 about the case 
La Conexion Familiar and it was the first time we heard about Sprint Corporation 
violating labor laws and the right to organize. 
In meetings of our international union organization, PTTI , on multi-national 
telecommunication companies, all member unions of this organization agreed to coor-
dinate their activities with these multi-national companies. Since at that time it was 
already known that the German telephone company Deutsche Telecom AG and its 
French counterpart, France Telecom, intended to form a joint venture with Sprint 
Corporation, we, the CWA and DPG, decided to have the unions cooperate very 
closely. 
After hearing about the complaints against Sprint Corporation, we acted in two 
ways. First, we wrote letters in July of'94, in August of'94, and in September of'94 
and in February '95, we wrote letters to the chairman and chief executive officer of 
Sprint Corporation, Mr. Esrey, asking him to respect the right to organize in his 
company. 
In addition, we also pointed out that Sprint's management guide contained a 
declared company object to keep Sprint union-free. We criticized this company policy 
and asked Mr. Esrey to guarantee the right of free choice of union representation and 
also to stop the threat to workers on the grounds of their union activities. To date, we 
have not received a satisfactory answer to these charges and indications. 
Secondly, we informed that Mr. Esrey that the Supervisory Board of the Deutsche 
Telekom AG had decided in December of 1994 upon a code of conduct for the par-
ticipation of the Deutsche Telekom AG in global telecommunications ventures. The 
then chairman of the board of the Telekom AG, Mr. Helmut Ricke, stated in an 
article of the employees' newsletter of the Deutsche Telekom that, and this is a quote, 
"Union rights will be respected. A common philosophy appears to be indispensable 
within the joint venture." 
In view of the planned cooperation between the Telekom and Sprint, we asked 
Mr. Esrey to participate in joint talks with CWA and us. Unfortunately to date, these 
have not taken place. 
We informed the board of Sprint Corporation that as a union of the telecommu-
nications workers in Germany we had developed and established a high level of par-
ticipation in German companies and that our working relationship was based on mu-
tual recognition and respect. 
185 
P L A N T C L O S I N G S A N D L A B O R R I G H T S 
As already mentioned, the board of directors and the supervisory board of the 
Deutsche Telekom, including the owners' representatives and the representatives of 
the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft, who are equally entitled members of the supervisory 
board, have set the code of conduct of the Deutsche Telekom AG in global telecom-
munications ventures. 
These state as follows: "In all global ventures in the telecommunications indus-
try, the Deutsche Telekom AG declares its support of its company principles. These 
company principles are announced to the partners in global ventures. 
"These principles specifically the Deutsche Telekom AG's responsibility in so-
ciety and responsibility towards its employees. 
"The Deutsche Telekom AG recognizes the elected body representing interests 
of the employees, including unions, in any global venture. 
"The Deutsche Telekom AG acts so that the company principles are taken up by 
the partners in the global ventures and are applied accordingly. This also means that 
the relations that are customary in Germany between employers and employees in all 
business areas and organizational departments in which the Deutsche Telekom AG 
works with global partners and their subsidiaries in Germany, are recognized and 
respected." 
The company principles of the Deutsche Telekom AG further states as follows 
in one paragraph: "All employees contribute to the success of the company. We are 
willing to perform and take on our responsibility. A special feature of good coopera-
tion is mutual give and take. The work has to be fairly compensated according to perfor-
mance. In its decision-making process our company takes into consideration the effects on 
its employees. We cooperate with the elected representatives on a basis of trust." 
Ladies and gentlemen, you probably all know that in the meantime the venture 
between Sprint Corporation, France Telecom, and Deutsche Telekom AG has been 
stipulated in a legally binding agreement and has been approved by the supervisory 
authorities of the United States and the European Union. In principle, we welcome 
this international cooperation. But on the other hand, we demand the acceptance of 
employee rights. 
This venture between these companies means that more than previously in the 
telecommunications field the principle of freedom of association laid down in the 
Constitution of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Agreements 87 
and 98 of the International Labor Organization have to be respected, even if these 
agreements have not yet been ratified by all member states of the International Labor 
Organization. The member states worldwide do support the control mechanisms of this 
special UN organization, especially regarding the principle of freedom of association. 
Thanks in no small part to the United States of America, social criteria, and also 
the rights to freedom of union association, are still on the agenda of the World Trade 
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Organization (WTO). The European Parliament as well as the competent bodies of 
the European Union support taking the International Labor Organization's stan-
dards more into consideration in developing foreign trade policy 
I am pleased to say that there is a worldwide international trend which sees the 
freedom of association of employees as an integral part of social standards. Not least 
the World Bank has pointed out in reports that in many countries union activities have 
contributed to the establishment of free and democratic structures. 
My union together with P T T I intends to make the "threefold declaration of 
principles on multinational companies and social policy" of the International Labor 
Organization an issue in the agreements between multinational telecommunications 
companies and their respective unions. 
Subparagraph 41 of this threefold declaration states under the heading 
"Freedom of Association and Right to Form Associations" among other things: "The 
employees of multinational and national companies should have the right indiscrimi-
nately without prior authorization to form an organization of their choice and to join 
such organizations, the only condition being the respect of its bylaws. Furthermore, 
the employees should be protected from all discriminatory treatments and against 
freedom of association in connection with their employment." 
Subparagraph 42 states: "In the areas of setup, actions, and administration, the 
organizations representing multinational companies or the employees of these compa-
nies have to receive adequate protection against interference from the other side, both 
for the organizations and for their representatives and members." 
These aforementioned regulations of the so-called threefold declaration of prin-
ciples on multinational companies and social policy are based on Agreements num-
bers 8 and 98 of the International Labor Organization. 
Subparagraph 44 of this threefold agreement states: "The governments are called 
upon to apply the principles laid down in Article 5 of Agreement No. 97 if they do not 
already do so, since it is important in connection with multinational companies that 
associations representing these companies or their employees can join international 
associations of employers and of employees of their choice." 
Today is a very important day for the development of workers' rights in the 
future also in the international sphere. The signal sent by this forum goes far beyond 
the United States. Thus, we welcome this kind of public forum because it contributes 
to show where the rights are infringed, where the workers' rights are violated, and it 
discusses this and it makes them public. 
The results and the outcome of this public forum will also be followed closely 
outside of the United States. And in my union but also in the media of the Federal 
Republic of Germany the actions of Sprint Corporation against its employees have 
attracted a lot of attention. Hence, we would greatly appreciate it if the authorities of 
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the United States of America continued to support their previous policy of social 
responsibility in the rules of the game as well as actions aimed at balancing relations 
between employers and unions. 
Thank you very much for your attention. 
MR. OTERO: Fraulein Altmeyer, Danke Schon. Thank you very much, Ms. 
Altmeyer, for your presentation. We appreciate you coming all the way from Germany 
to help us in this process. 
The next presenter is Mr. Jose Luis Mendoza, Legal Counsel for the Telephone 
Workers Union of the Republic of Mexico. 
Mr. Mendoza? 
And I would like to say at the same time that Mr. Mendoza is part of the Mexi-
can delegation to this event. 
MR. MENDOZA: ( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) First of all, I feel deeply com-
mitted for participating in this platform because as legal counsel for this union I was 
part of the procedures to bring all this into the open. 
The Telephone Workers Union of Mexico, faced with a severe violation of work-
ers' rights by Sprint and its subsidiary, La Conexion Familiar, based itself on the agree-
ment labor cooperation in order to submit its protests against this company that had 
dismissed over 200 employees because they had decided to exercise their freedom of 
association because these workers wanted to claim their right of collective bargaining 
with their employer. 
The doubts and concerns increased when we heard that throughout the United 
States there were 16,000 long distance operations or long distance workers who were 
not unionized either. NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, leads us 
to the fact that we have to confront new situations. It affects productivity systems. It 
affects organizational structures, it affects financial systems. Equally it affects com-
pany policies. 
These new ways of existence bring us vis-a-vis of certain structures of the orga-
nizations. We are being affected at all levels. The agreement on labor cooperation 
consistently with this evolution foresees in the way it is drafted and in its principles 
and obligations the way the situation could be regulated. You could think that under 
their protection North America could make progress and achieve these new ways of 
existing based on respect for basic workers' rights. 
The problem with Sprint can be analyzed from different points of view. From a 
legal point of view, we could arrive at the conclusion or at the analysis or ask ourselves 
if within the American legal system there is enough protection for the freedom of 
association and for the freedom of collective bargaining. We could also bring up the 
question of the procedural standards of the American legal system establishes proper 
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penalization when certain infringement has happened and how compensation of dam-
ages can be brought about. 
However, this would lead us away from the main issue. It would lead us away 
from those issues that are really transcendental. 
I respectfully disagree with my colleague Sergio Tapia. The problem that we're 
living is not a problem of the good guys and the bad guys. It is a problem of ignorant 
and weak ones. Weak ones, the workers. Ignorant, the management who has forgotten 
that there are new ways of existing, of structuring. Sprint with its behavior creates 
damages in at least three ways. It creates a social damage, it damages the workers, and 
it harms itself. 
Maybe the kind of management leadership, the destructive policy towards ev-
erything that has to do with unionization prevents the company from understanding 
that it's harming itself, that they do not realize that firing employees also bring about 
strong social economic and family hardship. 
We have heard the presentations of our colleagues that have been really moving 
and dramatic and this is a result of ignorance. 
The world of quality that is established or talked about in NAFTA and in the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation demands that certain principles 
and institutions are fulfilled and upheld. It demands for certain resources and instru-
ments to be implemented in a positive environment. 
With what aim? For the purpose that within this positive framework team work 
can take place, participation in leadership, good communication and motivation. 
We need to understand that within working procedures the human factor is of 
utmost importance and transcendental. The leaders who year after year meet in Swit-
zerland have stated that at the top of the pyramid in the companies should be the 
client. This point of view changed recendy, particularly at this international forum. 
Today, it is said that at the very top, at the very point, at the very tip of the pyramid the 
worker should be placed and it's very easy to understand and to explain how this 
change came about. 
Productivity and quality are a result of workers' efforts and there can be no 
productivity or quality in a negatively determined working environment. Changes 
that are brought about are harmful for society, for the company, for the worker, when 
these principles are not fulfilled. 
In the history of mankind, we have learned that unionism is a noble institution 
to defend the weak one. It is politically, legally, ethically, and philosophically defended 
and there is no doubt about it. 
When we analyze the different effects that have been brought about by Sprint's 
behavior, we find that there are caused just by one factor, by one reason, to avoid 
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unionization of workers, prevent them from defending their rights in a collective way. 
If we analyze the situation we are forced to reflect upon very basic elements such as 
management-labor relationships. 
The world over it is understood that these relationships are integrated by three 
elements: trade union, workers, and management. In Sprint, it is understood that 
labor relations represented by just the management and the pressure they exert on the 
workers. Whereas in the modern world we are finding out that workers should be at 
the top of the pyramid, at Sprint they say they should be at the very bottom, that their 
rights should be stomped and that not even the most basic conditions need to be 
fulfilled. 
We Mexican workers believe that the NAALC is a very good instrument to 
achieve its goals through its principles and it talks about situations through which we 
can bring about a change, a change where we can share wealth, a change where under 
the stewardship of workers and management we can create new living conditions for 
the world for the way work is performed. 
There are countries, for example, certain Asian countries, that have demon-
strated that if you give workers participation in decision making you can get excellent 
results. The lack of participation leads also to the lack of participating in solution of 
problems. We understand that by participating we satisfy a human need and we can 
solve problems that can exist within a company and we can arrive at more rational and 
more reasonable solutions. 
It is said the standards of international law lack efficiency because there are no 
coercive measures. In the case of the NAALC, we can see a really exceptional phe-
nomenon, an idea defined as the tool that will allow to wake labor conscious in North 
America where the outcries cannot be silenced by fear or oppression. 
Mexican workers, in particular telephone workers of Mexico, support decidedly 
the plight of the workers at Sprint, they show their empathy towards them and with 
their effort they have brought about the fact that they are being noticed in North 
America and that we all reflect upon these measures, considering that they harm com-
panies very severely, not only the workers involved. They affect negatively the society 
as a whole. 
The consequences of the NAALC also suggest us to be more daring, to be more 
bold. We can find means to assure that progress of humanity is through a well bal-
anced respect of workers' rights. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. OTERO: ( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) Thank you very much, Mr. 
Mendoza. 
The next presenter is a member of the Canadian tripartite delegation, speaking 
for the employer's side. 
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I ask Mr. Lawrence Bertuzzi to come to the podium. 
Mr. Bertuzzi is a partner in the law firm of Miller & Thompson. 
Mr. Bertuzzi. 
MR. BERTUZZI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
May I begin by thanking our hosts, the U.S. Department of Labor, for this kind 
invitation and I thank the head of our Canadian delegation, Mr. Edmondson, for 
including me in the delegation. 
I see that I will perform a rather unique function here today There are very few 
of us from the management side and I think they all got used up before lunch. I may 
be the only banner carrier for the afternoon, but nonetheless, let me address you from 
a Canadian perspective. 
Let me start by saying I am not here in any way, shape, or form to comment on 
the Sprint situation. It would be most inappropriate for me to do so and I will not pick 
up that particular baton. 
I understood the purpose of the forum to be to study the effects of the sudden 
closing of a plant on the principle of freedom of association and worker's right to 
organize. I would like to take the word sudden out for a moment and say to you that 
the closing of a plant on the principle of freedom of association and the worker's right 
to organize is in Canada a relatively straightforward matter. The word sudden compli-
cates it because it depends why. 
I hope to speak of three things during my brief 10 minutes. One is to tell you a 
bit about the Canadian law covering this top. Two is to make a pitch for what I call 
balance. I think balance is critical as we approach the task with each other. And the 
third is to comment on the procedure, if I might, Mr. Chairman. 
Firstly, under Canadian law, freedom of association and the right to organize 
unions of the employees' choosing is protected by every statute we have. As Mr. 
Edmondson said, we have 11 different labor statutes in Canada because we have 10 
provinces, similar to your states, and each of them have primary jurisdiction over most 
matters except those which have been deemed to be federal like intraprovincial trans-
port, telecommunications, et cetera. And for that, the federal government has thrown 
in their hat into the ring to create the 11th jurisdiction. 
Every jurisdiction clearly recognizes, as does our constitution, the right to orga-
nize a union of the employee's choice. In fact, in most jurisdictions in Canada, the 
right to select a union can be done even without a vote. The presentation of member-
ship cards of a certain amount, either 50 percent or 55 percent, in some jurisdictions 
more, will get a union organized, the union of the employees' choice, without a vote. 
Now, all jurisdictions, all 11 jurisdictions, prohibit taking actions or threats against 
employees because of union activity. I believe that the Canadian law may well go fur-
ther than the American law in this regard, Mr. Chairman, because as I understood it, 
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you have the Wright Line test which essentially says ask two questions: one, was there 
anti-union reason for the decision and, secondly, was there any good business reason 
for the decision. And then if the answer to each is yes, then balance them. 
The Canadian law in fact is less onerous on the unions and the employees than 
that. The test in Canada is was the decision motivated in any part by an anti-union 
motive. And, if so, if so, then the business interests may well have to take a back seat. 
The second major distinction is the employer, while in the U.S. as I understand 
it bearing the onus of proving the business rationale, the employer in Canada bears a 
reverse onus of proving that it did not have an anti-union animus. 
These are important distinctions but what the Canada law does and must con-
tinue to do even better is to attempt to put in a balance. We have a balance which in 
some respects comes from a sense of timing. It's not as good as it could be, but employ-
ers can decide to close or to relocate if that is not motivated by an anti-union animus. 
Sound economic reasons, capital decisions, location considerations, especially in 
this era of in Canada increasingly older workplaces which don't meet environmental 
or safety concerns, these are all legitimate reasons for moving a location or closing a 
location and are not banned by our labor laws, nor should they be banned by our labor 
laws, if they are not accompanied by an antiunion animus. 
Now, in many provinces, the scope of the union's jurisdiction is really only city 
or regionwide, so this right even can extend within only a few miles. And that is a right 
that they have in an attempt to have the balance in Canada and it's a right that seems 
to be working. 
The certification system in our countries is rare in the commercial contract world 
and it is my suggestion and submission that the right to locate on business consider-
ations, even if the impact is to deny union representation, is legitimate if it is not 
motivated by anti-union motivation. 
It is the flip side of the certification procedure. In the commercial contract world, 
there are very few situations where an employer is told this is the party with whom you 
must make your commercial contract and under Canadian law told even further and 
here are key elements that must be contained within that commercial contract. When 
I go to buy my product, I have a number of suppliers to choose from. When I go to 
pick my energy, I have alternate sources. But in labor, under the certification system, 
you have one bargaining party. And so the quid pro quo is certain rights to manage 
your business effectively to stay viable. 
Now, the collective agreement is in Canada pretty well the costliest commercial 
contract an employer signs. Of all the commercial contracts it enters into, it's the one 
that costs the most. And yet it is one of the few in which it has no choice with whom to 
bargain. 
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In Canada, we also have in most jurisdictions many mandatory provisions which 
I suggest give balance on the union side to the employer's right to move. For example, 
we have in most jurisdictions mandatory payment of union dues by every member of 
the bargaining unit, the very antithesis of your right-to-work states. 
We have mandatory first contract arbitration in jurisdictions covering far and 
away the majority of our workers. We have in two provinces the banning of temporary 
strike replacements and in pretty well every province the prohibiting of permanent 
strike replacements. 
So these are things that give leverage to the union side and things that tell me 
that I should continue to expose for a balance so that business can react accordingly in 
this environment. 
Now, in recognition of the balanced approach, labor boards look at things 
like timing of decisions. For example, a decision made suddenly in the face of an 
organizing campaign may well attract a different response from the labor board 
than a decision made during the course of a mature relationship or even a deci-
sion made during a strike when the union demands are such that they make the 
business uncompetitive. 
In one case, the realities have sent the labor board to say we must intervene. In 
the other cases they say we're all big players in a big market. When you exert your 
economic power as a union, you must do so within the context of realities and some-
times it doesn't work out that well. And employers have exactly the same difficult 
decisions to make. This is the balance that we must strive for. 
An employer chooses his location for a number of reasons. Location, transpor-
tation, energy, cost of money, government incentives, government restrictions, health 
costs, very important in Canada, skilled and available labor and the cost of that labor. 
So long as no anti-union motivation exists, it must be permitted to take those matters, 
all of those matters, into consideration in deciding where to locate or where to relocate. 
The availability, quality and cost of labor are factors which must be weighed with all 
the other factors, whether as between provinces in Canada or as between states in 
Mexico and the United States or as between our respective countries. If moves in the 
right direction in any factor drive investment away, the parties and the government 
must take heed. 
NAFTA is all about breaking down walls and recognizing our respective places 
in a bigger society, not about building walls to keep us in and others out. So, too, with 
our labor laws. 
Now, Mr. Chairman, the third point I wanted to comment on, and gently, I 
might add, is a bigger concern I have with the potential interference with the internal 
administrative and court mechanisms in a country. 
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In Canada, we have a system of labor relations boards, 11 to be exact, in each 
jurisdiction and they have primary jurisdiction to consider matters of certification and 
matters of unfair labor practice when employees lose their job. 
The matters have been removed from the court in first instance because of the 
recognition of the need for specialized, expert, independent tribunals to consider such 
issues. This has always been considered a positive development by both management 
and labor and it has been copied in a number of other areas in Canadian society. For 
example, environmental tribunals, real estate tribunals, et cetera. And those tribunals 
deal with their specialized matters, rather than the general court system. 
Now, the courts are still there. They ensure review, to ensure fairness, natural 
justice, due process and to make sure the tribunals stay within their own jurisdiction, 
so they have a role. 
I understand from my experience that the U.S. system, although distinct, is 
based on exactly the same principles. 
Now, in view of this, the NAOs and the ministries of labor must be careful not 
to interfere with this system as it progresses. Such action, I submit would be most 
unwelcome as the parties rely on these specialized tribunals for consistency, direction, 
certainty and finality 
Public international fora on the merits of an incident or the merits of the review 
process while it is in process must take care that it not detract from a tribunal's inde-
pendent and expert function. 
So I urge caution. External interference in a working review system, even if it 
has imperfections will only add to its imperfections and likely extend the delays. This 
is especially so where the system has a specialized review process. It should not be 
usurped by this process. 
In conclusion, let me say this. Bad facts invariably make bad law. It is a mistake 
to change the law because of an extreme case. That's the slippery slope to creating a set 
of laws and protections which makes a country uncompetitive, discourages new in-
vestment which, of course, is well beyond the arm of the law because it's not here yet. 
And ultimately does the greatest harm to those the law purportedly is created to pro-
tect, the workers and their jobs. 
There must be a balance. Violations when proven by due process require appro-
priate remedies but they do not require legal amendment which further restrict others 
who willingly comply with the law. 
In our workplace we sometimes joke about 95 percent of the rules are made to 
control 5 percent of the people. That should not be the principle in creating statutes. 
The statute should not be created to control the activities of 2 or 3 percent of the 
people. 
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Simply, as Mr. Anaya alluded to earlier, union organization is not a guarantee 
against normal economic decisions, whether they are good or bad from an employee's 
perspective. 
Union organization has a vital and essential role in the employer-employee rela-
tionship. In Canada, the role of unions are influential well beyond their 37 percent 
coverage. The healthy push-pull between business and labor in our country has pro-
duced much success but only when a balance is kept because when it gets out of 
balance we do not have success. 
Any analysis of the freedom of association and the right to organize must be 
seen in a realistic context which recognizes all the dynamics which go into running a 
business in the international marketplace. In Canada, we, and by that I mean busi-
ness, labor, and the government, must always be cognizant of that as we sit in such 
close proximity to our two much larger and attractive neighbors. 
Thank you for this opportunity to address you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you very much, Mr. Bertuzzi. 
I have some comments to make but before you leave, I wanted to ask you a 
question. I am cognizant of the fact that labor law in Canada by your own determina-
tion is a matter of the provinces, unlike the United States where we have a single 
application of the labor law. 
When you were alluding to the fact that the burden of proof on an employer in 
a contest for an election is to demonstrate that the employer had no anti-union bias, is 
this something that is applicable uniformly in Canada or were you speaking about one 
specific province? 
MR. BERTUZZI: No. I can't answer the question that it's applicable uniformly, 
although I suspect it is. I can tell you that it is the law which covers at least 65 to 70 
percent of the workers, because it is the law of Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, 
and the federal law and that would represent 65 percent or better of our workers. 
If there's an unfair labor practice charge laid against an employer, the onus is on 
the employer to prove that it did not commit an unfair labor practice. That's the check 
on one side and the rights go on the other side. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you very much. 
As you take your seat, I want to make some comments. First of all, I would like 
to thank you very much, Mr. Bertuzzi for bringing back the discussion to a broader 
picture of the impact that sudden closure of plants have on the freedom of association 
separating that from the instant case of Sprint which is what generated this forum in 
the first place. But that was the intent of the three countries in conducting this hear-
ing, was to look at the Sprint case, since it was the case that we.had before us, but also 
to broaden the inquiry to try to ascertain with a model of clarity what happens in 
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similar instances, not only in the United States but in the other two countries as well. 
And, in fact, we have, as I said before, tasked our labor secretariat in Dallas to under-
take an empirical study of this matter, looking not only at the Sprint case but going as 
far afield as the information will permit us. 
And so I thank you very much for refocusing the discussion of this afternoon. 
Ifou made a lot of very interesting points. 
I only want to assure you and the public here assembled that the United States 
and Mexico and Canada indeed in the process of conducting the ministerial consulta-
tions that were requested by the government of Mexico were extremely careful and 
cognizant of protecting the process. 
I would like to say for the record that shortly after Secretary of Labor Bonilla 
from Mexico requested ministerial consultation from Secretary Reich who prompdy 
accepted, at the time the judge of the NLRB had not rendered his decision and the 
parties, Mexico and the United States, agreed to suspend the ministerial consulta-
tions until the judge had concluded his analysis and rendered a decision so as not to 
give any appearance, however slight it may be, that this process that we were institut-
ing under the treaty had in any way any design to influence the outcome of that deci-
sion because we, like you, recognized the importance of separating this process on the 
two tracks. And so it was not until the judge in this case had rendered a decision that 
we decided then to proceed with the ministerial consultations and enter into an agree-
ment as to how we could deal with this problem without doing any harm. 
In fact, I would like to say also for the record that we were also very careful in 
consulting throughout the process with the NLRB itself to make sure that any of our 
steps did not in any way interfere because it would have been in reality improper for 
this process to have anything to do with that. This is being handled, as I said earlier, 
on two tracks. 
And so your caution is very well taken. We appreciate the fact that you thought 
about it and that you brought it to our attention, but at the same time, we have been 
extremely cognizant of our responsibility to protect the process because one case does 
not change the process, in our opinion. 
And I would like to say finally as another commentary, is that whatever maybe 
the result of these endeavors which our objective here is to find more specificity as to 
what impact this either closure, like you said, without the word sudden or sudden 
closures have on the principle of the right to organize and the freedom of association 
to which Mexico, Canada and the United States attach the greatest of importance, 
that is our objective here. 
And I think that you have made a significant contribution this afternoon by 
putting this discussion in the context that we thought from the very first moment, 
which was to look at the Sprint case, of course, but also look beyond at the entire 
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picture and you have been most helpful in your presentation and I want to thank you 
for doing so. 
Let me now recognize the next presenter. 
Mr. Philip C. Bowyer is the General Secretary of the Postal, Telephone and 
Telegraph International known as PTTI which is one of the 14 international trade 
secretariats associated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and 
Mr. Bowyer has come from Europe. We also thank him very much for crossing the 
Atlantic to be here with us today. 
Mr. Bowyer. 
MR. BOWYER: Thank you very much. 
Mr. Chairman, as you said, I am the General Secretary of the Postal, Telegraph 
and Telephone International, the PTTI , to which various colleagues have referred to 
earlier. The PTTI represents 4.6 million workers in 22 affiliated trade unions in 117 
countries of the world who work in the communication industries. 
I would like to begin by first commending the Mexico Secretary of Labor and 
the U.S. Secretary of Labor for their decision to initiate this public forum on the 
closure of La Conexion Familiar. And I would like also to thank you for presiding 
over this forum and for allowing me to share the views of the P T T I and its affiliates 
around the world concerning this case and the question of freedom of association. 
As you said, the PTTI cooperates with the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions. Within the European Union, which is probably the largest trading 
block in the world, we represent telecom workers. Also, and I think more relevant to 
this particular hearing, we participate in the activities of the Trade Union Advisory 
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
OECD. And we are also active within the ILO, the International Labor Office. 
Now, in particular, the latter two organizations have a great deal of work, have 
done a great deal of work in connection with the question of freedom of association 
and, of course, the United States of America is a member of both of these organiza-
tions and we believe has certain obligations to try and implement the standards which 
those organizations make. 
We think, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that given our activities we are in the PTTI 
well positioned to try and place the sudden closure of Sprint/La Conexion Familiar 
within a global context. 
We do believe that the U.S. Government must now face the responsibility that 
comes from liberalized trade and a more open scrutiny of practices in enforcing trade 
union rights in the U.S.A. and we are very clearly interested in the practical outcome 
of these proceedings. 
Throughout most of the world, the telecommunications industry has had one of 
the highest unionization rates of any industry. It's a highly profitable industry; it's 
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characterized by continuous innovation, high productivity, and a highly skilled work 
force. 
It's also a key industry in the development of trade and for the strengthening of 
democracy. And here in the United States, the telecommunications and information 
industries hold the promise of creating more and better jobs. 
The fact that telecommunication workers enjoy relatively high standards of liv-
ing we do not think is an accident or an achievement of benevolent employers. It is the 
legacy of this high unionization rate. But we also recognize that over the past 10 to 15 
years we have undergone extremely rapid change. 
Competition and liberalization in the sector as the result of liberalized trade 
have propelled an economic war with giant multinational companies buying each other 
out as they try to win part of the market. And, of course, U.S. telecommunications 
companies with some $170 billion of revenue at their disposal are amongst the most 
aggressive players in this economic battle. 
And for us there is clearly a social dimension to this war because when compa-
nies penetrate a foreign market, generally they also take with them their labor relations 
practices and, of course, Sprint is one of those companies and that is why we are so 
concerned about this particular case, because it can affect our members wherever they 
might be working in the world and wherever Sprint decides that it wants to be active 
in the future. 
Telecommunications around the world, I must say, are determined to ensure 
that Sprint respects its workers' right to freedom of association and to bargain collec-
tively and they are determined that the company will not be successful in undermining 
their right to a decent standard of living. These rights are embodied in the conven-
tions of the International Labor Organization, of which the U.S.A. is a member, and 
they are referred to in Annex 1 of the North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion. And the P T T I has been cooperating with our colleagues in the Communications 
Workers of America and with the Union of Telephone Workers in Mexico to try to 
ensure that Sprint is in compliance with these internationally recognized principles of 
labor law. 
And, Mr. Chairman, I will submit in writing an analysis of the relevant interna-
tional standards, particularly of the ILO and of the OECD, the ways in which the 
actions of Sprint have violated these standards and also the ways in which the U.S.A. 
has failed to implement its obligation under those standards. 
We in the international trade union movement were shocked to hear that Sprint 
had closed La Conexion Familiar only days before a scheduled union election. Since 
then, Sprint was found guilty of committing over 50 violations of the U.S. Labor 
Code, Sprint has been permission by the U.S. Government and by the European 
Union, to enter into a multi-billion dollar alliance with France Telecom and German 
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Telekom, the project known as ATLAS, but in the meantime 235 Latino workers 
faced a loss of income, the uncertainty of finding other jobs and, in many cases, having 
to uproot their families from the communities in which they lived. And in these cir-
cumstances, it would be hardly surprising if they have lost faith in the ability of the 
U.S. government as the guarantor of their rights as workers and as citizens to form a 
trade union. 
As an international observer, the Sprint case in my view is one of, if not the most, 
outrageous examples of the violation of workers' rights to form a union to occur in our 
industry worldwide. Even more shocking for us is the fact that the entire law enforce-
ment apparatus of the U.S. government, and even of the U.S. federal court systems, 
have proven inadequate or unwilling to either prevent or to remedy the flagrant viola-
tion of basic trade union rights by Sprint. 
The company's actions against these 235 Latino workers would be considered 
morally reprehensible, socially intolerable, and most certainly illegal in many other 
industrialized countries. As we have heard from spokesmen today, in Canada, the 
labor code would have facilitated recognition of a trade union based on a simple re-
view of employees' legal signatures. 
In Europe, under the treaty and the directives established by the European Union, 
all member states are obliged to enact legislation strictly regulating collective dismiss-
als. For example, the European Court of Justice, one of those special institutions of 
the European Union which don't exist under the NAFTA agreement, but the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in a case against the United Kingdom confirmed the following 
principles: 
They confirmed that governments must require an employer contemplating col-
lective dismissals to consult the workers' representatives with a view to reaching an 
agreement. 
Even more important, they confirmed that governments must provide for the 
designation of employee representatives even where an employer does not agree to 
this. 
And, finally, they say that governments must provide for effective sanctions in 
the event of a failure to consult workers' representatives. 
In other countries in the region, in Europe, in countries such as the Scandina-
vian countries or the country in which I live, Switzerland, Sprint would have been 
obliged to recognize industrywide agreements on working conditions. 
Now, our view of the inadequacy of the U.S. labor code to deal with such cases 
is shared by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
In its 1995 Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights•, the I C F T U concludes that 
in the United States, "Workers often have no effective redress in the face of abuses by 
employers. Inadequate remedies available to workers who have been fired illegally for 
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trade union activity and ineffective penalties against employers who illegally fire them 
place severe obstacles in the path of workers seeking to join trade unions." 
According to the ICFTU survey, at least 1 in 10 union supporters campaigning 
to form a union is illegally fired and 1 union supporter is fired for every 30 people who 
vote for a union in union elections. 
The I C F T U also quotes a poll conducted in 1994 which found that 79 percent 
of all Americans believe that workers are likely to get fired if they try to organize a 
union at their place of work. 
And, finally, the ICFTU concluded that the example of La Conexion Familiar 
was one of the most blatant illegal actions in 1994. 
The cumulative effects of this anti-union behavior on the part of employers in 
the U.S.A. is nothing but shocking. While thousands of workers are fired every year 
during,union organizing drives, the U.S. government can take years to make deci-
sions on illegal firings and anywhere from 3 months to 3 years to effectively conduct 
union representation elections. 
And, finally, as the Sprint case demonstrated, employers in the United States 
appear to have the ultimate weapon at their disposal, which is to close the facility all 
together in order to avoid unionization without any fear of effective sanctions being 
taken against them. 
Now, in the written analysis which I said I would submit, after looking at the 
conventions of the International Labor Organization, it must be said that even if one 
could accept Sprint's extremely improbable economic necessity argument, then the 
company's conduct would still be incompatible with the international recognized stan-
dards of the ILO of which the U.S.A. is a member. 
To Sprint, the cost of breaking the law has been negligible, but 19 months after 
the closure those workers remain fired and the company is still bidding for govern-
ment contracts. In our view, this indicates that the U.S. labor code and its enforce-
ment mechanisms need to be overhauled in the most pressing manner and in full 
consultation with the trade union movement. 
I agree with the president of CWA, President Bahr, that Annex 1 of the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation contains all the necessary objectives. 
However, the aggressive anti-union behavior of companies like Sprint show that we 
need to add strong economic sanctions to prevent companies from closing down fa-
cilities and shattering workers' lives under the guise of global competition. 
The PTTI believes that the violations of their rights that workers suffer in the 
United States must be prevented by the introduction of the Code of Conduct that 
President Bahr and STRM General Secretary Francisco Hernandez Juarez outlined 
during their testimony, which is based on the principles of the ILO and the other 
international institutions of which the United States is a member. 
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It's our expectation that this recommendation should be given full consideration 
as the NAO considers steps to be taken as a result of this examination. 
In my view, and also that of many other observers, the NAO investigation must 
ensure that the practical outcome goes far beyond an intellectual exercise on the inner 
working of U.S. labor laws. 
Mr. Chairman, what began for us in the PTTI as a simple exercise in interna-
tional solidarity with our colleagues in the C WA has grown into a campaign with a life 
of its own. Telecommunications workers around the world are taking the initiative and 
opposing entry of Sprint and its brand of anti-union practices into their countries. Just 
since 1993, workers in the United Kingdom, France, German, Mexico, Canada, Por-
tugal, Brazil, and Nicaragua, to name a few, have acted to oppose Sprint's anti-union 
activities. 
In fact, I've heard just recently that Sprint is about to bid for a part of the priva-
tized telecommunications in Nicaragua and our affiliate in Nicaragua will be oppos-
ing that and they will be supported by the PTTI and our affiliates around the world. 
Mr. Chairman, the lives of more than 200 workers, most of them women, were 
shattered in an instant simply because they were determined to exercise their right to 
freedom of association, to speak collectively through their union, and to negotiate 
their way out of injustice. Until this is resolved, the PTTI and its affiliates will con-
tinue to undertake whatever actions are necessary to deny Sprint Corporation entry 
into other telecommunications markets and we will do whatever is necessary to ensure 
that Sprint is brought into full compliance with internationally accepted standards. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Mr. Bowyer, thank you very much indeed for your presentation 
and for coming all the way from Europe to be with us. We share your interest in the 
practical outcome of these proceedings and, of course, we welcome your offer to pro-
vide us with analysis of the ILO and the OECD standards that may have been in-
volved in this case. 
I think I feel compelled to say that shortly after President Clinton was installed 
in office in consultation with Secretary Reich we proceeded to install the so-called 
Dunlap Commission, fully aware that American labor law is in need of some re-ex-
amination and revamping. And the Dunlap commission has labored long and hard 
with the participation of several former Secretaries of Labor from both political par-
ties, I might say, as well as representatives of the AFL-CIO and representatives of the 
business community. And the Dunlap report has been recently completed and for-
warded to the White House for presentation to Congress. 
Of course, at the present time, the climate for labor law reform in the United 
States is not entirely conducive to success and so I believe that their report itself is 
worth reading for those of you who may not be familiar with that effort because it 
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offers significant changes to expedite the process and to make it easier for both em-
ployers and workers to have a more expeditious process of settling these disputes and, 
of course, making the organizing of workers more in tune with the ILO standards. 
But I appreciate very much your offer to give us an analysis of the ILO and the 
OECD standard from your perspective and I will ask you that you kindly forward 
that to our office in the Department of Labor in Washington, D.C. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Bowyer. 
At this point now, I would like to call on another presenter, Ms. Marie Malliett. 
If I am not pronouncing your name correctly, please, I apologize. The president of 
Local 9410 of the Communications Workers of America, CWA, AFL-CIO. 
Ms. Malliett. Good afternoon. 
MS. MALLIETT: Good afternoon. 
My name is Marie Malliett and I am the president of Local 9410 of the Com-
munications Workers of America located here in San Francisco. My local provided 
the support and assistance to the workers of La Conexion Familiar in their organizing 
drive. 
My local was privileged to observe the tremendous worker solidarity and re-
solve to unionize their workplace. In a little more than 4 months, the La Conexion 
workers came within 1 week of achieving what no other workers in Sprint's long dis-
tance division had been able to accomplish. We observed this worker solidarity on a 
daily basis. By pure chance, the La Conexion Familiar moved into a building right 
next to our local union in 1993. It didn't take long for the La Conexion workers to 
hear about CWA and, in fact, the workers made contact with us in February of 1994. 
From that point on, the Sprint workers held regular, daily meetings in our union 
hall. They came before reporting to work, during their breaks, during lunch hours, 
and after work. They asked us a million questions about how to change their working 
conditions at Sprint and how to organize themselves into a union. They really became 
part of our local family. 
We shared with them the day-to-day painstaking tasks of building an organiza-
tion and the exhilaration of imminent success. 
We soon recognized that an overwhelming majority of the Sprint workers wanted 
a union. I have been through many organizing drives and we do not evaluate lightly 
the potential of a drive nor the timing of an election. I have always been aware of the 
risks that workers face in organizing and I am especially aware in today's current 
environment of a tax on workers' rights and particularly Sprint, which has an anti-
union corporate culture. 
During the organizing campaign, we assessed very carefully the business condi-
tions at La Conexion and Sprint, the company's anti-union campaign, the strength 
and resolve of the workers to overcome these incredible odds. 
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At every turn we concluded that these workers were committed to unionize the 
workplace. Based on these assessments we filed for an election with the National La-
bor Relations Board on June 3, 1994. The NLRB subsequently set the date for an 
election on July 22, 1994. 
Management itself confirmed our estimate of La Conexion/Sprint's prospects. 
In one of Sprint's own employee newsletters, it reported in the June 1994 issue, and I 
have provided it in an exhibit for you, just 1 month before the closure that, and I 
quote, "La Conexion Familiar is different than other carriers and very successful.... 
Using the grass roots strategy in conjunction with the power of Sprint's Marketing 
and Operator Groups, La Conexion has grown at an astounding rate in the last three 
years because it has targeted cities with large Spanish speaking populations." 
Other statements by Sprint management also confirm that La Conexion was 
financially prospering. 
During the last weeks of the campaign I devoted myself full-time to the drive. I 
participated in daily meetings and made home visits to the workers. Based on this 
intimate knowledge of the campaign and 70 percent of the workers who had signed 
their name to the petition for an election, I can tell you with absolute confidence and 
certainty that the union would have prevailed in the July 22nd NLRB election. 
On July 12th, I was informed by our national union staff that Sprint Vice Presi-
dent of Labor Relations, Carl Doerr, had requested to meet with CWA in San Fran-
cisco on July 14th. I attended the meeting, which was held at our district office in 
Burlingame. As I and other CWA representatives were waiting for Mr. Doerr to 
arrive, we received a telephone call from my local. We were told that a Sprint worker 
had just reported that Sprint had shut down La Conexion and it was shut down effec-
tively immediately. 
When he arrived for the scheduled meeting, Mr. Doerr confirmed the announce-
ment. As Mr. Doerr spoke, never as a union representative have I heard a corporate 
executive trash the integrity of his employees at the very same time that he was throw-
ing them into the street. He said, and I quote, that La Conexion workers only spoke 
"Hispanic," that they were all "illegal immigrants" who had "bought" their $7.00 an 
hour jobs. To find out later that this same executive was deeply involved in a con-
spiracy to submit evidence to an agency of the federal government only added more 
insult. 
The workers took the announcement very hard and so did I. Nothing could 
have prepared us for the suddenness nor the brutality of the mass execution. Upon 
hearing the brutal announcement over loudspeakers, workers burst into tears. One 
woman fainted and paramedics had to be summoned. The workers were told to im-
mediately gather their things and leave the building. As they left, Sprint security 
searched all their belongings and in some cases, workers were bodily searched. 
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As you can imagine, my local became a second home for many of these workers. 
We worked very hard to document their legal case against Sprint to ensure that work-
ers received the social services that they were entitled to and to supplement the wholly 
inadequate training and outplacement services provided by Sprint. 
We continued to hold regular meetings with the workers to keep them informed. 
We organized a food bank. We worked with them to take their case to the public. We 
held an all night vigil in San Francisco to make the public aware of Sprint's anti-
union/anti-worker philosophy. And we took our case home to the Latino community 
and to the Latino businesses that Sprint had been courting. 
We took their case to our local elected representatives of the San Francisco Board 
of Supervisors, to members of Congress, and to you, our elected federal officials. 
Through it all, the workers have shown amazing stamina. In spite of their un-
employment and the burden that places on their family, they have kept up the fight. 
What they can't understand is why it's taking so long to get a remedy from Sprint. 
Why do these workers have to pay the price of months and years of waiting? 
Why is it taking so long to get justice? 
I try to give them hope. I tell them that we will get justice, Sprint will be forced 
to pay for what they have done. But in my mind I wonder how long will it take, what 
will it take? Ifcu see, to me there is a very fundamental issue at stake. The Constitution 
of the United States guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of association; there-
fore, it logically follows the freedom to organize and become members of a union. 
However, Sprint in this country has been allowed to place themselves above the law. 
They fired the 177 La Conexion workers because they had dared to exercise their 
lawful rights to unionize their workplace. 
You would have had to have lived through this organizing campaign with me to 
understand the human fallout of illegal corporate behavior and the inability of our 
political system and our legal system to stop Sprint. From this entire experience, I am 
a changed person. 
Sprint didn't suffer at all. The same day they shut down La Conexion they mailed 
out a notice in Spanish to all La Conexion customers with the heading "Good News." 
They promised better service, $100 of free calls, lower rates, and a calling card. And 
to this day, Sprint continues to market its services to the Spanish-speaking commu-
nity. La Conexion became the first runaway shop on the new information highway and 
Sprint's customers were never told about the more than 50 violations of the federal 
laws which it had committed against its employees. 
The workers of La Conexion did what they had to do. They believed in the 
American dream, they believed in the rule of law, and they acted upon it. 
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Now, it's time for you, our elected representatives, to act upon what you have 
learned from this tragic experience. This forum is the first national opportunity these 
workers have had to state their case to the public. 
On behalf of all the La Conexion Sprint workers, I want to personally thank 
your brothers from the Mexico Telephone Workers Union for making this all pos-
sible. We hope the results of this forum will match its promise, so that other workers 
will not have to relive the trauma which befell the workers of La Conexion Familiar. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you very much, Ms. Malliett. 
By agreement between the next scheduled speaker and the last speaker on the 
list, we are going to switch the order because Mr. del Campo has a problem of child 
care and he has to go home by 4:00. 
Let me introduce formally Frank Martin del Campo, President of the San Fran-
cisco Chapter of the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement. 
Mr. del Campo. 
MR. DEL CAMPO: Muchas gracias, Jack, y Jaime. 
The issue of responsibility I will touch on today and I am very pleased to be able 
to have the support of my associates in LCLAA in being able to secure my own 
personal responsibility with respect to child care. 
I will offer my words in both English and Spanish, which will reflect the bina-
tional perspective of those of us who have the great fortune of having lived in two 
wonderful countries. 
( T H R O U G H INTERPRETER) First of all, I will speak in English and 
then in Spanish. Addressing the topics that we have discussed today on labor organi-
zation, I will offer some remarks trying to focus on workers' organizations in our 
countries of origin and also in this country. As a Mexican and as a Latin American, I 
would say that in this country, we have many millions, many million colleagues work-
ing here, seeking dignity. 
I come from a family that has a lot of pride. We are in Jalisco, in Guadalajara, 
there is a town called Ameca. On the way to Ameca, halfway through, there is a farm 
called Encalison. On this farm, my parents and my relatives have lived for 100 years. 
Recently, I went back to Ameca because there is no country like Mexico and all of us 
Mexicans go back to Mexico and in talking with my relatives, it was said that all my 
childhood friends, all of the people that I grew up with, summer after summer, year 
after year, none of us, none of us stayed in Ameca. Nobody, I repeat, stayed in Ameca. 
(IN ENGLISH) In many ways, we did not decide to leave Ameca. In many 
ways, although we as people in our family made the decisions personally, the decisions 
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that were made that had an entire town leave Ameca, Jalisco had more to do in the 
boardrooms of New York City and San Francisco, and in some regards, perhaps, in 
some regards, perhaps, in other countries of the world. 
But really these decisions that were made for us affected us much deeper than 
anyone else. Effectively, it is the central point of my offering today that the transnational 
who make decisions in New York and San Francisco have dominated the political 
decision making of all three countries. 
The irony of this particular case is, of course, that this particular company makes 
its living off of the separation of our families. The very process of immigration and 
our need to stay in touch with our families was the endeavor which united the companera 
La Conexion Familiar. 
In many ways, however, we remain the recipients of these decisions. The move-
ment toward the global economy and the corresponding decisions around privatization 
and layoffs are the results of the political and economic dominance of a few that affect 
all of our countries. 
Let's talk about the waves of immigration. 
My father came to this country looking for opportunity. Those who come to this 
country now are looking for survival and escape from repression in their countries of 
origin. The circumstances of that have a lot to do with the domination that I have 
described. 
What have the recent immigrants found? Speaking as a Latino workers, they 
find an environment of 1800 that denies them the very right to exist, incarcerates them 
in a prison of subemployment for the rest of their lives. They find a climate of retreat 
on affirmative action that deprives not only them but their children of the very fact of 
education which in my case it was employment and education which was the path to 
the middle class and it's now currently being deprived. 
These decisions around moving from La Conexion Familiar can be hidden be-
hind a very nice trapping of legal argument. Fundamentally for the workers of La 
Conexion Familiar to whom I am privileged to be with here today, what we have is a 
case that has been described as to what the outcome is, alcoholism, difficulty with your 
children, et cetera. They pay the price. 
In many ways, many of us here in the labor movement have examined the lack of 
enforcement of labor laws and the illegal process ad infinitum which means we are 
effectively disenfranchised of our rights and it's a sad reflection on the U.S. labor laws 
today that we search for ways around them rather than submitting to them, that in 
SEIU and many other unions of this country we reject the NLRB. We think it's a 
trap and what we look for is to find justice in the workplace, evading that trap which is 
an employer-dominated trap for us. 
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To conclude, I believe that there should be concrete recommendations offered 
here today and I would respectfully offer the following: 
Strengthen NAFTA and put some teeth into it so that rather than informational 
gathering here that we have a court where we can have sanctions to protect the em-
ployees from La Conexion Familiar. 
With respect to the question of Latino workers in this country stop the racist 
immigrant bashing which encourages the denial of their rights and the racism that 
they exhibited on their final day of employment which denied them their language, 
their culture, and their heritage. 
For the United States government from whom I have learned much and can 
thank for my education on the GI bill, I would submit respect the political decisions 
of other countries. Treat other countries as a cooperative arrangement and not one of 
domination and respect their political decisions with respect to the directions to which 
those countries wish to go. 
There must be cooperation, not domination, internationally and in the absence 
of that, in the absence of incorporation of the various sectors of society, we will always 
have disputes. 
Two last comments. 
With respect to Mexico and the country to which I have my most affinity given 
my cultural upbringing and the way in which I was raised, I would respectfully offer 
that perhaps you might resolve the question of Ruta Cien in Mexico to find a resolu-
tion through a negotiation. 
I'll conclude my remarks in the following way 
For those of us in U.S. trade union movement who have knowledge of Latin 
American unions, we know we will never go back to the days of Lazero Cartinas and 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Nor are we attempting to. However, the principles that 
were involved in both of those governments in a historic period, that workers 
should be included, respected, and find dignity in the process of their own labor 
and that their rights must be respected should be incorporated and that the lack 
of balance that we find today is because workers do not have the same rights as 
those who employ them and there is this disequilibrium, we will continue to have 
the problems that we face until such time as we address the problem of disequilib-
rium between those forces that employ us and those forces who are employed at 
the workplace. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you very much, Mr. del Campo. 
The next presenter is a member of the Canadian tripartite delegation speaking 
for the Canadian labor movement. 
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I would like to invite Mr. Dick Martin, Secretary-Treasurer of the Canadian 
Labour Congress, CLC, to come forward. 
Mr. Martin. 
MR. MARTIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
Perhaps before I just proceed, I should for the information of the delegates here 
explain that the Canadian Labour Congress is the major central labor body in Canada 
and represents some 82 affiliated unions and 2.3 million members. 
My role in the congress as secretary-treasurer amongst other administrative 
matters is responsibility for Latin America in terms of all issues, including human 
rights, trade union rights, economic matters, and, of course, issues circulating around 
NAFTA. 
I want to pay, first of all, my personal regards to the workers of Sprint who have 
testified here today and certainly educated me as to what had happened in your situa-
tion. You have courage, I know, to even come here and speak out. 
I also want to complement Francisco Hernandez Juarez, the president of the 
Mexican telephone workers, on his determination and courage to insist on laying these 
complaints and then coming here to testify in particular in view of his comments this 
morning that it was certainly suggested that he not come here and put his views forward. 
I also want to pay my regards to the leadership in terms of the Secretary of 
Labor, Robert Reich, and to Jack Otero for holding these hearings because at least in 
spite of the criticism that will follow from me at least it allows the workers here in this 
city and in this state and perhaps across the country to air their grievances and it also 
allows the representatives of the working people of the United States and Canada and 
Mexico to put their opinions forward. And so I think from that extent it's beneficial and 
I do know that the department has taken some risk in order to have these hearings. 
When we look at what has happened here, I think you should know that the 
Canadian Labour Congress strongly opposed NAFTA along with the AFL-CIO in 
the United States, for a great number of the reasons that we are here today. 
We were very, very concerned that this was going to have a major push, a down-
ward effect on the standards that we enjoy in terms of Canada both in terms of labor 
legislation but ancillary legislation that is very important to us, such as occupational 
health and safety, workers compensation and, indeed, our social programs. 
Of course, we were considerably worried that there was going to be a dramatic 
loss of jobs, simply because the discrepancies and differences between the three coun-
tries. 
In a report that has been put together by us, it goes on to talk about, and this was 
a joint report of which the AFL-CIO and a number of community action groups in 
the United States and Canada put together, we talked about the U.S. firms that break 
promises in both Canada and the United States. 
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Large corporations made sweeping predictions that free trade would enable them 
to hire more workers. Studies conducted in both countries indicate that just the oppo-
site has occurred. 
A U.S. consumer organization, Public Citizens, followed up on the jobs prom-
ise of about 80 pro-NAFTA companies. In nearly 90 percent of the cases surveyed, 
the companies had made no significant steps toward fulfilling their promises of U.S. 
job creation or export expansion. 
In fact, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, a number of leading NAFTA 
promoters have laid off U.S. workers as the result of NAFTA, such as Allied Signal, 
General Electric, Proctor & Gamble, Mattel, Scott Paper, Xerox, Baxter Interna-
tional, Alcoa, and Zenith. 
Likewise in Canada, most of the corporations which promised to create more 
jobs if the Canadian U.S. Free Trade Agreement known as FTA was signed have 
instead destroyed hundreds of thousands of jobs. The Canadian Center for Policy 
Alternatives has monitored 48 of the country's largest corporations and found that 37 
of them have slashed more than 215,000 jobs since the FTA passed in 1988. The 
other 11 companies created only 11,993 jobs. All of the firms are members of a pow-
erful business council on national issues in Canada which lobbied strongly for the 
FTA and NAFTA. 
Throughout Canada and the United States there is now, and indeed I will cor-
roborate that which Mr. Edmondson talked about this morning that we do have in 
relative terms a good record of certification, applications and certifications, in Canada 
relative to the United States and certainly it seems up here Mexico. But that does not 
mean that there are very, very strong interests, and in fact some provincial govern-
ments in Canada have stepped substantially backwards in terms of a number of laws 
that are very important to workers in our country and certainly this happens in the 
United States. 
They have stripped away or are attempting to strip away the enforcement power 
in the U.S., OSHA, and, indeed, in provincial legislation in Canada, occupational 
health and safety legislation. There are attempts to legalize company unions, abolish 
overtime pay, outlaw corporate campaigns targeting company's lenders, suppliers, or 
customers for picketing or other actions, reduce workers compensation, outlaw union 
shops, and repeal laws that guarantee prevailing wages for construction workers on 
federally funded projects. That is just the beginning. 
What we as labor have to understand and those that are in the general commu-
nity have to understand is that the corporate world is not created nor exists nor contin-
ues to exist to make anything better for anyone except to generate profits. That's what 
they're created for, profits for the shareholders, and indeed give CEOs some very big 
paychecks. 
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Private corporations are not created nor do they exist to enhance or sustain social 
programs. They are not created to enhance the environment or make sure workers 
have clean and healthy working conditions. They are not created by individuals to 
enhance the betterment of the state or create a new era of health, prosperity or peace. 
They are created, as I simply said, to create dividends and increase their share 
prices for shareholders. 
The concept of being a good corporate citizen is alien to their creation and on-
going operations. If being a good employer and good corporate citizen is beneficial to 
their bottom line, then smart management will do it. But also we do not necessarily 
have a lot of smart management. 
Consequently, they use confrontational, legal, bullying, and threatening ways to 
meet their bottom line of increasing profits. The corporate group, U.S.A. and NAFTA, 
for example, proclaimed that NAFTA itself will improve working conditions by gen-
erating economic growth which will enable all three countries to provide more jobs 
with higher pay and a better working environment. There is not one shred of evidence 
that NAFTA has done that. 
For example, in the United States and Canada, whipsaw bargaining is taking 
place, where a corporation threatens to shift production to Mexico unless unions agree 
to concessions. There abounds all kinds of examples of this. There is whipsaw legisla-
tion. For example, when President Clinton proposed an increase in the U.S. mini-
mum wage, Newt Gingrich and his gang of Contract of America fought back by 
arguing that this would force more U.S. firms to move to Mexico. 
Although Mr. Edmondson talked of success rates of Canadian unions obtain-
ing certification, and he is right, we are haunted by the specter that if a law is so 
weighted in the U.S. and in Mexico against workers organizing, we shall eventually 
be at those dismal statistics. 
It is ironic, I find, in a country like the U.S. that has probably more elections for 
anything than any of the other countries, certainly in terms of obtaining and sustain-
ing a public position, that the will of the majority right down to the very bottom in 
terms of election for dog catcher or sheriff must be sustained at the same time that 
when workers try to organize by a majority vote they are thwarted at every turn. They 
seem to be harassed, intimidated, fired, sometimes beaten, sometimes jailed. And that s 
from their colleagues in the United States. Democracy for all things, but not for workers 
who want a union. 
With all due respect to my American friends here, the United States, as has been 
repeated before, needs a complete overhaul of its labor laws and enforcement of its 
labor laws. 
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A previous speaker from Mexico spoke of employers becoming nervous if a new 
trade union comes into their company that they don't know or can't control, a union 
that won't impose discipline and order. With all due respect to my colleague, Mexico 
has signed more ILO conventions than either the United States or Canada and in-
deed has obeyed the least in our opinion. 
The United States and Canada should be castigated for not having signed more 
and not enforcing many of their provisions, but nevertheless the record stands for itself 
Quite bluntly, it is not the business of the company to approve or disapprove of 
a union the workers choose. As long as the workers democratically choose their union, 
their officers and approve or disapprove collective agreements, it is their business and 
no one else's. 
We are fed up. We are very fed up with corporations saying to government, 
"Don't intervene in our business but intervene in the rights of the workers." 
We demand as the Canadian Labour Congress that NAFTA and new trade 
agreements implement social charters that address and enforce basic human rights or 
our opinion will be of little value and the workers and citizens of all our countries will 
be the worse off for it and a very small top elite will be very much more wealthy. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you, Mr. Martin, "ibur remarks are well taken and I appre-
ciate it. 
The Chair now calls Ms. Janice Wood, Vice President of District 9, Communi-
cations Workers of America, CWA, AFL-CIO. 
Ms. Wood? 
MS. WOOD: Thank you, Mr. Otero. As you said, my name is Janice Wood. I am 
vice president of CWA District 9, which covers in part the states of California and 
Nevada. CWA represents 56,000 union members in these two states who work in 
telecommunications, broadcasting, publishing, the public sector, and other fields. 
I have some brief prepared remarks which I'll turn to in a moment, but I did 
want to comment briefly, if I may, on some things that I heard here today. 
There were three speakers who to my ears seemed to defend the actions of the 
Sprint Corporation and each of them said something that I found very interesting. 
There was Professor Corrada who said that the Wright Line standard gave Sprint the 
right to do what they did at La Conexion Familiar because they had dual motives, one 
of union animus and a second of financial interest. But we believe that that's just not 
the case, that there was a single motive for the closing of La Conexion Familiar and 
that motive was anti-union behavior. 
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Never was there any discussion, indication, or intimation of non-profitability of 
LCF until that issue was raised as a shield against the charges brought by the CWA 
and the workers at L C F against the Sprint company. 
And, Mr. Anaya, I believe that I understood you to say that collection bargain-
ing should be a demonstration of goodwill and cooperation, and I would agree with 
that. 
But, frankly, sir, the obstacles to organizing non-union workers in the United 
States are so enormous that it is nearly impossible to unionize workers at any company 
where an employer is willing to show even the smallest demonstration of goodwill or 
cooperation with its own workers. 
And Mr. Tapia said that it seemed that we were attempting to create an impres-
sion of good guys versus bad guys and he reminded us of the right of employers to 
close non-profitable businesses. We don't have to prove who the bad guys are. That 
proof has already been made in federal court. The bad guys are Sprint. They were 
found guilty of 50 different violations of federal labor laws. 
They may have the right, they may have the right to close a non-profitable busi-
ness, but that isn't what they did. They closed L C F and moved the work, the custom-
ers and the profits to other facilities in the Sprint Corporation, after they assured the 
workers at L C F that they were profitable, that Sprint benefited from their labor, after 
they spent tens of thousands of dollars to remodel the office of the manager who 
directed the threats against employees at L C F just a couple of months before the 
facility closed. 
If finances were the issue in the closing of LCF, why in God's name would 
Sprint have paid every worker there the equivalent of 60 days' pay for no work at all? 
Why would L C F not have stayed open so that people could continue to work profit-
ably for Sprint Corporation until the 60-day notice period had passed? 
Because L C F did just what they said they'd do. They threatened to close the 
facility if people wanted a union and they did it. 
The problem, however, is not that the La Conexion Familiar closed. The prob-
lem is that there are thousands of American employers who can and who will do the 
same thing, that it is the very industry in which we work that has created the technol-
ogy to make this possible. 
Work can be moved from one facility to another instantaneously using the tele-
communications network and that worked for Sprint. 
I am not here to prove who the bad guys are. I am here because I am an officer 
of the union that promised people that they had the right to organize and to be mem-
bers of a union, that they had the right not to fear if they did what the law allowed, to 
say that they wanted to be unionized. 
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I am here because we asked the workers at LCF to put their jobs on the line and 
they did. And because the government that promises that they can't be fired for doing 
so has nothing to offer them but the chance to come here to tell their story and to hope 
that having heard their story that you will act to change the system that makes these 
promises we all know won't be kept. 
The practice of union busting is so common in the United States that we have a 
term of union busting, that there are people who make their living as union busters, 
advocating openly to employers that it is cheaper to violate the law because the penal-
ties for having done so are less expensive than the cost of wages and benefits under a 
union contract. I am ashamed to be from the country that allows this. 
But my report is about the freedom to associate and the right to organize and I 
want to focus for a minute on the impact that the actions of employers like Sprint have 
on broader social and economic trends, on the decline in living standards among work-
ing people in our society. 
Just 3 weeks ago, the federal government passed a sweeping new telecommuni-
cations law that ushers in a new competitive age in telecommunications. 
California got a jump start on this legislation when it opened the in-state long 
distance market to competition earlier this year. 
These changes have been heralded as creating millions of new jobs in the grow-
ing information sector of our economy and only time will tell if this is true or just more 
hype from an industry eager to get into new markets. But one thing is certain: unless 
workers in the fast-changing information industry have the right to organize free from 
threat of plant closure and job loss, there will be a constant downward pressure on 
workers' wages and benefits in this industry. 
Historically, telecommunications has been the model of a high-wage, Jiigh-scale 
industry. Advanced technology, a skilled workforce, and a union wage standard have 
translated into productivity improvements and rising wages and benefits for telecom-
munications workers. 
Telecommunications is the only U.S. private sector service industry with a middle-
income wage standard and comprehensive benefits. Average annual earnings of non-
supervisory telecommunications workers are $37,500 annually, which is twice the av-
erage annual earnings of other service sector workers. 
What makes these statistics all the more impressive is that women comprise half 
the telecommunications workforce. In general, the higher proportion of women in the 
work force of an industry or occupation, the less its pay. And yet the telecommunica-
tions industry has been the exception to the rule of low pay for female-dominated work. 
It has also provided access to middle-class jobs for minority workers. According 
to a study by the Washington, D.C., research group The Institute for Women's Policy 
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Research, in 1994 nonsupervisory women in telecommunications earned on average 
$27,040 annually, twice the average earnings of $ 13,000 of all non-supervisory women 
workers in the service sector. 
Minority workers in telecommunications are also an exception to the rule of low 
pay. Nationally, minority workers in other service industries earn low wages, averag-
ing $14,300 annually This is just under the poverty level for a family of four. But 
minority workers in telecommunications average almost twice that much at $26,000 
annually, closer to a middle-class living standard. 
And what explains this pattern? Simply put, it's the high rate of unionization in 
the telecommunications industry Through 50 years of collective bargaining, workers 
in this industry have achieved middle-class wage and benefit levels. Collective bar-
gaining has enabled women and minorities in telecommunications to overcome labor 
market based pay discrimination that sets the standard in other female and minority 
dominated service industries. 
But this model of a high-tech, high-wage union future in the industry is now 
threatened. Non-union telecommunications companies such as Sprint are pursuing a 
low wage, minimal benefits path. They are choosing to compete by undercutting 
middle-income wage standards. 
Women are particularly threatened by these trends. The pay systems that com-
panies like Sprint Long Distance use widened the gap between predominantly female 
and male jobs, undermining the progress achieved through collective bargaining by 
women in our industry 
New developments in the industry threaten the progress made by women and 
minorities also. New technologies and regulatory changes provide opportunities for 
telecommunications employers to follow the low wage, non-union business strategies 
of the rest of the service sector. 
In the face of changes in the industry, it now seems likely that unless union 
representation is extended to the growing non-union segments of the information 
industry, average wages of all telecommunications workers will shift downward. The 
promise of the information age is to create millions of high-skill, high-wage jobs but 
that promise will not be realized if this trend continues. 
I thank you very much for the opportunity to address this panel. 
MR. OTERO: Ms. Wood, thank you very much. Is it appropriate for us to assume 
that this paragraph that you put in your testimony where you allude to the pay of 
minority workers in the telecommunications industry which average about $14,300, 
are you equating this pay with what actually transpired at La Conexion Familiar? Is 
this the kind of wage that was prevalent in the company? 
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MS. WOOD: The $14,300 figure is for the service sector generally. And, yes, if 
you figure it out, L C F was paying about $7.00 an hour. That would be significantly 
less than the average $26,000 paid to most minority workers in telecommunications. 
Or significantly less than the average $27,040 a year paid to female workers in tele-
communications. Certainly I believe one of the reasons that the workers wanted to 
organize and form a union, to improve their wages. To be paid like union workers at 
the Sprint Corporation are paid. 
MR. OTERO: Very well. Thank you very much. 
MS. WOOD: You are very welcome. 
MR. OTERO: We appreciate the clarification. 
Now I would like to invite to the podium Ms. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Director of 
Labor Education Research, New York School of Industrial Labor Relations at Cornell 
University. 
Welcome, Ms. Bronfenbrenner. 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: Thank you. 
Deputy Under Secretary Otero and forum members, thank you for this oppor-
tunity to present the findings of my research on the impact of plant closing and the 
threat of plant closing on the right of workers to organize. 
I am the Director of Labor Education Research at Cornell University. Starting 
in 1988 and continuing to the present, I along with my colleague, Tom Juravich, from 
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst have conducted a series of studies to ana-
lyze which factors contribute most to union success and failure at organizing and first 
contract campaigns. 
Today, this research provides the most comprehensive analysis of the determi-
nant role played by employer behavior, both illegal and legal behavior, in election and 
first contract outcomes and it's the only research that controls for other factors such as 
election background, bargaining unit demographics, union and employer characteris-
tics and union pay 
As you have heard in testimony today, Sprint Corporation engaged in an ex-
tremely aggressive campaign to prevent its workers at La Conexion Familiar from 
organizing. 
Throughout the campaign, Sprint threatened and harassed union supporters, 
used electronic surveillance and coercive interrogations to ascertain and undermine 
union support, vowed to never bargain with the union, and threatened repeatedly to 
shut down operations if the workers voted the union in. 
After the union staged a solidarity day where 100 of 170 workers wore the T-
shirt we saw here today, the company knew for certain the union was going to win the 
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election and they shut La Conexion Familiar down. They even went so far as to fabri-
cate documents to fraudulently claim that the decision to close La Conexion Familiar 
had been made long before the union campaign got off the ground. 
As you have learned here today, even the company did not dispute those facts. 
Neither does the NLRB administrative law judge who found Sprint guilty of more 
than 50 different egregious labor law violations. 
"Yet, despite the mountain of evidence that this was an extremely successful mar-
keting division in the process of expanding operations and that Sprint's sole reason for 
shutting down the operation was to maintain their union-free status, the judge did not 
find that the shutdown itself was in violation of labor law. 
What I can tell you based on my years of study in this area is that Sprint's actions 
during this period represent an all too familiar pattern of aggressive union avoidance 
on the part of American private sector employers. The judge's decision also reflects a 
labor law that in both its standards and enforcement provides weak and ineffectual 
protection of the right to organize free of coercion and intimidation, which is the 
stated mission of the National Labor Relations Act. 
Given the extent and intensity of employer opposition to union organizing, we 
should not be surprised that less than 50 percent of elections in the private sector are 
won by unions and that less than a third of all workers who attempt to organize end up 
under a union collective bargaining agreement. 
This contrasts sharply with the data that we've found about the public sector, 
where win rates average 85 percent and unions win with 85 percent victory margins in 
public sector elections, in a climate where very few if any employers oppose union 
activity. In fact, we found 25 percent of employers in the public sector don't campaign 
against the union whatsoever and only 8 percent run aggressive campaigns. 
What my research shows is that more than three-quarters of private sector em-
ployers run aggressive anti-union campaigns, including some combination of dis-
charges for union activity, threats, surveillance, captive audience meetings, bribes, 
promises of improvements, illegal wage increases, anti-union committees, leaflets, let-
ters, meetings. 
As shown in Table 1 that's attached to my testimony, most of these tactics were 
associated with win rates 10 to 20 percent lower than in units where these tactics were 
not used. And the individual employer tactics, when included in a regression equa-
tion, were found to decrease the probability that the union would win the election by 
between 3 and 22 percent. That's individually In combination, it's much, much higher. 
Under the free speech provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, employ-
ers have virtually unlimited opportunities to aggressively communicate with their 
employees, in letters, in leaflets, in captive audience meetings, and in supervisor one-
on-one conversations. 
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Under our law, these employer communications can and often do include dis-
tortion, misinformation, threats, and intimidation with very little chance of censure or 
penalty by the board or courts. 
Not surprisingly, win rates decline dramatically as the number of employer meet-
ings and letters increase. In fact, the probability of winning the election decreases 1 
percentage point for each additional letter, for each additional meeting. 
In these letters, leaflets, meetings and supervisor one-on-ones, employers tend 
to focus on three primary issues: strikes, dues, fines and assessments, and the threat of 
plant closing. In fact, my research shows that close to 30 percent of all employers 
make the threat of plant closing a primary focus of their campaign. In some cases, like 
La Conexion Familiar, the threat is very clear and direct. In others, it's more subtle, 
with management pointing to other places that shut down when there was a union 
drive. But the impact is consistently negative. 
Where there are no such threats, the win rate is 59 percent. Where those threats 
are, the win rate goes down to 41 percent. 
This aggressive anti-union behavior does not stop when the union wins the cer-
tification election. In fact, the majority of private sector employers continue to aggres-
sively fight the union during the first contract process. They continue to fire workers 
for union activity. They continue captive audience meetings. And they continue to 
threaten to close the plant down. In fact, a quarter of employers even though the 
election is won, threaten the plant will close if there is a union contract. Four percent 
of employers actually shut their plants down rather than operate union. 
In some cases, a third of the cases, the threat of a plant closure successfully 
erodes support for the union and the union is never able to get a first contract. In 
others, such as the laundry workers' campaign in the late '80s in NASDCO in Chelsea, 
Massachusetts, the union wins the election, bargains a first contract, ratifies the agree-
ment, only to be told that corporate headquarters decides to shut the plant down as 
they count the ratification ballots. 
In still others, the threats serve to undermine union bargaining power, weakening 
the agreement but still reaching a settlement. 
These data, however, do not include cases such as La Conexion Familiar, where an 
election is never held because the employer initiates a full or partial plant closing 
before the election takes place. 
We will not have quantitative data on the percentage of union campaigns that never 
get off the ground or never get to an election due to plant closings or serious threat of 
plant closings until we get the results of the 6-month study commissioned by the 
secretariat and unless the secretariat addresses that specific issue. 
i 
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However, we do know from case study data collected by the Industrial Union De-
partment of the AFL-CIO that plant closings and the serious threat of plant closings 
are significant both in number and impact in campaigns that never make it to an 
election. 
For example, we have a 1991 UAW campaign at Flex Cable and Furnace Products 
in Morley, Michigan. First, the employer threatened to shut the plant down if the 
workers unionized. When that threat didn't work, the employer then on the Friday 
before Memorial Day had the workers watch as they padlocked the gate. On the 
Monday after the holiday, they called back those workers who had not supported the 
union campaign, but the union supporters were never called back to work. 
Six months later, in an NLRB settlement, some of the workers got reinstatement, 
some got back pay, but the union campaign had been effectively broken. 
Some employers even go so far as to threaten the NLRB with plant closings. Dur-
ing the 1980s, what was then ACTWU and what is now U N I T E campaigned at 
Farris Fashions in Arkansas. The employer repeatedly made statements such as "If 
you don't quit messing with this union, I will close the plant down, turn it into a 
chicken coop and manure." 
Although the union lost the election, they were able to establish at the NLRB 
hearing that a clear majority of the workers there wanted a union and the Board issued 
a bargaining order supporting the union's argument that it was employer threats and 
coercion that had undermined union support. 
In their post-trial brief, the company went so far as to state, "The Respondent will 
close if it ultimately has to bargain with the union. This is a fact that the union and 
that CGC," the counsel for the General Counsel of the NLRB, "should not doubt." 
What these cases show is that although Sprint's anti-union behavior at La Conexion 
Familiar was extreme, it is not uncommon. I am afraid, Mr. Bertuzzi, that Sprint's 
actions represent not the exception but the norm of employer behavior in the Ameri-
can private sector. 
Under our labor laws, employers have virtually free rein to threaten, to intimidate, 
to bribe, distort, with only minimal penalties for the most gross infractions of the law. 
If they fire half the workforce, as they did at ACTWU's campaign in Lichtenburg in 
Georgia, the worst penalty they face is reinstatement and back pay. There are no 
possibilities for punitive damages. 
If they absolutely refuse to bargain, after bargaining order after bargaining order, 
the worst penalty they face is another piece of paper telling them to cease and desist 
from failing to bargain in good faith and to go forth and bargain in good faith. 
And in the case of La Conexion Familiar, the only penalty was that Sprint be re-
quired to send a letter to employees informing them that they had a right to organize 
and pledging not to harass them in the future. 
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As Arizona Congressman Ed Paster said, this ruling "would be laughable if it were 
not so heartless." 
Professor Corrada is correct that there are legal precedents for shutting down a 
plant for business reasons in the midst of a contentious organizing campaign, but the 
facts in this case speak otherwise. 
Sprint has shut down other facilities for business reasons and in all those cases they 
gave at least 60 days' notice. And in all those cases, they gave the employees an 
opportunity to bid for other Sprint jobs. But in this case, there was no notice and there 
were no jobs offered. 
It is clear that in this case, it was not a business decision, it was a decision based on 
anti-union animus alone. 
In the end, when we hear the testimony of the courageous women at La Conexion 
Familiar, I think we are struck by how workers still manage to fight for unions despite 
the odds. 
The only way that we can ever create the environment envisioned by the drafters of 
the National Labor Relations Act is through significant expansion of both worker and 
union rights and employer penalties in the organizing process. This will require not 
only more vigorous and rapid enforcement of current law, but also serious financial 
penalties and injunctive relief to restrain the most egregious employer violations, par-
ticularly plant shutdowns, and the threat of plant shutdowns. 
It will also require expansion of union access to the workplace in order to counter-
act the captive and coercive nature of employer communication with workers during 
the organizing campaign. 
As CWA President Morton Bahr testified earlier today, these changes need to be 
accomplished not only by significant reform to U.S. labor laws but also by amend-
ments to the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation to provide an en-
forceable code of conduct for countries covered under NAFTA. This code must 
include both restrictions on the ability of companies to shift their operations to other 
countries to avoid unionization and guarantee for the right to organize free of man-
agement interference and intimidation. 
Most important of all, these new codes must include meaningful penalties for the 
violation of those rights. Then and only then will workers be able to exercise their 
democratic rights to have an independent voice of their own choosing to represent 
their interest in the workplace, and then and only then will employers such as Sprint 
Corporation no longer be able to flagrantly violate labor laws at the expense of their 
workers' dignity and well-being. 
I sincerely hope that this forum, along with the 6-month study to be conducted by 
the secretariat, will be an important first step in that direction. 
Thank you. 
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MR. OTERO: Ms. Bronfenbrenner, thank you very much. I have a couple of questions. 
On page 3, you went off your prepared text and you cited some statistics which I 
failed to write down. 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: I condensed it. 
MR. OTERO: Would you please repeat them for me? What you were talking about 
is no surprise that less than half the NLRB elections held this year in this country 
result in union victory and then you went on and cited some — 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: The public sector? 
MR. OTERO: Right. But I was not able to copy that. 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: Okay. 
MR. OTERO: Would you repeat that? 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: Okay. That's in the written testimony by the way; but I'll 
go over it again. It's in the written testimony on page 8. 
MR. OTERO: Page 8? 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: Yes. The second paragraph on page 8. 
In the public sector, win rates are 85 percent across all unions and there are very 
few employers who engage in any kind of employer opposition. 
MR. OTERO: I see. Okay. My second inquiry deals with your intriguing statement 
on page 5 to 6, when you state that "We will not have quantitative data on the percent-
age of union campaigns that never get off the ground or never get to election due to 
plant closings until we get results from the 6-month study." 
And I'm wondering if you're telling us that in your research you have been able to 
quantify that and, if that's the case, could you outline why? 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: I have not done that study to this date. 
MR. OTERO: I see. 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: It can be done. It's very extensive and expensive re-
search. Now, Lance Compa from the secretariat met with me last week to ask my 
advice in designing a study and I explained to him that — and what data we had and 
I explained to him the only way we can find out whether the threat of plant closings 
and plant closings truly affect workers' ability to organize is if we look at campaigns 
that never made it to an election and that can only be done by taking all campaigns 
where a petition was filed but then withdrawn and surveying those campaigns to find 
out whether there was a threat of plant closings or plant closings, which would be 
difficult but not impossible research to do. 
MR. OTERO: That's very good. 
My final question deals with the research that you have done. Is this limited to the 
United States only? 
MS. BRONFENBRENNER: Yes. 
220 
"T 
A P P E N D I X F: T R A N S C R I P T OF PUBLIC F O R U M 
MR. OTERO: Okay. Thank you very much. We appreciate your help. 
I now call to the podium Ms. Giselle Quezada, union steward of Local 9410, 
Communications Workers of America. 
Ms. Quezada, please? 
MS. QUEZADA: Thank you very much. My name is Giselle Quezada and I am 
originally from South America, from Peru. I am a mother of four and I am a union 
steward and also very active in my community. 
Approximately 3 years ago I became a U.S. citizen because I realized that no mat-
ter how active I am I have no voice in this country, so I became a U.S. citizen. 
I want to also tell you how I met the workers. 
I was asked to help organize the workers from La Conexion Familiar, since I was a 
union steward and active in my union and they had lots of questions in regards to how 
does the union work, what are the contracts, and so I went in and helped. 
I was very impressed with the workers. At first, they were there, they had a lot of 
questions and were uncertain about where all this was taking them. But the injustices 
they endured were so great, you heard some of them, that it just empowered them and 
at the same time gave me so much energy that I wish I could share that with you with 
my words. They were empowering. They believed in what they stood for. They 
realized that the struggle was hard but they knew that in this country they had the 
opportunity and the chance to speak out and become part of a union, that that was a 
right they had, that they had the freedom of speech, and that they would be heard. 
And this is amazing when we hear of the stereotyping that takes place, that they'll 
only come here to this country to have children, just to reap the benefits that we have 
to offer, so that they could receive welfare and be taken care of. But yet these workers 
before you all wanted to have a decent job. They wanted to be very much a part of the 
American dream. They wanted to be able to become citizens, make a better living, 
and for their children, offer them the chance and opportunity of a good education. 
And I feel that the workers would have accomplished that if they would have been 
given the opportunity to have a chance to vote. But yet the place was closed, the doors 
were slammed shut in their faces without any regard of who they were or what they were. 
They also were told, well, where else could you get a job? All you do is speak 
Spanish. It's amazing when we stop and think that when they want our business, all of 
a sudden we are valuable, but when we become the workers then we are treated so 
differently with a lot of injustice and put down. 
When we stop and we think what is it that in shutting down La Conexion Familiar 
by Sprint it devastated the community which, by the way, it had promised that it would 
hire people and it would be a part of the community, and they were out there cam-
paigning, selling, they had booths everywhere, saying this is a service, that we care.— 
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Let's look at the name they gave this company, La Conexion Familiar, which in-
volves the family, but yet when it came to the workers and giving them their rights, 
they did not. 
The other part of who I feel feels the greatest part is the children as they watch their 
parents struggle up to this day without jobs. And when we talk about their chances 
and their opportunities, that we are in a land that they can speak out and voice their 
opinions and vote in a union and yet all they look at is having to move from one place 
to another because of the fact that their parents don't have a job, their mom. 
And some of these people, by the way, also contrary to what was said by Sprint to 
the president of my local, Marie Malliett, that they were illegal people, they had people 
in there of high education but the only unfortunate part was they did not speak the 
language, the English language. But yet if it weren't for the fact that they spoke 
Spanish, they wouldn't be employed, they wouldn't have been employed by Sprint to 
begin with. 
I think that I would like to see that we never forget these workers, these workers 
who gave up a great deal, who stood up and believed for their rights, who believed in 
the kind of power and what it took to be able to be recognized and stand up and to be 
treated equally with respect and dignity. 
I hope that we send that message loud and clear from one end of the earth to the 
other that what would happen to them as workers was wrong, unfair, and unjust. 
Now, if I may say a few words in Spanish. 
( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) The fight as workers for us is very difficult 
and it's very rough and tough, but all of us together, we will never be divided. 
Thank you. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you very much y muchas gracias, Ms. Quezada, for your 
presentation. 
And we now come to the final presenter of the day, who by personal decision shifted 
with Mr. del Campo. 
Let me ask Jaime Gonzalez, the field representative of the California Federation of 
Labor, AFL-CIO, to come forward. 
MR. GONZALEZ: ( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) First of all, Mr. Otero, I 
would like to thank you, to share with you and all your colleagues this present 
opinions. 
I bring you greetings from the treasurer, Jack Kenney, who was unable to be here. 
I congratulate you by the way you used this dialogue, utilizing the manipulation of 
La Conexion Familiar. 
(IN ENGLISH) This forum is to examine the impact of sudden plant closures 
on the freedom of association and organizing by workers. The inference and com-
222 
A P P E N D I X F: T R A N S C R I P T OF PUBLIC F O R U M 
mon-sense assumption based on the track record of corporate America is that the 
closing is done in order to prevent the successful organizing by workers. 
My intent is not to repeat the facts as stated by the workers of La Conexion or 
CWA and accepted by any common sense individual who has firsthand experience 
with labor-management relations and is not rendered naive by personal interests or 
potential business contents, but rather to share with you an opinion of possible conse-
quences of further plant closures in an effort to prevent successful worker organizing. 
This opinion is based on an understanding gathered from different comments that 
have been made here today 
It has been stated that there is an interest in reconciling the interests of both work-
ers, unions, and capital corporations. 
The reconciliation of the interests of what under NAFTA are considered units of 
production, not people, not workers, but units of production, and the interests of 
corporations begs the question what interests are more common, what interests are 
more important to our society if a decision had to be made between the interests of 
workers' well-being and corporate profits? 
The answer would depend on what type of society we would want. Some would 
want a society where only a minority would have the opportunity to fulfill aspirations 
and human potential and the majority live in subsistence standards and economic 
insecurity. 
These individuals would choose the interest of corporations in which they have a 
vested interest to live better than the majority. These individuals would welcome 
company unions that are not too radical or threatening. They would want free ap-
plause simply because of their title and not because of the substance or merit of their 
words. 
On the other hand, others would take a more risky attitude. They would choose 
the interests of workers, the people, the families, the majority. These would seek a 
society where people play by the rules according to the law, even if the law is not 
intended to lay a level playing field. 
They would choose to seek a society where the majority of the population, not the 
vested elite minority, get an opportunity to enjoy even the most simple of pleasures, a 
job, respect, dignity, and even some free time and money to nurture a family. 
These individuals would choose the interests of the people, the workers or, as stated, 
the units of production. 
I thank those of you on this board who have a proven record of concern and com-
mitment to the interests of people and not of capital profits for a noble attempt to 
bring justice and credibility to a deal that was not meant to produce justice but rather 
profits. 
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I thank you for refusing to be accomplices to the exploitation of people by un-
checked capital. I share with you this opinion. If justice is not rendered through some 
just resolution to this matter and other corporations continue to close their plants 
suddenly in order to prevent the organizing of workers, there will be other martyrs 
and other workers and their families will suffer as those of La Conexion Familiar. 
But these economic martyrs will become a powerful reminder that workers cannot 
depend on an enlightened government or a benevolent corporate agenda to secure a 
humane society. They will continue to remind us that a humane world for the major-
ity will only come about through worker organization and international solidarity. 
These proceedings will at the very least strengthen and stretch the bond of coop-
eration and solidarity between and among the workers of the Americas. 
( T H R O U G H TRANSLATOR) And those who speak Spanish, I would like to 
remind ypu that everybody looks after their own selves and maybe that's why so many 
of them didn't show up here today. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. OTERO: Thank you very much, Mr. Gonzalez. Please convey my best wishes 
to the Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, Jack Kenney, a long-time friend. 
We have come now to the conclusion of this event, ladies and gentlemen, and be-
fore we all go on our own merry way, I would like to take the prerogative of the chair 
to make a few final comments. 
First of all, I must express my personal appreciation on behalf of the Department of 
Labor to each and every one of the presenters for their brief, useful, insightful, and 
enlightening presentations. Most particularly, I am thankful to each and every one of 
you for the discipline and the cooperation you lent the chair in ensuring the orderly 
process of these proceedings in a manner in which everyone had the opportunity to 
say his or her piece. 
Let me also say that as we prepare to leave this room, everything that has been said 
here by every person must be respected as their own opinions, even if as they spoke 
some felt the opposite viewpoint. That is the beauty of the democracy in which we live, 
that we are able to be tolerant of others in expressing opinions, even on matters as 
controversial and as painful as some of these presentations here have demonstrated 
today. 
We came here with the hope that we would be able to learn more about the impact 
that cases where companies' shutdown have on this very precious right of freedom of 
association. I am going away today enriched by the contributions of each and every 
one of you. I hope that my colleagues from Canada and Mexico feel likewise. 
And, of course, we will pursue this matter to an even greater degree by working 
with our labor secretariat in Dallas in developing more empirical data, not only as 
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these cases have occurred in the United States, but also in Canada and Mexico, and 
we hope that by the end of this summer we will have a report that we could elevate to 
the three ministers of labor who compose the Ministerial Labor Commission under 
the North American Labor Agreement, for it is they, the ministers of our countries 
responsible for labor matters, who are ultimately the judge of what can and should be 
done either collectively or individually by each country with regards to the problems 
at hand. 
Let me say also that on behalf of the Department of Labor we in the United States 
recognize that American labor law is far from perfect. We recognize that there are a 
number of areas that need to be changed. As I said before, Secretary Reich and 
President Clinton sought immediately upon ascension to power to undertake a study 
of these problems and commission a very respectable, highly respectable, commis-
sion, I should say, led by Professor Dunlap to undertake this study. 
We appreciate the constructive criticism and we hope that there will be more for 
only in true transparency can we hope ever to be able to change something that is not 
working very well and make it work even better for the benefit of those who toil every 
day for their livelihood. 
The report of these proceedings will be made public in a few days, hopefully, as 
soon as we get all of the technical aspects and they will be available as a public avail-
able information document through the Department of Labor, specifically through 
our National Administrative Office. If you have looked at all of our materials, the 
telephone number, the fax number and the address of our National Administrative 
Office at the Department of Labor is available in the documentation. 
I would also like to request that those of you who may have developed or who may 
have other information to offer upon return to your homes please feel free to do so. 
The record will not be closed because we have allowed a number of people who did 
not want to present testimony in public to have sent it to us in writing and we will keep 
the record open for the next two weeks so that we can have the opportunity to collect 
even more materials that would be useful to us. 
Finally, let me express my sincere appreciation to my colleagues, Mr. Warren 
Edmondson from Canada and the tripartite delegation that accompanied him here to 
participate in these proceedings; also to Dr. Luis Miguel Diaz of the Mexican Labor 
Secretariat along with the Mexican delegation, for their presence and the contribu-
tions that they have made to this process today. 
I would also like to say thanks to my very effective, very efficient, but silent col-
leagues, Irasema Garza. She does have a tongue, believe me. And my legal advisor, 
Mr. Widom, who is very knowledgeable on matters regarding American labor law. 
H e is in the Solicitor's Office now but he was for many years one of the principal 
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people at the NLRB. They have been able to provide the technical support and the 
necessary legal advice that is required for us to do the job. 
I also would like to express my appreciation to our logistics and public relations 
director, Mr. Bob Z. I can't pronounce his last name. He was responsible in dealing 
with all of the arrangements for this event and also with the press. 
And I think also that we owe a debt of gratitude to the technical people, the inter-
preters, the people who actually wired the room and made sure that technically we 
were up to par. There was not a hitch in the communications today. And all of this 
only happens because of the dedication of these people who are behind the scenes and 
make people like me look very good. 
So I would like to thank everyone. And, of course, I say to them also the check is 
in the mail, you will be getting paid, I hope. 
And to all of you, ladies and gentlemen, unless you have anything else that anyone 
cares to say at this point, I bid you all goodbye. May you have a very safe and happy 
return to your respective homes and thank you very much for being here with us 
today. 
This concludes the forum officially at 5:04 p.m. 
Thank you very much. 
[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m. the forum was concluded.] 
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Chart of Case Files on uConflictos Colectivos de Naturaleza Economica" 
(Case file summaries) 
—Juan Jose Rios Estavillo (38 pages, in Spanish: $5.00) 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AFL: American Federation of Labor 
AU: Administrative Law Judge 
BLS: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
CA: collective agreement 
CAB: Conciliation and Arbitration Board (Mexico) 
CBO: U.S. Congressional Budget Office 
CI MO: Programa de Calidad Integraly Modernizacion (Integral Quality and Mod-
ernization Program) 
CIO: Congress of Industrial Organizations 
CLRB: Canadian Labor Relations Board 
COBRA: Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (United States) 
CSTEC: Canadian Steel Trade and Employment Congress 
CWA: Communication Workers of America 
d/b/a: doing business as 
DWS: Displaced Worker Survey (United States) 
EB: Extended Benefits 
EDWAA: Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Act (United States) 
EL" employment insurance 
P L A N T C L O S I N G S A N D L A B O R R I G H T S 
FLL: Federal Labor Law (Mexico) 
GAO: U.S. General Accounting Office 
HRDC: Human Resources Development Canada 
IAS: Industrial Adjustment Services (Canada) 
IDB: Inter-American Development Board (Mexico) 
ILO: International Labor Organisation 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
IMSS: Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (Mexican Institute for Social Security) 
IN EG I: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informdtica 
INFONAVIT: Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda Para los Trabajadores 
ISSSJE: Instituto de Seguridady Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (Insti-
tute for Security and Social Services for Public Servants) 
JTPA: Job Training Partnership Act (United States) 
LABA: Labour Adjustment Benefits Act (Canada) 
LCF: La Conexion Familiar 
LMAS: Canadian Labour Market Activity Survey 
LMRA: Labor Management Relations Act (United States) 
MSS: Mexican Social Security Institute 
NAALC: North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement 
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L I S T OP A B B R E V I A T I O N S A N D A C R O N Y M S 
NAFTA-TAA: North American Free Trade Agreement Transitional Adjustment 
Allowance 
NAO: National Administrative Office 
NLRA: National Labor Relations Act (United States) 
NLRB: National Labor Relations Board (United States) 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLRA: Ontario Labour Relations Act 
OLRB." Ontario Labour Relations Board 
PARAUSSE: Programa de Accion para Reforzar el Acuerdo de Unidad para Superar la 
Emergencia Economica (Program to Reinforce the Unity Agreement 
to Overcome the Economic Emergency) 
PCMO-" Programa de Calidadde la Mano de Obra (Human Resource Training 
Program) 
PEET." Programa Emergente de Empleo Temporal (Short-Term Employment Program) 
PMMT: Programa de Modernizacion del Mercado Laboral (Labor Market Moderniza-
tion Program) 
POWA: Program for Older Worker Adjustment (Canada) 
PROBECAT: Programa de Becas de Capacitacionpara Trabajadores Desempleados 
PROSSE: Programa de Servicios Sociales Esenciales (Essential Social Services Program) 
RC: representation case 
SAR: Sistema de Ahorropara del Retiro 
SEDESOL: Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (Ministry of Social Development) 
P L A N T C L O S I N G S A N D L A B O R R I G H T S 
SLID: Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 
SNE: Servicio Nacional de Empleo (Mexican National Employment Service) 
STPS: Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social (Ministry of Labor and Social 
Welfare) 
STRM: Sindicato de Telefonistas de la Republica Mexicana 
TAA: Trade Adjustment Assistance 
TRA: trade readjustment allowances 
UAW: United Auto Workers 
UE: United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America 
Ul: Unemployment Insurance 
ULP: unfair labor practice 
WARN: Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (United States) 
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